

Message from the Editorial Board

At the end of our seventh year, the Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy directs its attention to the Changing Nature of Diplomacy. In a new security era and a rapidly globalizing world, diplomacy has moved beyond the confines of traditional state-to-state channels. This issue seeks to contribute to the understanding of informal diplomacy, along with a broader analysis of current diplomatic challenges.

Our keynote author, Joseph V. Montville, pioneered the phrase “Track Two Diplomacy.” In his article, Montville further articulates the application and relevance of track two diplomacy; in particular, he focuses on grassroots approaches to constructing a shared history among post-conflict groups. Avnita Lakhani advocates the value of faith-based diplomacy in confronting the challenges of resolving religious conflict. Robert L. Ostergard, Jr. explores US diplomacy in the age of terrorism and oil dependency. Focusing on the role of individuals, Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz look at the unique leadership potential of the office of the first lady. Finally, Binoy Kampmark looks at the role of media and information technology and its impact on cultural diplomacy.

Our World Leaders Forum continues with Lech Walesa, Former President of Poland and Nobel Prize Laureate, who delivered a speech at Seton Hall in December 2005. We have also included a speech from Congressman Robert E. Andrews, who addressed Seton Hall University in October 2005. On the topic of conflict prevention, Hae S. Kim analyzes the claims regarding the root causes of conflict. On the economic front, Brian N. Zeiler-Kligman examines the impact of multinational enterprises on global trade regimes. This issue concludes with our Book Review section, which surveys a range of recent international affairs literature.

The publication of this issue coincides with the final semester of our Interim Dean, Father Paul Holmes. The Whitehead Journal gratefully acknowledges all of his support and guidance throughout this period of transition, both for the School and the Journal. We would also like to thank the faculty of the Whitehead School, particularly our advisor, Dr. Philip Moremen.

The Editors

Address to Seton Hall University

By Lech Walesa

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much; but I would sooner hope to receive similar applause when I finish. Now, you have set a high challenge for me. How should I earn similar applause when you say farewell to me? You have actually made my situation very hard to begin with, but, revolutionaries always have to face such situations.

Eminences, dear fathers, ladies and gentlemen, dear young people. I come from a country that is not very big, located in the middle of Europe. Many of you might even wonder, having seen some pictures, what they mean. You saw some people shouting here, you saw some people striking there. You might ask yourselves, is this the way to produce bread? So let me explain to you briefly why we actually acted in this way. I only speak about this in order to help you to better understand the challenges of this moment, of today.

The struggle that you have just seen has led us to the situation in which the United States has become the only superpower in the world. For 50 years, we were used to the idea that there were two antagonistic blocs in the world, and the situation was such that we could anticipate certain outcomes. We could foresee the future events because the structures were known to us. Today, however, we have a totally different situation. It is a new situation, and the role of the United States is completely different too.

There are no doubts, whatsoever, that you are the military leader of the world. There are no doubts, whatsoever, that you are economic leaders of the world. But, are you equally the political leader of the world? I have the right to say such things straightforwardly, especially here. After all, this university gave me an honorary doctoral degree. Therefore, listen to what I have to say; though, do not take what I am saying as showing off my wisdom. On the contrary, I do not even know whether the things I am saying are right. The only thing I can do now is to share my insights and perspectives with you, and you, being the superpower, will have the responsibility to choose the best perspectives in order to be the true leader to the world.

Lech Walesa, former President of Poland and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, visited Seton Hall University on December 1, 2005.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, there are places around the globe that somehow experience more than other places, and my homeland happens to be such a location. People who happen to be living in such places, due to that kind of experience, have learned to anticipate, better than others, the threats and opportunities of the world.

The difficulties that Poland has faced resulted from the fact that we have two powerful neighbors, the Russians and the Germans. As you may well know, they are two nations that enjoy military tourism, and they visit and revisit one another from time to time. Of course, in the older times, when the technology was quite low, they would travel by horse-driven carts, and naturally would take the shortest way, that is, across Poland, across my country. Once they entered Poland, they would realize that it is really a beautiful country, so they would decide to stay. Most recently, after the Second World War, we ended up in the zone of influence of the Soviets. We had been involved in the fighting along all the possible fronts of the Second World War, and we had shed almost all our blood during this war. So by the end of it, we had hardly any strength to oppose the installment of the Soviets. Some senior citizens may recall it; younger ones can see it in history books.

The difficulties that Poland has faced resulted from the fact that we have two powerful neighbors, the Russians and the Germans. As you may well know, they are two nations that enjoy military tourism, and they visit and revisit one another from time to time.

We, the Polish people, had tried to warn the world before the outbreak of the Second World War, actually suggesting that perhaps we should anticipate the German attack. And how did the world reply to us? Well, we heard, it is merely a local conflict—we are not going to die for that. The world did remember the Polish warning once the war actually reached London and Paris, but it was too late at that point. At the end of the Second World War, we were trying to tell the powerful of the world that Stalin was tricking them, that half of the globe would end up in the embrace of the communist system. And how did the world reply to us then? It replied by breaking off diplomatic relations with the Polish legal government in exile, and establishing relations with the government that Stalin imposed on Poland. Actually Stalin himself, once he had succeeded in subduing Poland, loved to say that the communist system fit Poland like a horse saddle would fit a pig.

It took us fifty years of struggle in order to improve the errors that were committed at the end of the Second World War. At first, in 1940s and 1950s, we tried to oppose communism with arms; however, with the Soviet support, any such attempt was suppressed with bloodshed. In the 1960s and 1970s, we tried to oppose communism through strikes and protests in the street. We would fight, you know, in separate social groups—sometimes they were students revolting, then there were workers revolting—however, all such attempts were continuously suppressed.

Basing ourselves on our previous failures, we found a concept that we thought would allow us an effective struggle. Do not forget, it was demonstrated to us, all the time, that we stood no chance to liberate our country. There were 200,000 Soviet soldiers based on the Polish territory alone, based there permanently; another million Soviet soldiers in the neighboring countries, and nuclear missiles all around. Those who were a little bit sensible, realizing the circumstances, would postpone their struggle for independence, for freedom, for some later and better days. At that time, we had the opportunity to discuss the situation with the many powerful people of the world—presidents, prime ministers, royalty—and we were trying to tell them that we were totally fed up with the oppression of the Soviets; that we wanted to free ourselves from it. We tried to tell them that we were convinced enough to win, to get rid of that oppression, that we would win. And the powerful people of the world, when they heard us, would enter that information into their computers. They naturally added the information about the number of tanks, the number of soldiers, and the interests involved; and the wiser the computer, the quicker it answered: no chance whatsoever—at the risk of a world war. Being so discouraged, we felt helpless and actually gave up any efforts. So much so that, you know, in the twenty years I had been involved in my dissident activity, I had managed to recruit ten people out of a 40 million person Polish nation. You would find other similar dissident centers in Poland in the number of five or ten people at most, not more; and even fewer of such dissident circles in other communist countries, or in some of them, none.

At that point, something incredible happened. Do you realize, that at this point, we were coming to the end of the second millennium of Christianity? Just when the world felt totally helpless, we were given the gift of a pope who was a Pole, and a year after he was elected pope, this Pole came over to Poland. All of the world looked with much astonishment at Poland, a communist country, asking themselves, “what is happening there?” Almost all of the Polish people participated with enthusiasm in the meetings with the pope. Even the communists and the secret police learned how to cross themselves. Of course, they would not say the proper words, but they would go like 1-2-3-4-5. At least they would cross themselves.

A year after the pope’s departure from Poland, I was able to recruit, out of the 10 original people, 10 million people.

A year after the pope’s departure from Poland, I was able to recruit, out of the 10 original people, 10 million people. I did not suddenly become any wiser, nor did I become any richer within that year, but what happened was that the Holy Father awoke the nation. Let us make one point clear. The Holy Father did not encourage us to fight or to struggle; he did not encourage us to get involved in any conspiracy. The point was, the words he said were so convincing that each of us had to reflect about our own self. At the same time, we also had the opportunity to look around

and see how many of us there were, and what happened was that those awakened nations let themselves be led downstream, through strikes and negotiations, to freedom.

The Soviets, realizing the situation, simply panicked. They also noticed that the Pope was immortal—he was shot at, but not killed. They realized that more and more nations were awaking. At that time, one of the big Soviet leaders remembered that there was some minor political activist, somewhere in Siberia, who when having a bit of vodka would talk quietly, so as not to be overheard, that communism needed remodeling. Certainly, he would not have said it openly when sober, because he would have been too afraid. So, he was brought over to Moscow and appointed first secretary of the Communist Party. This secretary, seeing communism falling to pieces, decided that he would propose *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

All of us who were involved in the struggle against communism knew perfectly well that communism was not a reformable system. We encouraged his remodeling, because we knew that if he touched the foundations of the whole construction, it would collapse on his head. This is exactly what happened. He failed in every attempt that he did. Neither did he reform communism, nor did he reform the Soviet Union, nor did he reform the Warsaw Pact—a total failure. But that is exactly where his success is. I am telling you about this so that you will not be discouraged with any failures in your life. If you mean well, and if you head in the right direction, even with your failures, you can end up with a Nobel Prize.

Of course, things were not so smooth and easy. At one point, this poor secretary got tired and decided to go on holiday. His deputy president, Yanayev, and his prime minister let the army and the tanks into the streets in order to prevent the collapse of communism. However, once again, we were extremely lucky. There happened to be yet another Russian man, who climbed on a tank, gave a very good speech, and managed to stop the soldiers and the tanks. Well, even today we have not decided whether he did it sober or drunk, because his name was Boris Yeltsin. So if any of you wanted to attribute precise credit to all of the factors that contributed to the final success, we should admit that more than 50 percent of the credit should go to the Holy Father and 30 percent to Solidarity and Lech Walesa. Of course, I could have attributed more to myself, but I want to be on good terms with the one up there.

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Ladies and gentlemen, I brought this historical part up in order to tell you about our perspective on today's world. There are certain things that we see. The first of them is that this is a very special generation. Not only do we witness in our lifetime the beginning of a new century and of a new millennium, but also, we are witnessing the beginning of a new era. From the era of divisions, borders, and hostility, we are passing into an era of intellect, information, and globalization. No other generation

before us faced such an opportunity. To meet such an opportunity for peace, prosperity, and equal opportunity requires that we notice that the institutional framework that we have in today's world is unfit for the new era. We even require a re-definition, a more precise definition, of the position of the only superpower that we have in today's world, that is the United States. We must also notice that the United Nations, an institution of great merit, does not actually serve its purpose in today's world.

All of us who were involved in the struggle against communism knew perfectly well that communism was not a reformable system.

We also need to notice other things, for example, in the sphere of the economy. This economic system worked in a factious world, as long as we were confined within the borders of particular countries in antagonistic blocs. Today, however, we need to observe that less than 10 percent of mankind has in their pockets more than 90 percent of the wealth of the globe. As for the democratic principles, we need to observe that, as long as we have counted one individual, one vote, whoever managed to group more individuals won any election. However, when we enter the globalized world, many different institutional structures, both American and European, will be joined by China. The Chinese, being starved for democracy, will naturally insist on having votes or referenda on any decision. Can you think that you might win any referendum or vote against the Chinese? Imagine that at one point they decide that Europe should join China, for example. They can vote it over. Once again, questions of this kind are also your responsibility, the responsibility of the superpower. So the alternatives in this respect are either we reform the democratic principles, or every family has at least 30 children.

So as you see, ladies and gentlemen, there are so many open questions, questions regarding the shape of the structures we establish within the context of the global world. Europe, for example, proposed a constitution. It has not been adopted as yet, which is just as well. What was the European proposal in this constitution? Very simple. Freedom of the individual, freedom of association of any type, economic freedom, no subsidies whatsoever, meaning that the free market will deal with everything. It also decided that questions of values, and of God, should be restricted to the private sphere of the individual. It seems like an appealing concept, but the last appealing one of the old era.

It is unfit for the new one, because the higher the civilization, the higher the technological progress; the bigger the territory, the more badly we need values. Let us raise and educate an individual of conscious, and I mean in every sphere—a union activist, a politician, a capitalist owner. We can give you two examples of what might happen when we only base ourselves on freedom. One of the examples can be seen in the Ukraine.

I was there last year helping them solve the problems during the Orange

Revolution. What did I see when I was there? People had the freedom, the liberty, to elect the president; they had the freedom to elect the members of the Parliament. They simply did not want to get involved. They would not participate in the elections. They would not organize themselves in political parties. What happened then was that an oligarchy took over power in Ukraine and would not share it with anyone. I suppose this is an inevitable end to any solution if we just base ourselves on freedoms. If such a thing happens, how will democracy respond; how will it react? In this respect, we can cite the example of Poland.

If we see any distortion of our public life, we propose parliamentary commissions. So I imagine that if we have a life of this kind, we will have nothing but commissions. One superior commission over another commission, investigating into a commission, which is investigating into yet another commission. These commissions will contribute to more chaos, actually, than they will clarify things. Those commissions will just consume all our taxpayer money, but will hardly improve anything, and I foresee the final outcome in twenty years. We would need at least five police officers controlling each individual, making sure that this individual does not go astray, or get involved in the wrong political activities or makes sure this individual pays taxes, et cetera. On the other hand, an individual of conscience, that is a very cheap means of control and very, very effective.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, the final word is yours; you are the superpower, and the world wants you to remain the superpower. That is why you will have the decisive voice in resolving many things; that is, what should be the grounds on which we establish any structure in this new world. If you resist, if you do not want to be the superpower, why do you not share this position with Poland? We will try to cope with the responsibility. Well, here I would like to conclude with my encouraging and provocative remarks. I am not certain I chose the right topics, but I hope it was insightful. Thank you.

Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History

by Joseph V. Montville

These are good times for the concept of track two diplomacy, the unofficial, constructive interaction between adversaries in political conflicts. The search engine Google, for instance, lists thousands of entries for the term. In the fall of 2005, moreover, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, one of the largest American grant makers in the field of international peace and security, devoted the cover story of its flagship magazine, *The Carnegie Reporter*, to track two diplomacy. In “Track II Diplomacy: Averting Disaster?,” that issue also highlights the work of three practitioners of track two diplomacy, whose activities demonstrate the range and significance of that approach.

The first is Harold Saunders, the most senior of track two diplomats. A former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, Saunders helped President Carter negotiate the Camp David peace agreement between President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel in 1978. Since leaving official, “track one” life, Saunders has participated in track two dialogue between Russian and American civilians during the Dartmouth conference series and, since 1993, has been running an unprecedented, sustained track two process to support democracy building in Tajikistan. Michael Krepon, founding president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC has been practicing successful track two diplomacy for years between India and Pakistan on nuclear nonproliferation. Susan Shirk, a deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific in the Clinton administration, is now working on track two diplomacy from her base as the director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego, and was also the founder of the North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a track two program that has been bringing together representatives of China, Japan, Russia, North and South Korea, and the United States since 1993. Shirk is currently researching the way track two diplomacy affects the perceptions and moderates the policies of track one actors; builds informed back channels useful in crises; injects policy ideas into track one discussions; and influences the creation of permanent institutions to carry out the functions of the unofficial dialogue

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process.

Thus, the unofficial, high-level dialogues and problem-solving workshops of track two diplomacy have received validation from significant sectors of the philanthropic foundation, national academic and think-tank world, several of whose members have been senior track one officials in the US State and Defense Departments and in governments overseas. Outside of the US, there has been extensive use of track two methods to advance dialogue among the parties to the Northern Ireland conflict, in Africa and the Balkans, and a more than three-decade investment of track two diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

In the twenty-five years since the concept first appeared in print,¹ track two diplomacy has taken on a life of its own. This, of course, begs the question: What exactly is track two diplomacy?

In “Foreign Policy According to Freud,” an article I co-authored for *Foreign Policy* magazine in 1981, track two diplomacy was rather simply defined as

*unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open-minded, often altruistic...strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness.*²

As might be inferred from its title, most of the article focused on the political psychology of violent conflict, and its roots in the wounds to self-concepts of peoples and nations.

In a 1987 essay entitled “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” I laid down a more detailed definition of track two diplomacy that built on that earlier work.³

It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, formal, “track one” government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationships.

*Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders...by exploring possible solutions out of the public view and without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage. Track two diplomacy seeks political formulas or scenarios that might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of the parties to a particular dispute. On its more general level, it seeks to promote an environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.*⁴

A third element of track two diplomacy presented in “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” is cooperative economic development that would provide “incentives, institutional support, and continuity to the political and psychological processes.”⁵ Although the economic dimension is not the focus of this essay, a new book, *Strategic Foreign Assistance: Civil Society in International Security*, by A. Lawrence Chickering, Isobel Coleman, P. Edward Haley, and Emily Vargas-Baron, provides a very encouraging integration of development strategy and civil-society building within a track two framework. The book is especially exciting because of its special focus on the

overwhelming empirical evidence that education of girls and empowerment of women is the most powerful engine of economic growth in traditional societies.

For the rest of this essay, I will concentrate on the second component of track two diplomacy mentioned above; that is, trying to create an environment in public opinion that makes it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace. It is the most neglected part of the track two concept, and, in my opinion, the most promising for real peacebuilding.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE HEALING OF HISTORY: A BRIEF LOOK AT NORTHERN IRELAND

Two days before Saint Patrick's Day this year, Duncan Morrow, chief executive of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council, spoke at a program organized in Washington, DC, by the US Institute of Peace. An energetic and articulate young man, Morrow could barely conceal his disillusion with the peace process in Northern Ireland, eight years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Noting that 95 percent of Northern Ireland's children attend segregated schools, he made the point that the province is still significantly divided between its Protestant and Catholic populations. He said, "we have, it seems, agreed after thirty years to stop [the killing], but not to share [the future]."⁶

Duncan Morrow's words recalled Paul Arthur, a brilliant political analyst at Ulster University, a Catholic trusted by Protestants, and a determined laborer in the fields of Northern Ireland track two diplomacy. In 1997, Arthur assessed the impact of the Catholic hunger strikers in Belfast's The Maze prison in 1980–1981.⁷ He said those who died in the strike followed the long tradition of Irish Catholics who had given their lives in the fight for dignity and justice against British rule. Even though the Irish Republican Army was ideologically atheist and wedded to a Marxist-Leninist belief in revolutionary violence at the time, the air was thick with Catholic symbols of martyrdom. An iconography emerged of men expiring in the posture of crucifixion, with barbed prison wire used for crowns of thorns, and images of the Virgin Mary, as in the Pieta, holding her sacrificed son.

In a book chapter, entitled "Justice and the Burdens of History," I wrote

*The sense of persecution and loss, and almost spiritual and existential feeling of injustice, is the substance of the memory of the hunger strike, but also of the [1846-48] potato famine, and Cromwell's armies in the 17th century....It is well that the 1998 peace agreement was made on Good Friday.. But the Resurrection for the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland has yet to take place.*⁸

Furthermore, in the just cited chapter, I described what I believe is the critical role of the "acknowledgement-contrition-forgiveness transaction" between groups and nations that have gone through violent political conflict and experienced the traumatic losses associated with it. In brief, the people subjected to violent attack develop a victimhood psychology that is, in fact, a natural psychological individual and group defense against the possibility of further attack and loss by the aggressor

group or nation. The psychology of victimhood is sustained by a fear of further aggression and a sense that the attackers have no moral values that the victims can recognize. There is, therefore, no possible basis for trust between the two sides. Thus, unless the aggressors acknowledge the injustice of their actions against the victims, and show they are very much aware of—and ideally openly regret—the losses their victims suffered, no reconciliation or real peace is possible, no matter how many treaties or so-called peace accords are signed by political leaders.

Almost three years ago, a conference on the healing of historic wounds in Derry/Londonderry in Northern Ireland gathered together Protestants and Catholics, Israelis and Palestinians, and Jewish children of Holocaust victims and the children of Nazi perpetrators. Among the attendees was a Northern Irishman who had been blinded by a bomb, and others who had been wounded in the “troubles.” Other participants included the infamous Paddy McGee, who had been convicted for his leading role in trying to blow up a Conservative Party conference in Brighton, England, and Martin Bormann, Jr., son of the convicted Nazi war crimes perpetrator and godchild of Adolf Hitler.

One of the conference organizers was a Protestant woman who is completely devoted to peacemaking in Northern Ireland. Her husband was an officer with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), at that time the almost 90 percent Protestant Northern Ireland police force. He telecommuted for the RUC from home doing administrative chores because he had been seriously disabled in an Irish Republican Army attack on his police post, as had his father, also an RUC police officer. Worse, no Catholic had ever expressed regret or apologized for the losses she had lived with for so many years. Not even Protestant friends spoke much about it, the woman said—it is not the custom for people in the North to speak about their feelings.

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What the woman from Derry/Londonderry was describing is what political psychologists would call a culture of repression of affect or emotion. People defend against the pain of loss by refusing to talk about it. But as anyone who has studied basic psychology knows, failure to speak about emotions assures that there is no movement toward letting go of losses, and, in fact, results in a form of stagnation or paralysis, socially and in the political process. Eight years after the Good Friday Agreement, this was the situation Duncan Morrow seemed to be describing.

I cannot offer any detailed proposals on how to move the culture of avoidance and denial in Northern Ireland toward a process that is more creative and moves toward eventual reconciliation. I would not even attempt to suggest a strategy without extensive consultation with English, Irish, and Scottish historians, as well as historically inclined Catholic and Protestant theologians. The goal of this sort of rolling consultation, elsewhere called a walk through history, would be not unlike that

of a psychoanalytic process. In the latter, a therapist works with a patient to try to reclaim or excavate memories of events or relationships that may be buried deep in the unconscious, events that have influenced significantly the person's sense of identity and inspired defensive or dysfunctional behaviors. Another metaphor that psychoanalysts use is the peeling back of successive layers of an onion to discover memories and history that cause us to act in certain ways we do not understand. The object is a form of liberation through cognition—through knowing and understanding. The new knowledge helps individuals and—one hopes—nations to understand why they behave the way they do, and through this new knowledge to offer choices to the newly enlightened person or nation—whether to continue the old behavior or to try another, literally more enlightened, path.

This uncompleted mourning has kept peoples and nations frozen in their sense of existential injustice and victimhood.

The subject matter for an Anglo/Irish walk through history would certainly start with the Reformation and the religious wars in Europe. It would have to cover the Puritan revolution and its manifestation in Britain, the politics of religious warfare in Britain and Ireland, the establishment of the Ulster plantation, Oliver Cromwell's military expeditions in Ireland, and the consequences of British rule in the island of Ireland down through history. The citizen-scholars would lead the walk and identify those moments most painful to the memory of their peoples, which would become the agenda for healing. The aim would be to have Protestants and Catholics, English, Scots, and Irish courageously identify acts of aggression by their own sides and undertake the appropriate acknowledgement-contrition-forgiveness transactions. It may sound simplistic and formulaic to the unsentimental intellectual or politician, but it *always* has a major impact on victims.⁹ The ultimate goal is to disseminate, with dignity and sensitivity, to the conflicted publics, the new knowledge that offers the opportunity to work through to completion a mourning process that may be literally centuries old. This uncompleted mourning has kept peoples and nations frozen in their sense of existential injustice and victimhood. A walk through history can help to free and heal them.¹⁰

ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND HEALING THE JEWISH-CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP

Probably the most famous success of the track two dialogue process was the Oslo Accords of 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The contacts began as an unofficial initiative by a Norwegian scholar, but, by the time it was finished, that track two dialogue had transitioned into full-blown track one diplomacy, finalized with a handshake on the White House lawn between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO head Yasser Arafat. Although it is fashionable these days to consider the Oslo Accords to have ultimately failed, they

achieved some extraordinary breakthroughs in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship—up to and including the acceptance by former prime minister Ariel Sharon of the principle of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

In a broader sense, however, the Oslo agreements underlined the limitations of track two dialogue. Efforts made at the leadership level must be pursued in conjunction with a strategy to create support in public opinion for peacemaking. As Saunders often says, governments sign peace treaties, but only the people in conflict can make peace. The personal relationships between the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Oslo were remarkable—many of them had met in unofficial dialogues for years. At Oslo, for instance, a Palestinian participant became seriously ill and was thought to be near death. The press reported Israelis in tears at his hospital bed. Fortunately he recovered, and he continued in the negotiations.

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This anecdote illustrates how human beings on opposite sides of a conflict can develop close personal relationships. Indeed, this proclivity of humans for bonding is one of the greatest assets for the track two dialogue process. The dilemma remains of how such trust can be transferred, both to top leadership levels, where trust, vision, and courage are often very rare commodities, and to the publics that must be convinced to consider trusting their traditional enemies.

As in the case of Northern Ireland, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs a very careful and comprehensive walk through history. It cries out for an inventory of historic hurts, of traumatic losses, of painful injustices—all of the unhealed wounds of history that keep the conflict today in an almost frozen state. We experience a roller coaster of emotional highs but mostly deeply depressing lows—Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn, Rabin assassinated, Sharon walking on the Temple Mount, Arafat blessing the Second Intifada, an Israeli cabinet minister murdered gang-style outside his Jerusalem hotel room, blowing up a Passover Seder in a big hotel, Hamas Shaykh Ahmad Yassin vaporized in his wheelchair by an Israeli helicopter rocket, armored bulldozers leveling houses in refugee camps and Rafah, and frequent targeted assassinations or suicide bombers on buses and in markets.

On March 3, 2006, Doron Rosenblum wrote in the Israeli daily Haaretz:

Israel, going on 60, is still at the same mental stage as the day it was born. It is still guided by raw, existential fear. It is still searching for the most elementary thing in human and national life: protection and shelter, preferably behind a nice brave soldier – the one with the biggest gun. Today, reflecting on our response to the rise of Hamas [victory in the parliamentary elections], it is hard to say whether existential dangers have shaped our primeval mentality or this mentality plays a role in cultivating those dangers.

This wonderfully clear and powerful statement captures the critical challenge of a track two strategy in its broadest conception. I will devote the rest of this essay to

some ideas of how to ease the Israeli Jewish worry over survival as well as calm the Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim anger over insult and injustice, and also highlight the special role of the Christian West in this triangular, Abrahamic relationship. Taken collectively, these ideas and activities, many of which are already underway, are a potential answer to the challenge of how to create an environment in Jewish, Muslim, and Christian public opinion that might make it safer for leaders to take risks for peace. There is also the not inconsiderable side benefit of dealing with the threat of terrorism at its roots.

Jews and Christians

Doron Rosenblum's declaration that Israel's existential fear for its survival has not changed in the sixty years since its founding is directly related to the Jewish experience in Christian Europe. The memory of the Holocaust is a constant specter of Ashkenazi Jewish consciousness. How could it not be? Although Hitler's policy was unprecedented in its obscenity, it was not unique for Jewish populations in Christian majority countries through the ages. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Church dogma systematically condemned the Jews as the killers of Jesus Christ. Saint Augustine had written that Christians should not kill the Jews, but keep them in a state of perpetual humiliation, so that they never forget the crime they committed. In fact, the Catholic Church annulled the blanket, perpetual condemnation of Jews for the killing of Christ only in 1965, as a result of the Second Vatican Council, a full twenty years after the end of the Holocaust.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cries out for an inventory of historic hurts, of traumatic losses, of painful injustices—all of the unhealed wounds of history that keep the conflict today in an almost frozen state.

James Carroll has documented the systematic persecution of Jews by Christians in his masterful *Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History*.¹¹ To start on the walk through history necessary to healing this crisis, Christians must be aware of the structural prejudice against Jews, rooted in the language of the New Testament, especially the Gospel of John. Christians need to know the origins of anti-Judaism, which eventually segued into racist anti-Semitism in Europe. Christians need to be able to discuss this history with Jews and to begin the process of persuading them that it may be safe to stop worrying about survival.

Christians and Muslims

A Christian discussion of this terrible heritage would provide Muslims some context for understanding the motivation of Jewish nationalists in Europe, or Zionists, to establish a home in Palestine. The irony here is that Islam never had the pathological prejudice against Jews that Christianity did. Jews and Christians were recognized by Muhammad as "people of the book," who shared with Muslims the

belief in the one, shared God, and who were joined together in the fight against paganism and its many false gods. Reza Aslan's *No god But God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam* provides a brilliant and accessible study, addressed to Christian and Jewish audiences, about the meaning and beliefs of Islam. This book places particular emphasis on the Prophet's respectful thoughts on Judaism, and the Torah, which was God's first revelation to humankind.

Publishing basic information on religious values and history helps fight ignorance and negative stereotypes, as well as deliberate distortions.

The anti-Semitism in the Hamas charter, an understandable preoccupation of Israelis and Westerners, is entirely imported from European Christians and is used by Hamas as a psychological weapon against a militarily superior Israel. It has no basis in the Koran. Track two peacemakers need to be thoroughly informed about this, to be able to debate extremist Jews who believe and propagate the line that Islam is innately anti-Semitic and to debate extremist Muslims who distort Islam by making it sound anti-Semitic. Another very important book on this subject is Abdulaziz Sachedina's *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism*,¹² which grounds such basic human values as freedom of conscience, the dignity of the individual, God's love for all his creatures, and the central place of mercy, compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the Koran. Works such as these would help Muslims, Christians, and Jews, and have informed discussions about the shared values in the Abrahamic traditions, and therefore understand the basis for mutually respectful relationships among the three communities.

Muslims and Jews

Publishing basic information on religious values and history helps fight ignorance and negative stereotypes, as well as deliberate distortions. Beyond that, research and programs that seek to recover from the past evidence of great achievements and cultural distinction are important for reconstructing a good sense of self for peoples and nations who have been battered by history and are burdened by a psychology of victimhood. Such was the goal of a project I launched from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, in 2000 with support from the Carnegie Corporation. It was called "Israel, the Palestinians and Reviving the Memory of Muslim Spain." The idea was to creatively confront the deep pessimism affecting the peace process, as well as the sense that Jews and Arabs could never build community together or even coexist. The knowledge base for the project was the significant amount of scholarship that documented life in Al-Andalus, as the Muslims called it; the name survives in modern Spain as Andalusia. As the project developed it came to embrace the entire medieval Mediterranean and drew on valuable studies of the period, including the monumental five volume *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the World as Portrayed in the Documents of*

the Cairo Geniza, by S.D. Goitein.¹³

The goal of the project was to disseminate to Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim audiences, through a variety of multimedia initiatives, a broad consciousness of the period between the eighth and fifteenth centuries CE when Jews, Muslims, and Christians created a level of civilization, especially in Spain, that was the envy of Europe and compared favorably to Constantinople and Baghdad at their height. In Al-Andalus, the Muslim rulers observed the literal tolerance of the Koran toward Judaism and Christianity, and created an environment for cooperation and creativity that preserved ancient knowledge and added immeasurably to new knowledge in the arts and sciences, medicine, engineering, philosophy, theology, and literature. The project has produced a multi-authored book by internationally recognized medieval specialists on Muslim and Jewish collaboration in mathematics and science, medical practice and ethics, the modes of commerce and trade among merchants of different religions, the influence of Sufi mysticism on secular Hebrew poetry, and politics and social relations. The project also plans eventual historical tourism to Al-Andalus, as well as other relevant sites in North Africa and the cultural remnants of the Norman Kingdom in Sicily, for Israeli and Arab high school and university students, journalists, playwrights, musicians and composers, and artists.

Research and programs that seek to recover from the past evidence of great achievements and cultural distinction are important for reconstructing a good sense of self for peoples and nations who have been battered by history and are burdened by a psychology of victimhood.

Other scholars are conducting projects on the Jewish-Christian-Muslim shared fatherhood in the Patriarch Abraham. William Ury, of the Harvard Project on Negotiation, is working on a visually imaginative initiative called Abraham's Walk, which will recreate the migration of Abraham and his followers from ancient Haran in Turkey, where Genesis says God first called to him, to Hebron, where he is buried. The walk, estimated to take 55 days, is interspersed with placards that note the variations in place names along the route and where the paths diverge according to Biblical and Koranic sources. The purpose of the walk is to root firmly in public opinion, through constant satellite television coverage, the shared origins of the monotheistic religions. There will be special focus on Hebron, where the Hebrew Bible and Koran tell us that the alienated sons of Abraham—Isaac representing the Jews and Ishmael representing the Muslims—returned to bury their father together. The plan is to televise this powerful symbolism to the world.

Another project that will contribute to the shared Muslim-Christian-Jewish walk through history is the publication, translation, and dissemination of the book, *Vision of Abraham*, by Edward Miller, an Orthodox Jewish lawyer from New York.¹⁴ The

narrative begins in Ur in Mesopotamia, where Abraham was born, and continues to the founding of the State of Israel. The book is beautifully illustrated with maps and high-resolution photographs of coins with Hebrew and Arabic script. The text has emerged through close consultation with Muslim religious leaders in Palestine, and Orthodox rabbis in Israel and the United States. The book is also the basis for future media distribution, through documentary films, free distribution in Israeli and Palestinian schools, and a possible feature film that tells a story of a Jew and a Muslim in sixteenth century Toledo, Spain.

Additionally, I have written a book, *Children of Abraham: An Understandable Guide to Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, aimed at middle school students.¹⁵ Commissioned by the New York–based Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, the book will include an appendix grid comparing similar beliefs and religious practices of the three religions. *Children of Abraham* will be made available to students both in the US and abroad. Yet another media project that will contribute to this walk through history is Jacob Bender's *Reason and Revelation*, a series of three separate one-hour documentaries on the medieval intellectual giants: Averroes, a Muslim, Maimonides, a Jew, and Thomas Aquinas, a Christian.¹⁶ Each made enormous contributions to the challenge of reconciling the demands of faith with those of science and rational philosophy in the Middle Ages and together contributed greatly to the foundation of the Renaissance in Europe.

A final example of research and scholarly engagement through dialogue on the path to the Abrahamic family reunion, is a program at Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California, the site of serious and successful track two engagement on the psychology of the US-Soviet relationships in the 1980s. These three four-day workshops on Muslim, Christian, and Jewish fundamentalism are designed to identify the origins of fundamentalist doctrines in each of the monotheist religions and apply what is known about large group psychology and historic trauma to see if there is a way to minimize the more militant and aggressive aspects of fundamentalism. The ultimate goal is to build a strong alliance of participants in the Jewish-Christian-Muslim workshops scheduled to conclude at the end of this year and lay the basis for a committed future relationship based on shared ethical and social values—in a sense to accept and celebrate the belief that we are all God's children and equally valuable and valued.

CONCLUSION

While it may seem that the forgoing is just a list of disconnected activities that may or may not have an impact on public thinking in Israel and Palestine and in the broader universe of Jewish-Christian-Muslim relationships, I strongly believe that these projects, and others like them, can make an important contribution to healing historic wounds in the Abrahamic relationship. Healing this relationship will make a valuable contribution towards a more peaceful world and build a solid foundation from which relationships with other religious and spiritual practices can be mended.

It is obvious that much of the track two diplomacy activity aimed at healing

history is ad hoc and not coordinated to have the greatest impact on regional and world public opinion. To have a greater impact, a well-financed center on track two diplomacy must be established, where the material and human resources to make the greatest impact on peacemaking will be coordinated and pursued with intellectual rigor, psychological focus, and human passion. This center would also train young professionals to carry on this work and create similar centers in different parts of the world. In this way, the contributions of track two diplomacy can be solidified and extended, a legacy for all of our children.

Notes

¹ William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," *Foreign Policy* 45 (Winter 1981–1982): 145–157.

² *Ibid.*, 155.

³ In John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 5–20; also reprinted in Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius, eds., *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II Unofficial Diplomacy at Work* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 161–175.

⁴ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162–163.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁶ Duncan Morrow, "A Shared Future: The Democratic Imperative," USIP Seminar, Washington DC, March 15, 2006. Available at http://www.community-relations.org.uk/about_the_council/background_info/duncan_morrow_speech/washington/ (Accessed May 31, 2005).

⁷ Paul Arthur, "Reading? Violence: Ireland," in David E. Apter, ed., *The Legitimization of Violence* (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), 234–291.

⁸ Joseph V. Montville (2001), "Justice and the Burdens of History," in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed., *Reconciliation, Coexistence, and Justice in Interethnic Conflict: Theory and Practice* (New York: Lexington Books, 2001), 129–143.

⁹ For elaboration of this theory on healing history, readers may consult Joseph V. Montville, "Psychoanalytic Enlightenment and the Greening of Diplomacy," in Volkan, et al, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, 177–192; see also Joseph V. Montville, "The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution," in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 112–127; and and Joseph V. Montville, "Reconciliation as REALPOLITIK: Facing the Burdens of History in Political Conflict Resolution," in Daniel Rothbart and Karyna Korostelina, eds., *Identity, Morality, and Threat: Studies in Violent Conflict*, in press.

¹⁰ For detailed elaboration of the theory of interrupted mourning in groups and nations see Joseph V. Montville (1995), "Complicated Mourning and Mobilization for Nationalism," in Jerome Braun, ed., *Social Pathology in Comparative Perspective: The Nature and Psychology of Civil Society*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 159–173.

¹¹ James Carroll. *Constantine's Sword* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2001).

¹² Abdulaziz Sachedina. *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹³ S.D. Goitein. *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988).

¹⁴ Edward Miller. *Vision of Abraham* (Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publications, 2003)

¹⁵ *Children of Abraham: An Understandable Guide to Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (in draft)

¹⁶ *Reason and Revelation* (in production)

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Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo:

A Track Two Approach

by Avnita Lakhani

In the October 26, 1998 issue of U.S. News & World Report, reporter Fouad Ajami wrote “Serbia has had enough of poetry and legend; in its return to reason and to practicality must lie its deliverance.”¹ Since June 28, 1987, when Serbian President Slobodon Milosevic arrived at the Field of Blackbirds, just outside the Kosovo capital of Pristina, Serbia has drenched Kosovo in a rain of blood and war based on Serbia’s legendary tales dating back to their defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1389.² Despite countless attempts by the international community to intervene in the killing fields of Kosovo, neither reason nor practicality cut through the Serbian cultural and religious claims to the predominantly Albanian stronghold. Finally, in June 1999, after significant United Nations Security Council intervention, shuttle diplomacy, and heavy NATO bombing, NATO reached an agreement with the Yugoslavia government to: 1) withdraw its Serb troops, militias, police and secret police from Kosovo; 2) allow NATO-led peacekeeping forces to enter Kosovo; and 3) allow ethnic Albanians to return to their homeland.³

Kosovo today is considered an international protectorate under an interim trusteeship administration by the United Nations.⁴ Even under international protection, there has been violence in Kosovo, including deadly rioting in March 2004 that left 19 people dead and more than 4,000 Serbs and others without homes.⁵ This recent outbreak of violence underscores the fact that, despite abatement of the violence in Kosovo via traditional international intervention, unrest is growing because Kosovar Albanians are “frustrated with their unresolved status, the economic situation, and the problems of dealing with the past.”⁶ Clearly, there can be no peaceful and practical future for Kosovo without first addressing the historical, cultural, and religious claims of the Serb majority of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Albanian majority of Kosovo, and the Serb minority of Kosovo.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the overriding issue of Kosovo’s unresolved status and how faith-based diplomacy can serve as a critical, non-governmental mechanism for conflict resolution. Faith-based diplomacy can begin to

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address the historical, ethnic, and religious claims that lie at the heart of helping Albanian Kosovars and Orthodox Serbs to peacefully co-exist in the future and for determining Kosovo's final status in the Balkans.

Faith-based diplomats orient the potential solution to an international conflict towards a particular religion—the religious texts, their ideologies, their practices, and their traditions because of a potential integration between religion and politics. Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy will look to understand “the two-vectored spiritual orientation around which all of them [religious elements] resolve: 1) the proper orientation of politics to the transcendent; and 2) the active role of the divine in human affairs.”⁷⁷

In particular, faith-based diplomats believe that, in some instances such as identity-based conflicts, there is an integration between religion and politics. For example, practitioners of faith-based diplomacy argue that the political order (how people and societies are to live together) is based on the religious texts of the various faiths of the world. Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy argue that by understanding such religious texts and ideologies, the horizontal relationships between members of the society, and the vertical relationships between the society and the divine,⁸ one can gain a deeper understanding of the source of the conflict, as well as some possible solutions that will address the underlying interests. By addressing the underlying interests and root causes, proposed solutions will be more viable and withstand the pressure of backlash, disintegration, and non-commitment.

The next section provides a brief perspective of the Kosovo conflict and the historical roots of the violence between the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and the Serbs. Section II provides a faith-based analysis of the Kosovo conflict and how the conflict is rooted in unresolved cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. Section III discusses faith-based solution proposals for moving Kosovo towards a more peaceful path and a final status. Finally, the article concludes with a call to action for establishing security and stability in the Balkans by boldly addressing the unresolved status of Kosovo in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

SECTION I: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The seeds of the Kosovo conflict were sowed long before President Slobodan Milosevic began his campaign of ethnic cleansing against the majority ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo in 1989.⁹ In a chilling event foreshadowing the bloodbath to come, Milosevic sparked Serbian nationalism when, on June 28, 1987, he came to the Field of Blackbirds, outside of the Kosovo capital of Pristina, and denounced Kosovo's Albanian majority in front of more than one million Serbs and “promised the Serbs that nobody would beat them again.”¹⁰ Milosevic reminded the Serbs of their defeat in 1389 by the Turks of the Ottoman Empire and promised that he would avenge that loss at the expense of the ethnic Albanian majority that currently occupied Kosovo.¹¹

According to Serbian classical history, the Serbian Prince Lazar fought the Ottoman Turks at Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) on June 28, 1389, and lost.¹²

While Prince Lazar is celebrated as a war hero and as a “glorious sacrifice,”¹³ the Serbian loss to the Turks became engrained in Serbian national consciousness, shaped the national identity of the Serbs, and transformed Kosovo from simply a battlefield to “the crucible of Serbian nationalism.”¹⁴ As the Rev. Blastko Taraklis, a Serbian Orthodox priest stated, “We cannot give up Kosovo because it is the Serbian Jerusalem. The birthright of the Serbian Orthodox Church is in Kosovo and must remain there as part of Serbia.”¹⁵

Faith-based diplomats believe that, in some instances such as identity-based conflicts, there is an integration between religion and politics.

By 1459, the Turks ruled all of Serbia, including Kosovo.¹⁶ The Serbs began to migrate north towards Bosnia and, after a failed uprising in 1689, the migration escalated, changing the population balance of Kosovo.¹⁷ Ethnic Albanians, descendants of the ancient Illyrian tribes¹⁸ that inhabited the Balkans before the Slavs, started settling in Kosovo during the Turkish rule and their numbers grew steadily.¹⁹ As more Muslim Albanians moved into Kosovo’s fertile lands from the mountains of northern Albania, Serb emigration continued until Kosovo became 90 percent ethnic Albanian. In 1817, the Serbs won autonomy under the rule of Prince Milos Obrenovic and became a fully independent state again, but Kosovo remained under the control of the Ottoman Turks.²⁰ During the Balkan War of 1912–1913, the Serbs and other independent Balkan states banded together to drive the Turks out of the Balkans, and Europe itself.²¹ The Turks then ceded Ottoman territory to Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.²² After defeat during World War I, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was abolished and Serbian King Alexander established a royal dictatorship and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.²³ Within the newly created kingdom, hostilities escalated between Serbs and non-Serbs until 1934, when Croatian terrorists assassinated King Alexander.²⁴

In 1941, during World War II, Yugoslavia formed an alliance with Hitler, who would ultimately betray the country and invade Yugoslavia, followed by Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces.²⁵ Marshall Tito organized a partisan resistance against Germany, took control of Yugoslavia, and established a communist Yugoslavia consisting of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.²⁶ Kosovo remained part of Serbia.

Marshall Tito, through an iron hand and a vision of a united Yugoslavia, sought to appease Serbs and non-Serbs alike, including the Kosovar Albanian majority. In fact, Tito, in an attempt to recruit Albanian soldiers during the war, promised the Kosovar Albanians that they would reunite with Albania after the war.²⁷ After they realized this promise would not be kept, ethnic Albanians began a series of uprisings, resulting in a lockdown of the province that lasted until the 1960s. In 1974, under a revised Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo was given full autonomy.²⁸ The ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo established Albanian language schools, observed

Islamic holy days, and were allowed to have representatives on the “old collective federal presidency.”²⁹

When Marshall Tito died in 1980, so did the vision of a united Yugoslavia.³⁰ In the wake of turmoil and the break-off of Slovenia and Croatia from the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia,³¹ Slobodan Milosevic³² gained control of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987 by manipulating the grievances between Serbs and ethnic Albanians and demonizing the Albanian Kosovars.³³ In 1989, Milosevic took away Kosovo’s autonomy, declared the Albanian language unofficial, and changed the school’s curricula into one strictly focused on promoting Serbian nationalism.³⁴ By 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established with two republics: Serbia and Montenegro.³⁵ The ethnic Albanian Kosovars responded to Milosevic’s actions by holding peaceful resistance against Serbian rule, declaring their independence, and running a parallel state complete with separate health, taxation, and education systems.³⁶

Under the leadership of author Ibrahim Rugova, the ethnic Albanian majority attempted to regain their independence in a non-violent manner.³⁷ However, some Albanians became weary of Rugova’s pacifism and, in 1996, took up arms as a radical group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA has since claimed responsibility for several attacks on Serbian policemen and have not been backed by the clandestine ethnic Albanian leaders headed by Rugova.³⁸ The KLA’s actions led to a police crackdown in Kosovo and the subsequent deaths of thousands of Albanian Kosovars. In February 1998, eighty people were killed when Milosevic sent Serbian troops to take back KLA-controlled areas in Kosovo.³⁹ Between February 1998 and spring of 1999, Milosevic continued the “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo, resulting in the death or expulsion of over one million Albanian Kosovars.⁴⁰

The key issue is how to transform Kosovo and its ethnic Albanian majority and Serbian minority into a stable society where ethnic, religious, and cultural differences are a point of celebration instead of a point of disintegration.

Despite numerous international attempts to intervene and end the conflict in Kosovo, including the Rambouillet Accord⁴¹ and the Belgrade agreement brokered by American diplomat Richard Holbrooke in 1999, both sides in the conflict failed to adhere to the peace agreements, and violence continued.⁴² Finally, in March 1999, NATO began a 78-day airstrike campaign in an attempt to force President Milosevic to stop the military offensive against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.⁴³ On June 10, 1999, Milosevic accepted a UN-backed agreement to cease all hostilities.⁴⁴ The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which outlined measures for withdrawing Yugoslavian military forces, allowed UN peacekeepers to enter, and established a UN trusteeship administration for both civil and military affairs in

Kosovo.⁴⁵ The goal of Resolution 1244 was to eventually allow for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo.⁴⁶ However, this has proven to be a difficult task. Today, Kosovo is still under UN trusteeship administration with an “indefinite protectorate status,”⁴⁷ under the “standards before status” policy⁴⁸ established by the United Nations.

The key issue is how to transform Kosovo and its ethnic Albanian majority and Serbian minority into a stable society where ethnic, religious, and cultural differences are a point of celebration instead of a point of disintegration. Faith-based diplomacy can play an integral role in bringing the parties to a better understanding of the religious and ethnic roots of conflict and ways to release such tensions. The focus of the next section is an analysis of the underlying conflicts that must be addressed by those working to find a peaceful path for Kosovo.

SECTION II: CONFLICT ANALYSIS

As a result of a tumultuous history, the Kosovo conflict is one that has various interdependent and complex levels. Some of the key issues include: the relationship between the ethnically diverse population of Kosovo, the historical wounds suffered by the Serbs and the ethnic Albanian majority, and the search for a national identity that is entangled with ethnic and religious affiliations. In addition, there are the expectations of the international community that has tried and failed to bring peace to Kosovo via traditional diplomatic intervention. Each of these areas is discussed in detail below as a means of fully understanding how faith-based diplomacy might be the untapped solution to defining the future and final status of Kosovo.

Ethnic or Religious Conflict and National Identity

The Serbs originated from the Southern Slavs who have long inhabited the Balkans from the sixth and seventh centuries.⁴⁹ The ethnic Albanians originated from the ancient Illyrian tribes who began to inhabit Kosovo under the Ottoman Turkish rule of the Balkans.⁵⁰ Because they are from different ethnic backgrounds, the Serbs and Albanians have different attitudes and behaviors, not only towards the preservation of their own cultural identity, but also regarding the importance of Kosovo. Furthermore, their ethnic differences include their “language, myths and shared memories of common origin and ancestry, state traditions, and religious affiliations.”⁵¹ Because of these differences, it was relatively easy for both sides to see the other side as an enemy and create an “us vs. them” conflict in order to achieve their political aims. Both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians had visions of a “Greater Serbia” or a “Greater Albania” that further fueled the conflict.⁵² By demonizing each other through highlighting their differences, the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians fought to gain control and used the differences to fuel human aggression as well as force their political and historical ideology on the other. In so doing, the battle between the Serbs and the Albanians became a battle of control over the past.⁵³

In addition to the ethnic polarity, many argue that the Kosovo conflict is deeply

rooted in religious differences. According to one estimate, of the 1.9 million residents of Kosovo at the time of the conflict, there were 1.7 Muslims, 60,000 Roman Catholics, 150 Serbian Orthodox, and approximately 150,000 Roma (gypsy) and Ashkali.⁵⁴ Serbs are almost entirely followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which originated in Kosovo before the Turkish invasion.⁵⁵ The non-Serbs, or the majority of ethnic Albanians, are followers of Islam and Roman Catholicism.⁵⁶ An understanding of the religious make-up of Kosovo is critical to resolving the underlying conflict. As of late 1998, of the 1.89 million inhabitants of Kosovo, 81 percent were Muslim (90 percent of the ethnic Albanians), 10 percent were Serbian Orthodox (10 percent of the Serbs), and 9 percent were Roman Catholics (an Albanian minority).⁵⁷ Furthermore, religious identity is now fused with national identity such that the future of Kosovo cannot be separated between political goals and religious identity.⁵⁸ In fact, the Serbian Orthodox Church provided strong support to Milosevic, “becoming a haven for the nationalist-oriented intelligentsia, offering them legal cover and moral legitimacy.”⁵⁹

Historical Wounds

The historical wounds suffered by the Albanians and the Serbs play a critical role in the Kosovo Conflict, and many of these wounds are still being played out in the current conflict in Kosovo and neighboring nations. For example, Yugoslavia was initially established by a Serbian King with a vision of uniting all Serbs within a single state, creating a “Greater Serbia.” On the other hand, ethnic Albanians moved from the harsh northern mountains of Albania into Kosovo during the Turkish rule with hopes of creating a “Greater Albania.” Each of these visions has been shattered by violence, beginning as early as 1389, when the Ottoman Turks invaded the Balkans.

During the First World War, Serbs and Albanians both “suffered mutual and lasting national traumas” in the form of “ruthless Serbian occupation of Albanian areas since the Berlin Congress of 1878, followed by Serbian colonization of Kosovo and racist attempts at Serbianization and the expulsion of Albanians to Turkey.”⁶⁰ In addition, during the Second World War, the Serbian massacre of Albanians led the Turks, along with third-party occupiers in collaboration with Armenians, to expell the Serbs from Kosovo.⁶¹

During the period of the Second Yugoslavia (coinciding with World War II), it is reported that those who found themselves to be victims of brutal oppression or genocide “typically claimed that their own depredations had been maximized, while those of the enemy had been minimized.”⁶² Each side adhered to their sense of being “more sinned against than sinning.”⁶³ Because of this perception, the key to addressing the issue of historical trauma is not so much what actually happened, but what people “knew” or believed to have happened to them or their families. Intertwined with the historical traumas are the visions of what might have been, what could be, and what God has promised for both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians.⁶⁴ Such historical wounds combined with religious divinations carry a heavy burden that cannot simply be diminished or addressed by traditional

diplomatic intervention.

Problems Caused by Traditional Diplomatic Intervention

A final, yet major issue involves the traps created by traditional “Track One” diplomatic intervention in a genuine effort to end the bloodbath in Kosovo. International diplomacy is at the heart of preventing, and resolving, international conflicts such as the one in Kosovo. However, traditional diplomacy has its roots in law, policy, and international politics. Traditional diplomacy must also adhere strictly to respect for the national sovereignty of nations under international law and the rules and regulations established by international organizations, especially the United Nations. Because of these inherent “traps,” the benefits of traditional international intervention are reduced by the time, expense, and limited considerations imposed by a regulated political body. These problems are at the heart of the Kosovo conflict even today.

First, the conflict between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians occurred and continues to occur today within a sovereign state. It is well established in international law that the international community must respect the boundaries of a sovereign nation. Regardless of how many people may despise “[Milosevic] and his treatment of the Albanian minority [in Serbia, not as a majority in Kosovo], reaction would, legally speaking, have amounted to an outright invasion of a sovereign state;”⁶⁵ both Serbs and ethnic Albanians would reject such a foreign intervention. In fact, in an April 1998 referendum, 95 percent of Serbs voted against international intervention in Kosovo,⁶⁶ and Milosevic, consistently and defiantly, refused to sign international peace accords to stop the military offensive in Kosovo. The ethnic Albanian majority and, in many cases, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) refused to sign the peace accords because it did not give them full independence. Both sides resisted international intervention for various reasons and rejected the peace accords brokered by the international community on the grounds that these agreements did not help either side achieve their mutually exclusive political goals.

Second, the current trusteeship administration of the Kosovo province has raised questions about the legality and effectiveness of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in establishing a United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).⁶⁷ Many scholars and international leaders question whether the UN had authority to even establish such an administration under the UN Charter’s purpose and principles. Furthermore, critics argue that by intervening in Kosovo, the Security Council “effectively creates new international law doctrine through the establishment of an omnipotent trusteeship administration in the present case” that is not rooted in explicit articles under the UN Charter for UNMIK’s authority to occupy Kosovo.⁶⁸ To be sure, intervention was necessary because of the rate of mass killings by the Serbian offensive in Kosovo; however, such divided views on the actions taken by the UN Security Council foster division among the Balkan nations and the international community. It further polarizes the safety and security of the Kosovars as a legitimate sovereign nation within the international community. This is

specifically evident in the “standards versus status” policy established by the United Nations as a pre-condition to discussions on Kosovo’s future status as well as the current, six-year UN occupation of Kosovo amidst continuing violence and growing frustration by the ethnic Albanian majority.

A final issue regarding the nature of traditional diplomatic intervention has to do with the international community’s expectations of Kosovo as compared with the expectations of the Serbs and the Albanian Kosovars. UN Resolution 1244 was passed with the intent of granting Kosovo “substantial autonomy” by forcing the Serb government to withdraw all military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, allowing UN peacekeepers to enter and provide humanitarian relief, and place the UN, assisted by NATO, as civil and military administrator until the UN could oversee the transfer of authority to a more stable political structure for Kosovo.⁶⁹ This goal is consistent with that adopted by the six-nation “Contact Group,” consisting of the U.S. and European nations, and the recommendation made by the International Crisis Group in its January 2005 report.⁷⁰ While this goal is seemingly consistent at the international level, it is internally at odds within international institutions in terms of tactical execution and policy. It is also inconsistent with the pre-war demands of the Serb majority in Yugoslavia, the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, and the KLA rebel group. A primary reason for this is that international expectations are rooted in temporal international law and policy while the expectations of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo are from the ageless standpoint of ethnic, religious, and historical differences.

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The Serbs have always had a vision of a united Yugoslavia and a “Greater Serbia,” dating back to the ruling days of King Alexander and Tito, to the more extremist policies of Milosevic. Because Kosovo holds a special place in the Serbian national consciousness, it is doubtful that Serbia will give it up entirely without a fight. It is also widely recognized that such a partition of Kosovo is undesirable and would not lend to stability in the Balkans.⁷¹ On the other hand, ethnic Albanians have fought for a “Greater Albania” with hopes of one day reuniting with their homeland. Albania has also made clear that they would be united in their support of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo should war break out. Ethnic Albanians wanted to retain the autonomy they have had since 1974, and they peacefully protested for the Serbian government to capitulate and eventually grant independence for Kosovo. At the same time, the KLA fought for complete independence with methods other than non-violent protest. Indeed, KLA began the violence against Serb police in an effort to demonstrate their methods in the fight for Kosovo’s independence.

As a result of these conflicting expectations at the state, regional, and

international levels, the goal of substantial autonomy or even full independence for Kosovo is slowly fading.⁷² Therefore, Kosovars live on in a state of limbo, and the lack of a defined future status, much less a final status, means that Kosovo is not unlike the Kashmir in the war between India and Pakistan. Though both religious and non-faith-based attempts have been made to bring about some peace in the area,⁷³ Kosovo is in dire need of practical, effective proposals for moving the country forward both historically and psychologically. The next section discusses some proposals for helping the ethnic Albanian majority and minority Serb population of Kosovo move towards peaceful settlement of their religious, ethnic, and historical wounds so that they may peacefully co-exist in an otherwise volatile region.

SECTION III: PROPOSED FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY SOLUTIONS

Mainstream diplomacy regarding the resolution of international conflicts is mainly centered on Track One diplomacy. This means that the main proponents and participants engaged in conflict resolution are state actors—official governments and government-sponsored organizations. Therefore, Track One diplomacy is essentially a “process whereby communications from one government go directly to the decision-making apparatus of another.”⁷⁴

In contrast, Track Two diplomacy, or citizen diplomacy as it is sometimes called, is the unofficial interaction between unofficial parties to the conflict resolution process. As defined by Joseph Montville, the pioneer of the term Track Two diplomacy, it is the “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict.”⁷⁵ This process may involve a variety of non-governmental entities, such as conflict resolution specialists, private citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or businesses.

Faith-based diplomacy is a form of Track Two diplomacy because it involves non-state actors working within an unofficial capacity to help groups or nations resolve the conflict. More specifically, faith-based diplomacy involves “incorporating religious concerns into the practice of international politics...by making religion part of the solution to some of the intractable, identity-based conflicts”⁷⁶ that are part of some of today’s politically volatile landscapes.

There are at least four principal ways in which faith-based diplomacy can assist in bringing about a peaceful path for all those who live in war-torn Kosovo. First, the ethnic and religious conflict that stands at the core of the national identity of both the Serbs and Albanians can be addressed with good-faith dialogue and education. While the religious institutions of Kosovo have initiated dialogue, faith-based diplomats can bring a broader, more objective perspective to the conflict through their lack of direct involvement on either side. By not having a self-interested purpose in seeking a resolution, the faith-based diplomat can more easily work with civil society in an attempt to build bridges between the Serb minority, Albanian

majority, and the KLA. Education is also a critical first step in helping Kosovars realize that they share not only ethnic similarities, but religious similarities as well. A faith-based diplomat who is familiar with the biblical Abrahamic family, its history, and the ways in which the Christian and Muslim traditions are connected, can help both ethnic Albanians and Orthodox Serbs begin to heal the root cause of their conflict.

One way of doing this is to engage not only civil society, but also the youth in particular. While civil society may be able to influence leaders, it is the youth who will eventually carry the burden of Kosovo's ethnic and religious history. Therefore, it is necessary to teach a history that is integrated and takes into account the goodness of both Serbs and Albanians. In this way, the future of Kosovo will bring, not a Greater Serbia or a Greater Albania, but a Greater Kosovo that is ethnically diverse, culturally sensitive, and religiously tolerant. At the moment, the key issue is the inability of either side to create a vision apart from the one inherited by ancient myths and a victim mentality. For example, the ethnic Albanians today consider the original history, flag, and culture of Albania as their source of identity, even though they are aware they do not have full independence. By working with children of Kosovo, a faith-based diplomat can help transcend history and myth, bringing about a new reality based on tolerance and a respect for all religious traditions and cultural practices.

Faith-based diplomats can offer a unique perspective in helping to resolve the layers of conflict in Kosovo, where reality collides with myth and religion intersects with reason.

Second, both Serbs and ethnic Albanians must recognize that Kosovo has special significance both as a mineral-rich land and as a historical landmark. Kosovo is perceived as a sacred place. A faith-based diplomat can work with key religious and political leaders to find ways to honor the Field of Blackbirds, instead of holding it hostage as a reminder of past defeats, future plots of revenge, and the current cause of historical wounds. Serbs and ethnic Albanians could mark the Field of Blackbirds as a sacred site by constructing a museum on the grounds to commemorate the Serbian and Albanian history in the fight for a united Yugoslavia. In addition, the Field of Blackbirds could be designated as a historical landmark and opened for guided tours. The Serbs, in particular, should be reminded that as much as the Field of Blackbirds was a site of early defeat by the Turks, it is also the sight of survival and victory for their culture and religious ideals. On the other hand, Albanians need to fully understand and appreciate Serbian history, as it relates to Kosovo, in a manner that respects the once-held vision of the Serbian kings of a united Yugoslavia. The Field of Blackbirds might also be converted into a national cemetery or national park, similar to Valley Forge national park in Pennsylvania, where both Serbs and Albanians could commemorate their intertwined history and celebrate

their survival.

Third, healing the wounds of history is critical to the future survival of those who live in Kosovo and surrounding provinces. As it stands today, despite the “forced peace” implemented by the UN and NATO forces, an institutional collective memory remains within the Serb and ethnic Albanian communities that is linked with an identity-based view of what their relationship should entail. Unfortunately, this collective memory is fueled with emotional, spiritual, and moral pain and suffering that is keeping individuals, institutions, and the entire nation from developing to its full potential. For example, the parties have been so consumed with demonizing each other for past injustice, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war that they have failed to appreciate the strategic location of Kosovo as a potential example of a regional peace center. They have also been blinded to the fact that Kosovo is a mineral-rich province that could provide significant economic advantages if the Serbs and Albanians could find a way to work together.

In an effort to control the past, each side is actually desecrating the memory of their ancestors and destroying the future for their children. Each side has adopted a victim-offender dynamic that results in an interdependent bondage based on historical pain and guilt. A faith-based diplomat can help the parties deal with historical wounds by using a process that would allow them to face the truth about their history, rewrite the master narrative of history, grieve for those who are lost, repent for crimes committed, and make amends with each other. Kosovo could establish community truth commissions whose purpose would be to simply allow Serbs and ethnic Albanians the opportunity to “walk through history,” focusing on reconciliation and restoration. These commissions would not include the purpose of punishing anyone, as is traditionally seen in other truth commissions, such as the one established in Rwanda.

Implementing truth commissions may be especially important for the children, the ones most tragically affected by the mass killings in Kosovo. For children, the form of the truth commission could be less formal, and more playful and indirectly engaging. These children need to be heard and they need to voice their feelings about what they saw, how they felt, and what they need, so that their collective memory of those incidents might be washed from their minds. If this is not done now, they will suffer the burden of memory that will leave them in a perpetual state of internal conflict, causing wounded worldviews, psychological suffering, victim mentalities, and demonization of other ethnic groups. By helping the children and young adults, the faith-based diplomat creates a portal through which the youth may heal the wounds of all those around them. This may seem counter-intuitive, as the traditional approach is to work exclusively with adults; however, children have a more innate understanding of what is spiritually true: that we are one people. Children can see beyond the superficial and ideological roadblocks of adults to the purity of one’s actions and intentions, thereby having a better perspective through which to re-write history. Because certain aspects of conflict resolution are innate to children, a faith-based diplomat who focuses on healing the wounds of history for children may well

find greater success in influencing adults in the political and religious communities.

Finally, the issue of Kosovo's status as a province must be addressed in order to provide Kosovo with a chance to thrive. There needs to be an honest, truthful dialogue with and between individuals and communities about their vision for Kosovo. It is no longer plausible to allow the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo to believe they will obtain full independence, or to allow Serbs to believe that they can control Kosovo in the manner in which they are accustomed. The dialogue about the honest future of Kosovo should start with individuals and communities. This dialogue must be based on the current reality, rather than historical myth and legend. To date, it seems that ethnic Albanian Kosovars have been drinking from the cup of promised independence, as long as they meet certain standards. These standards and conditions are a mirage. Kosovo could never meet such conditions unless its status within Yugoslavia and the international community is resolved. Without knowing whether Kosovo is autonomous, independent, or no longer a separate province, it cannot obtain foreign investments, monetary credit, support and respect from neighboring states, or political recognition to participate in international decisions. In many ways, Kosovars stand as hostages of the UN and NATO in a battle rooted in history, much like the example of Kashmir in the disputes between India and Pakistan. It is a battleground, not a legitimate province. Once Kosovo is given an official status, whether permanent or temporary, Kosovars can begin to rebuild with help from the international community. They can begin to re-write history, commemorate and celebrate sacred places, and form a national identity that takes ethnic and religious differences into account. This policy may work better if re-conceptualized as "status before standards," in recognition of the fact that only when an individual knows who they are and how others see them, can they begin to appreciate their goodness and change their unacceptable conduct.

As the international community continues to work with Kosovo and the current political leaders of Serbia and Montenegro over the future of former Yugoslavia, it is important that traditional diplomatic channels be open to the non-traditional diplomatic methods of resolving conflict. Faith-based diplomats can offer a unique perspective in helping to resolve the layers of conflict in Kosovo, where reality collides with myth and religion intersects with reason. As aptly stated by Fouad Ajami, "In the legend of the Serbs their history is one of martyrology and self-sacrifice where the 'kingdom of heaven' was always preferable to the 'earthly kingdom'—hence, the nihilism at the heart of that history."⁷⁷ Faith-based diplomats can begin to help the Serbs, the ethnic Albanians, and neighboring nations affected by the Kosovo conflict build bridges between heaven and the earthly kingdom so that all may live in relative peace and tolerance.

CONCLUSION

Kosovo will not simply go away because of a UN Security Council resolution, NATO forces, or pressure from the international community. The memories of the mass killings will also not disappear because Milosevic or other officials are indicted

by the International Court of Justice. The wounds of the Kosovo conflict are deep, historical, and psychological at many levels. The healing of Kosovo can begin with the intentional, active intervention of faith-based diplomats, working in partnership with existing, traditional diplomatic intervention. This will ensure the integrity of future solutions under international mediation, while also endeavoring to heal the national consciousness of all Kosovars.

Notes

¹ Fouad Ajami, "The Killing Fields of Kosovo," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 26, 1998, 40.

² *Ibid.*

³ "Religious Aspects of the Yugoslavia – Kosovo Conflict." Available at:

http://www.religioustolerance.org/war_koso.htm (Accessed April 24, 2005). See also Epaminontas E.

Triantafilou, "Matter of Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo's Current and Future Status under International Law," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, no. 5 (2004), 355, 358.

⁴ Triantafilou, "Matter of Law," *supra* note 3, p. 357-358.

⁵ Nicholas Wood, "Still Deeply Divided, Nervous Kosovo Goes to Polls This Weekend," *New York Times*, October 23, 2004 (discussing how the residents of Kosovo voted in an October 2004 election for the 120-seat Parliament).

⁶ "Kosovo: Toward Final Status," *International Crisis Group, Europe Report*, no. 161. Available at:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&cid=3226> (Accessed April 27, 2005).

See also Wood, "Still Deeply Divided," *supra* note 5 (quoting Sorren Jessen-Petersen, new head of the UN mission in Kosovo as stating that the March 2004 riots were "...very much a protest against this sense of muddling along...[a] sense of urgency was no longer there [by the international community].")

⁷ Brian Cox and Dan Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent," *Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs* (2003). Available at: <http://www.icrd.org/docs/cox&philpott.html> (Accessed May 13, 2006).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "Balkans Special Report – Kosovo Background: 1980s to 1998." Available at:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/timekosovo4.htm> (Accessed April 24,

2005) (indicating that in March 1989, the Serbian National Assembly first ratified constitutional changes that returned key Kosovo governmental bodies back to Serbian control. Rioting ensued, which led to the death of over 20 people. Milosevic was named president of Serbia in May 1989 and, in July 1990, Serbia dissolved the Kosovo government altogether).

¹⁰ Brian Duffy, Kevin Whitelaw, Warren P. Strobel, Thomas Omestad, and Richard J. Newman, "The Art of the Deal," *U.S. News & World Report, Classroom Program: The Balkans – Teacher's Guide 7*. Available at:

www.usnewsclassroom.com (Accessed April 24, 2005). See also Dr. Zlatko Isakovic, "Diplomacy and the Conflict in Kosovo: Notes on Threats and Fears." Available at: <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/~zlatko.htm>

(Accessed April 24, 2005).

¹¹ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," *supra* note 12.

¹² Tim Judah, "History, Bloody History," *BBC News: Kosovo Crisis*. Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/110492.stm (Accessed April 25, 2005).

¹³ Judah, "History Bloody History," *supra* note 19.

¹⁴ "Religious Aspects," *supra* note 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Judah, "History Bloody History," *supra* note 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ "Kosovo: Key facts and background," *BBC News: Kosovo Crisis*. Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/61354 (Accessed April 25, 2005).

²⁰ Judah, "History Bloody History," *supra* note 19. See also, Duffy, et al., "The Art of the Deal," *supra* note 12, p. 13.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Duffy, et al., "The Art of the Deal," *supra* note 12, p. 13.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Judah, "History Bloody History," supra note 19.

²⁸ "Key Facts," supra note 24.

²⁹ Ibid. See also Judah, "History Bloody History," supra note 19 (Kosovo was given almost the same rights as the other six republics. It was during this period that Albanian Kosovars started to demand full independent status as the other republics. Serbs, now a minority in Kosovo, began to complain of harassment).

³⁰ Duffy, et al., "The Art of the Deal," supra note 12, p. 13.

³¹ Ibid, supra note 12, p. 13.

³² Ibid, supra note 12, p. 7 ("Not only was he [Milosevic] born in the province he has now managed to "cleans" of its ethnic Albanian majority, but it is the key to his claim of leadership of the Serbs.").

³³ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," supra note 12 (discussing how Milosevic's nationalist campaign was aimed at demonizing "them" [Albanians] by "vilifying their rivals and "their" side, which is inferior to or at least less perfect than "our side" is." By doing so, Milosevic proclaimed the ethnic Albanians as near inhuman, thus making it easier to foster human aggression against them without having a sense of conscious guilt for one's actions. It was almost as if Milosevic saw the ethnic Albanians as the "Turks" all over again and made the rest of the Serbs believe this as well).

³⁴ "Key Facts," supra note 24.

³⁵ Duffy, et al., "The Art of the Deal," supra note 12, p. 13.

³⁶ Judah, "History Bloody History," supra note 19; "Key Facts," supra note 24.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ "Key Facts," supra note 24.

³⁹ Elissa Haney, "Kosovo Factsheet," *Infoplease.com*. Available at: <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kosovo1.html> (Accessed April 27, 2005).

⁴⁰ Duffy, et al., "The Art of the Deal," supra note 12, p. 13 ("Kosovo has been an extraordinarily ugly little conflict. Thousands died. Thousands more were injured. More than 1.5 million refugees were driven from their homes, and most may have none to return to.")

⁴¹ "Religious Aspects," supra note 3 (discussing the Rambouillet accord, brokered by a six-country "contact group" consisting of the U.S. and European countries, as being unsuccessful because of two main reasons: 1) Serbs objected to Kosovo autonomy and allowing NATO troops to enter the province to maintain peace; and 2) Albanian Kosovars objected because the accord did not give them full independence. While the KLA signed under pressure, the Serbian government refused to sign the accords and the violence continued).

⁴² Elissa Haney, "NATO in Kosovo: 1998-1999," *Infoplease.com*. Available at: <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kosovo-timeline1.html> (Accessed April 27, 2005).

⁴³ Triantafilou, "Matter of Law," supra note 3, pp. 357-358.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, supra note 3, p. 365 (discussing four proposals that have been discussed regarding the future status of Kosovo: 1) indefinite protectorate status; 2) partition of Kosovo; 3) full independence for the entire province; and 4) conditional independence with loose confederation with Serbia).

⁴⁸ Triantafilou, "Matter of Law," supra note 3, pp. 366-367 (discussing the conditions Kosovars must meet in order to transfer sovereignty to the ethnic Albanians, including the "abatement of irredentism and latent nationalism, establishment and proper implementation of a justice system, adequate disarmament of paramilitary forces...and...Kosovars commitment to regional cooperation, regional governance, and enduring regional institutions"). See also "Final Status," supra note 6 at 2-3 ("standards before status" is the term used for the "Standards for Kosovo" document which states that before Kosovo's future status as an independent province will be considered, certain conditions must be met to ensure that Kosovo will adhere to a policy of protecting human rights, especially those of the now Serbian minority in Kosovo). This "standards before status" policy has been severely criticized from within the United Nations, even by the Special Representative to the Secretary General (Kofi Anan), Mr. Soren Jessen-Petersen who argued that resolving the final status of Kosovo was key to stabilizing the Baltic region and stating "I think there's a limit to how long you can keep a place in limbo.")

⁴⁹ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," supra note 12.

⁵⁰ "Religious Aspects," supra note 3.

⁵¹ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," supra note 12.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid. (quoting George Orwell, author of *1984*, in the Ingsoc party slogan "Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.") This conflict is over whom ultimately controls the past, as this will determine who ultimately survives.

⁵⁴ "Religious Aspects," supra note 3.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid. (also discussing the minority of ethnic Albanians who follow the Albanian Orthodox Church but would not have significant conflict with the Serbian Orthodox, presumably because of common origins).

⁵⁷ Ibid. (discussing the religious and ethnic make-up of the Balkans, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

⁵⁸ David A. Steele, "Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo," *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 130-33 (discussing the impact of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia as "becoming a haven for the nationalist-oriented intelligentsia, offering them legal cover and moral legitimacy.") For example, note that when Milosevic made his speech at the Field of Blackbirds in Kosovo in 1989 on the 600th anniversary of the Serbian defeat by the Ottoman Turks, he was surrounded and supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church. While the Church later withdrew its support of Milosevic, they did, in fact, offer legitimacy to Milosevic's campaign in an effort to provide a sense of togetherness for the victimized Serbian people.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," supra note 12 (discussing the historical traumas suffered by the Serbs and Albanians during the First Yugoslavia and Second Yugoslavia, corresponding closely with WW I and WW II).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ F. Brian Cox, "Faith Based Diplomacy and International Peacekeeping," *International Center for Religion and Diplomacy* (2000) (discussing the foundations of the Abrahamic faiths and the differing histories and expectations of those who are part of the three main Abrahamic families: Jews, Christians, and Muslims).

⁶⁵ Isakovic, "Notes on Threats and Fears," supra note 12 (discussing the nature of diplomatic intervention in the Kosovo crisis and differing opinions on the impact and perception of such actions).

⁶⁶ "Timeline: Countdown to Conflict," *BBC News: Kosovo Conflict*. Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/99748.stm (Accessed April 28, 2005).

⁶⁷ Triantafylou, "Matter of Law," supra note 3, pp. 358-360 (discussing the legality of the UNMIK under international law).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. (stating that UN Resolution 1244 resulted "in the formation of a civil branch, UNMIK, and of a NATO military branch, the Kosovo Force ["KFOR"]).

⁷⁰ "Final Status," supra note 6.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Religious Aspects," supra note 3 (stating that "NATO's vision of a multi-cultural Kosovo appears impossible to implement.") See also, Triantafylou, "Matter of Law," supra note 3, p. 358 ("The existence of a Serbian minority in Kosovo combined with the enduring Serb belief that Kosovo is a shrine of Serbian history means that any concession to the Kosovars will come at a large political cost.")

⁷³ Steele, "Christianity," supra note 64, pp. 144-157 (discussing the role played by churches in the Kosovo conflict and serving as agents of reconciliation). The discussion and proposals that follow in Section IV are based on the analysis in the previous section, as well as ideas developed through a broad-based understanding of faith-based diplomacy. The focus is on discussion proposals that are complementary to those already discussed in the book.

⁷⁴ Said, A.S., Lerche, Jr., *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 69.

⁷⁵ V. Volkan, D. Julius, and J. Montville, ed., *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work, Vol. II* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), 262.

⁷⁶ Dr Douglas M. Johnston, "Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik," (presented at the Norwegian Chaplains Corp 50th <http://www.icrd.org/docs/norway.html>)

The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea

by Robert L. Ostergard, Jr.

In the course of a country's history, pivotal points, or critical junctures, mark fundamental changes in that country's foreign policy.¹ For the United States, several events in the twentieth century proved to be major, pivotal shifts for its foreign policy. The entrance of the United States into World War I ended American international isolationism, and its victory in World War II propelled it reluctantly into the role of global leader against the communist threat. When the communist threat ceased to exist in 1990, America once again experienced another pivotal point in its foreign policy.

The focus of US foreign policy during the Cold War was based on a clear "us vs. them" dimension, with "them" clearly as the communists and their ilk. Containment of communism became the cornerstone of every administration's foreign policy during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of "them," a new attempt was initiated to redirect American foreign policy toward a new objective. President George H. W. Bush made the first attempt at redirecting America's foreign policy by trying to create a multilateral framework of security and cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations. Bush's "New World Order" brought together a United Nations mandate and a coalition of thirty-four states to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait after Iraq's 1990 invasion. With a total force numbering between 500,000–600,000, the US-led coalition ousted Iraqi forces, driving them back across the Iraq-Kuwait border. The "New World Order," however, was short-lived. Its demise was due in part to the United States' inability to act effectively outside of its own national interests, as was demonstrated in Somalia shortly after the Persian Gulf War. The United Nations also contributed to the death of the "New World Order" by showing complete ineptitude in handling the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Hence, the multilateral approach that drove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait fell apart in the wake of two disastrous humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Rwanda.

The second attempt to redirect American foreign policy in the post-Cold War

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period came when Samuel Huntington proclaimed that future conflicts would no longer be between states, but between civilizations. Huntington's thesis first appeared in 1993 in the influential policy journal *Foreign Affairs*, but at the time it was dismissed by academics, scholars, and policymakers as vague and riddled with problems.² However, policymakers in particular latched on to Huntington's culture thesis after the September 11th attacks on Washington, DC and New York City, which were perpetrated by mostly Saudi Islamic extremists. Huntington's image of a clash of civilizations was much easier to accept in the aftermath of the attacks. It provided a simple—albeit too simple—foundation from which the US could redirect its foreign policy focus to a familiar “us vs. them” view of the world. The attachment to Huntington's thesis lingered as it appeared to put a reasonable perspective on the unique situation that emerged from the September 11th attacks.

Huntington's image of a clash of civilizations was much easier to accept in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.

The United States was again at war against an ideology. In the twentieth century, the US fought a hot war against Nazism and fascism, and a cold war against Marxism-Leninism. In the twenty-first century, the United States has become embroiled in a hot war against radical Islam. The threat from radical Islam is similar to that faced by US troops in their fight against Japan in World War II. The willingness of Islamic extremists to martyr themselves is reminiscent of Japanese willingness to sacrifice themselves in the name of Emperor Hirohito, whom they saw as the divine spirit of the Japanese people.³ The primary difference between the two is that radical Islam is not centrally focused within a state, as fascist rule was in Japan. Radical Islam has its adherents in states (Iran) and groups (al-Qaeda, Hezbollah), as well as among individuals across the entire Islamic world. It is not just an ideology; it is a movement fueled by anti-Western resentment.

In this sense, Huntington's thesis could not be sustained within policy circles. Ideologies are a byproduct of culture and regional politics. The major ideological movements of the last 200 years—liberalism, communism, socialism, fascism, and Nazism—are all Western in their origin. This time, the ideology is not Western and is based primarily on a very cultural element—religion. What made Huntington's thesis problematic was that it painted the entire Islamic world with a wide brush of radical Islam, when in reality such a brush should be extremely narrow. While radical Islam has adherents that are geographically widespread, it makes up only a small fraction of the entire Islamic world. Even so, radical Islam has helped to shape the new vision of American foreign policy, which emerged in the post-September 11th world as one that reflects the traditional “us vs. them” framework. President Bush said as much in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States when he noted that “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology

of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11th, 2001.⁷⁴

Many of America's former Cold War foreign policymakers spent much of the post-Cold War period searching for the next enemy, or the next grand purpose, for the United States. These two objectives have now come together in the post-September 11th world in the war on terrorism through attempts to spread democracy across the globe as a means of fighting terrorism. The identification of a new enemy in terrorism, and the grand purpose of spreading democracy, have become the greatest excursions into foreign policy idealism since Woodrow Wilson declared that "the world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty."⁷⁵

FACING THE NEW THREAT: THE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

In the twentieth and the first part of the twenty-first century, state-sponsored terrorism, more so than independent terrorist groups, has been the greater threat. Groups that perpetrate terrorism are typically responding to perceived grievances they have with governments, foreign or domestic. Historically, military responses to terrorism have provided only temporary relief, mostly because terrorist groups have the ability to adapt to new security precautions and arrangements, while garnering even greater support for their causes in the face of government hostilities. But can terrorist groups be effective in achieving their objectives? One of the best indicators of success seems to be the amount of support the group receives from the general population, or what may be considered its constituency in the region in which it operates.

Historically, this issue of constituency is borne out by the rise and fall of terrorist movements in Europe. Groups such as Germany's Baader Meinhoff Gang and Italy's Red Brigade were representative of leftist terrorist groups that sought to overthrow their governments. In both cases, support within their respective populations was weak and, by the end of the Cold War, both groups were effectively neutralized. However, terrorist activities in Spain and Northern Ireland have taken a slightly different turn. In Northern Ireland, support for the Irish Republican Army's objectives did not necessarily diminish, though decline in popular support for its violent methods, which brought British government retaliations and the death of more innocent people, ultimately led to negotiations between Sinn Féin, the political arm of the IRA, and the British government.

In Spain, the same story unfolded; the Basque separatist group ETA did not lose support for its goals and objectives, though it began to lose support for the violent methods it had used. The popular resentment against the ETA began to build in 1995 with the failed assassination attempts on then future president José María Aznar and King Juan Carlos I. Popular resentment further increased in 1997 when the ETA kidnapped Partido Popular council member Miguel Ángel Blanco and killed him after the Spanish government failed to meet its demands. In response, millions of Spaniards marched in protest of the ETA's assassination of Blanco, with some

equating the ETA's tactics to those of Spain's fascist dictator Francisco Franco.⁶ While the Basque people still supported the objectives of the ETA, they clearly rejected their methods. The lesson to be learned from these cases is that no matter how brutal the government response to the terrorists' activities, these groups either saw their demise or their effectiveness decline substantially only after support within the population, or within the terrorists' constituencies, began to waver.

Populations across a number of countries sympathize with or even support terrorist groups who have targeted the United States and its allies.

If it is the case that terrorists' success is predicated on popular support, the United States has a major problem that has been consistently underplayed, and even ignored: populations across a number of countries sympathize with or even support terrorist groups who have targeted the United States and its allies. The current administration under George W. Bush received overwhelming international support and the American people garnered sympathy and compassion from around the world in the wake of the September 11th attacks. The US enjoyed widespread support for the retaliatory action taken against the Taliban regime that harbored al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, when the administration turned its attention to Iraq, international support was tepid at best.

Despite claims to the contrary, the old Iraqi regime had no involvement with the September 11th attacks, or links to al-Qaeda.⁷ Likewise, the claims that Iraq was an imminent threat to the United States were equally difficult to substantiate, given that the US and coalition partners had effectively isolated the country since the Persian Gulf War. When the Bush administration launched its war against Iraq in 2003, with significantly less international support than in the Persian Gulf War, it launched a war against an undoubtedly brutal and despicable regime.⁸ Few, if any, will bicker over the tyrannical nature of Saddam Hussein's regime or shed a tear over its demise. However, the administration's arguments for the war were simply unfounded.

The war on terrorism that the US launched in 2001 has become the new cause célèbre of American foreign policy, predicated on the notion that terrorism can be identified and militarily defeated. It seems that the ultimate victory in the war on terrorism would be the installation of democratic regimes able to suppress the growth of terrorism, but this new foreign policy objective is based on a misguided assumption, tainted by a major contradiction in America's foreign policy that dates back to the end of World War II.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PERCEIVED HYPOCRISY

The misguided assumption underlying American foreign policy is that the war on terrorism can be won through militarily actions alone. This assumption is rooted in the celebratory rhetoric that followed in the wake of the Cold War. While communism and the threat it posed could be easily identified, the war on terrorism

has no clearly defined enemy. Therefore, it does not fit squarely into the rubric of a military solution, especially one imposed by an outside power.

Terrorism is first and foremost a problem of governance, either in response to government policy or as an act of government policy. In this sense, the major contradiction in America's post-World War II foreign policy has been that while the US government has been willing to espouse Wilson's liberal vision to make the world safe for democracy, it has done so only as a matter of convenience to America's national interest. American support for brutal dictatorships that committed crimes or terrorist acts against their own people came all too easily. American foreign policy spoke of the liberal agenda for the world, but succumbed to the *realpolitik* of America's national interests. The liberal rhetoric could not be practiced in the face of America's immediate and short-term security concerns. The end result has been that people around the world perceive a hypocrisy in America's foreign policy—the language of liberal democracy contradicted by actions meant to secure America's national security interests. That historical contradiction has now crossed paths with the war on terrorism.

The most stunning and recent example of this foreign policy contradiction came in the 2006 State of the Union address, when President Bush scolded the American people, saying that “America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.”⁹ Implicitly, the administration was placing the problems in the Middle East on the consumption of oil by the American people; blaming the American people for their addiction to oil is like blaming a drug addict for the addiction without mention of the peddler or cartel that supplies the drugs. What the President forgot to tell the American people is that their addiction was aided and abetted by decades of foreign policies that have enabled that addiction. There is no doubt the president diagnosed the problem correctly in substance, if not in form. However, no state has truly been immune to the addiction to oil; after all, the Pacific theater in World War II erupted partly as a result for the quest for oil. The US addiction to oil is one of the most dangerous diseases this country has faced.

The war that George Bush never launched was a war against these contradictions and hypocrisies, a war that every administration back to Harry Truman's has never waged. This is what is partially at the root of America's foreign policy failures today. If the old saying that politics makes strange bedfellows is true, then there could be no stranger bedfellows than the leaders of the free world perpetually welcoming and befriending some of the most tyrannical dictators throughout the world, particularly those in oil rich countries of the Muslim world. Through both direct and passive support, the US has been, at times, a partner in repression and a supporter of those that have oppressed their people. Every president since Roosevelt has considered oil a strategic resource that drives America's national security, a policy that always has been a short-term, unsustainable proposition simply transferred from one administration to the next. That proposition has created an unhealthy and imbalanced strategic relationship between the United States and its oil suppliers.

How is it possible to champion liberal principles such as freedom and democracy while providing unquestioned support for tyranny?

During the post–World War II period, the oil relationship that dominated much of US foreign policy with Middle Eastern states embodied a Jekyll and Hyde complex. The United States has had a strong, friendly relationship with many of the Muslim monarchs and dictators of the Middle East who, at the same time, have been less than friendly to their own people. The people who lived under repressive rule saw the United States as an accomplice because of its unwavering support for their monarchs and dictators. But perhaps more importantly, these people saw an unmatched level of hypocrisy on the part of the United States. How is it possible to champion liberal principles such as freedom and democracy while providing unquestioned support for tyranny? A case in point is the US relationship with Iran.

Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union vied for influence over Iran in the immediate aftermath of World War II. In 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union forced the ruler, Reza Shah, from power and installed his son, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, as ruler. However, a nationalist movement led by Muhammad Mossadegh attempted to drive the Shah from power in 1953. In doing so, Mossadegh threatened to nationalize Iran's oil production, threatening Western oil interests in the country. Shortly afterwards, Mossadegh's opponents, with the help of the United States, overthrew his government, reinstalling the Shah as absolute ruler in Iran. The Shah's return translated into tremendous benefits for the West that included large arms sales and the training of Iran's secret police, the SAVAK. The Shah grew increasingly autocratic, using the SAVAK to crush his opponents while plundering the country's oil wealth. Dissent grew at all levels of Iranian society as the Shah allied himself more closely with pro-Western interests.¹⁰

The Shah's October 1971 celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy symbolically marked the turning point for the Shah's rule. More than \$200 million was spent to bring dignitaries from around the world for the celebration. The week long celebration was marked with a feast prepared by French caterers, which included over 25,000 bottles of wine. The celebration represented the high point of excess and insensitivity toward his impoverished people while showing a complete disregard for Iran's Islamic heritage. The bloody suppression of dissenters ushered in a new period of terror and intolerance of dissent within Iran.¹¹

Despite the growing social unrest and the Shah's brutal crackdown on dissent in Iran, the US did not waiver in its complete support for the Shah. On June 24, 1973, President Richard Nixon welcomed Iran's monarch, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to the United States "...as not only an old friend, as a progressive leader of your own people, [but] also as a world statesman of the first rank."¹² In a toast to the Shah and Empress of Iran on May 15, 1975, President Gerald Ford told the audience, "the present period will be seen by historians as a very major milestone in Iran's ancient and very glorious history. The leader whose vision and dynamism has brought Iran

to this stage, His Imperial Majesty, is clearly one of the great men of his generation, of his country, and of the world.”¹³ On a state visit to the United States on November 15, 1977, the Shah of Iran received President Jimmy Carter’s praise for maintaining a “strong, stable and progressive Iran” under his leadership.¹⁴

President Carter, the champion of human rights in US foreign policy, would be the last US president to express his public support for the Shah. Two major social forces opposed to the Shah’s rule would change Iran’s history dramatically. Shia Muslims were outraged by the Shah’s attempt to sidestep Iran’s Muslim heritage in seeking a rebirth of the old Persian Empire (symbolically represented by the 1971 celebration). They joined forces with students and other progressives angered by the Shah’s autocratic, corrupt, and tyrannical rule to oust him in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. That revolution paved the way for a radical Islamic regime to come to power. While the United States did not bring the Islamic regime to power, it was certainly responsible for condoning the Shah’s policies, supplying him with the weapons to make those policies possible, and providing him with large aid packages and unconditional support. The social unrest combined with US support for the Shah proved to be a “perfect storm” that converged into a massive social uprising against the brutal monarchy. The Iranian people blamed the United States for prolonging the regime, providing weaponry for its brutal policies, and for harboring and protecting the Shah after he was ousted in the revolution.

Such policies are still in practice today around the Middle East and in parts of the developing world. The American oil addiction, like any addiction, has an impact on others besides the addict. When the United States supports repressive regimes in the name of strategic oil acquisitions, it is supporting the brutality that is being imposed upon people around the Middle East. Terrorist groups that target the US and the monarchies of the Middle East get their support from populations who see the United States as the friend of the oppressors. Terrorism against state interests is supported, and even succeeds, in these areas because terrorism has been used in the past by the states themselves. Thus the populations of these regions are more likely to see terrorism as their only voice.

THE NEW FRONTIER IN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: WEST AFRICA

Recently, there has been a growing realization that the United States’ relationship with Middle East monarchs is becoming untenable and that alternative sources of oil must be sought. If the United States is going to remain politically, economically, and militarily competitive, conventional wisdom dictates there must be a search for new sources of petroleum. The alternative sources of petroleum that have emerged are predominantly in Central Asia and West Africa, two regions that prior to September 11th had little strategic value to the United States. In the case of Africa, ironically, the disappearance of the Soviet threat after the Cold War marked the beginning of the United States’ diplomatic departure from the continent. Within three years of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bureau of African Affairs in the US State Department lost seventy positions; consulates in Kenya, Cameroon, and Nigeria were also scheduled

to be closed.¹⁵

It has been easier for policymakers to seek alternative sources of oil, rather than alternative resources.

Now, not only are new embassies being opened in West Africa, they are being accompanied by military advisors and the possibility of a permanent US military base. For the past few years, US military officials have focused on ways in which the Gulf of Guinea can be secured from piracy and terrorist attacks. The Gulf of Guinea, experts believe, has the largest deep-water, offshore oil reserves in the world.¹⁶ The states that surround the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of Africa include Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo. While the present administration has vigorously denied any movement toward building a permanent US presence in the region, all the signs seem to point in the other direction.

Beginning shortly after the September 11th attacks, the US government and private military companies began visiting parts of West Africa to set the framework for an onslaught of American investment, including approximately \$5 billion invested in Equatorial Guinea alone.¹⁷ In a 2002 report, the US National Intelligence Council predicted that by 2015 no less than 25 percent of US oil imports would come from the Gulf of Guinea, compared to roughly 15–17 percent now.¹⁸ As such, recent trade agreements between the United States and African states have improved the conditions under which oil imports come to the US, leading some to claim that the trade pacts were essentially aimed at increasing the flow of crude oil from West Africa.¹⁹ Trade flows between the United States and Africa have been dominated by oil; in 2000 about 68 percent of US imports from Africa were oil products, and 40 percent of the oil imports were duty free under either the Generalized Systems of Preference or the African Growth and Opportunity Act.²⁰ Those numbers have been projected to climb in the coming years.

Given the prevailing economic and political conditions in the post–September 11th environment, it has been easier for policymakers to seek alternative sources of oil, rather than alternative resources. Partly driving that decision are American consulting and lobbying firms that have made strong moves to represent the Gulf of Guinea states and their interests. Amongst them include former Oklahoma congressman, JC Watts, who led several delegations to Abuja, Nigeria to investigate the oil industry there and elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea Region. Watts now heads The JC Watts Companies, which lobbies on behalf of petroleum interests in the Gulf of Guinea. Other Washington insiders include Calvin Humphrey, former assistant secretary for International Affairs at the Energy Department; Andrew Young, former UN ambassador; Walter Carrigan, former US ambassador to Nigeria; Walter Kansteiner, former assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to the first President Bush; and Whitney Schneidman, deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs during the Clinton

administration.²¹

Additional movements toward a regional security pact to protect these investments in the Gulf of Guinea have included military assistance. In July 2004, deputy commander of United States forces in Europe, Charles Wald, traveled to Nigeria for high-level talks with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo on establishing a program named African Coastal Security, with its primary objective being the protection of the Gulf of Guinea. Substantively, the African Coastal Plan would simply exchange oil for military assistance on the part of the United States.²² Additionally, since 2003, the US military has been advising the government of Sao Tome on how to restructure its military and to protect the country's coasts. In February 2004, the US Trade Development Agency financed the first studies on constructing a deep-water port in Sao Tome. The only purpose such a port could have would be to accommodate large oil tankers, as Sao Tome does not export large amounts of any other commodity.²³ Rumors have also persisted, though denied by the United States government, that the US is either in the negotiating or planning stages for a permanent military base in the Gulf of Guinea, most likely in Sao Tome.²⁴

West Africa may indeed turn out to be nothing more than a distant manifestation of today's Middle East.

The prospect of oil wealth has already begun to have disastrous political consequences for some of these West African countries. Nigeria, which has experienced political violence since its independence from Great Britain, has recently confronted political violence related to its oil refining in the Niger Delta region. The most recent attacks in the oil-rich Niger Delta provoked outrage from the Abuja government, which expressed its concern for the growing instability in the region while blaming the United States for being slow to assist in protecting the area. Nigeria's Vice President Atiku Abubakar noted that negotiations with the United States for assistance did not "appear to be moving as fast as the situation is unfolding."²⁵ As a result, in 2005, Nigeria signed an \$800 million deal to supply PetroChina with 30,000 barrels-a-day of oil, and the Chinese have agreed to supply the Nigerians with military equipment needed to fight rebels in the Delta region.²⁶ However, Nigeria's instability problems in the Delta region, primarily related to the poverty and inequality caused by corruption in the government and oil industry, may be the least of the country's problems.

As a major oil producer with a large Muslim population—about 50 percent of the total population—Nigeria has been on the periphery of the new war on terrorism. Recent clashes between Islamic and Christian communities have heightened tensions in the country. Islamic extremists are rumored to be operating primarily in northern Nigeria. Such rumors are not surprising and their truth may be more than either the United States or Nigeria wish to believe. Just prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Osama bin Laden, in an address to the Iraqi people, called

upon Muslim populations to rise up against oppressive regimes associated with the United States: “We also stress to true Muslims that...they must motivate and mobilize the umma to liberate themselves from their enslavement to these oppressive, tyrannical, apostate ruling regimes who are supported by America, and to establish God’s rule on earth. The areas most in need of liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.”²⁷ If conditions in Nigeria continue to deteriorate, it will become increasingly likely that Islamic extremism generated both inside and outside the country will become an increasingly important factor in Nigeria’s long-standing conflict between Muslims and Christians.²⁸

While corruption and civil conflict are endemic in Nigeria, other Gulf of Guinea countries have similar problems, which are now being exacerbated by their newfound potential for oil wealth. In July 2003, forces in Sao Tome stopped an attempted military coup against President Menezes. An agreement signed with the rebels shortly afterward included provisions to manage the country’s oil wealth. In Equatorial Guinea, one of the primary targets of US training and investment, the 2004 US State Department Report on Human Rights has said that

*The Government human rights record remained poor, and the Government continued to commit serious abuses. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government peacefully. Security forces committed numerous abuses, including torture, beating, and other physical abuse of prisoners and suspects, which at times resulted in deaths. Prisoners often were tortured to coerce confessions....Members of the security forces generally committed abuses with impunity. Security forces used arbitrary arrest, detention, and incommunicado detention. Foreigners with legal standing were arbitrarily harassed, detained, and deported. The judicial system repeatedly failed to ensure due process....Discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly the Bubi ethnic group and foreigners continued. The government restricted labor rights. Child labor persisted and forced prison labor was used. The Government passed an anti-trafficking law during the year, but trafficking in persons continued, largely unchecked by the government.*²⁹

Echoing the State Department’s Report, the Office of the Press Secretary released a Presidential announcement on September 10, 2004, stating that under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, “... Sudan, Venezuela and Equatorial Guinea ... failed to make significant efforts [to stop human trafficking], and are thus subject to sanctions, [but] the President has determined that certain assistance for these three countries would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.”³⁰

What all three of these countries have in common is that they are, or are becoming, significant players in oil production. Venezuela has long been a supplier of crude oil to the United States. Sudan has long been suspected of having significant oil reserves.³¹ As a result, the Chinese government has actively funded the exploration of Sudan’s oil fields, building roads and bridges and community housing in the region. The Sudanese government for its part has used these Chinese built roads and bridges as a much more efficient method to ethnically cleanse the regions where oil exploration has been occurring. Equatorial Guinea is considered one of the

fastest growing producers of oil in West Africa, which has led to a willingness in the US administration to turn a blind eye to its human trafficking problem. Such malignant disregard of abuses, as noted earlier, has been a basic premise of US foreign policy for decades. In general, Equatorial Guinea's government is probably best summarized by Geoffrey Wood who referred to it as a "criminal state."³² Of course, it is not just the United States that is involved in the move toward African oil; other countries including Russia, China, and even Saudi Arabia and South Korea have already invested millions of dollars into exploration rights in West Africa. Such heavy stakes and special interests make Africa the frontier in the new geo-strategic re-alignments that the scramble for oil is creating among the major global powers.

CONCLUSION

Some time ago, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey stated that the basic problem the United States has had in the Middle East relates to its treatment of the countries in the region as its personal gas station and the people like gas station attendants: "...we convinced many people there that we did not give a damn about the people in the region and that we cared principally about its oil; that it was a filling station for our large sport utility vehicles."³³ It would seem that the only lessons that we have learned in the past fifty years of dealing with the Middle East is that we need a new gas station because the old one is now in a bad neighborhood. While the Pentagon, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies see West Africa as removed from the political violence that has rocked the Middle East, it should be a sober reminder that Africa's post-colonial history is wracked with unrest and instability.

Africa, already plagued by civil unrest, military coups, endemic corruption, ethnic conflict, and even genocide, is a bubbling caldron of political problems. Oil and the promises of oil are not going to make the region any more stable; in fact, it will only serve to further destabilize the region. In the long term, as oil becomes the trump card in Africa, the United States will increasingly be looked upon as a source of instability and chaos on a continent that is already wracked with monumental problems. If the chickens have come home to roost in the Middle East, new chickens are being hatched in West Africa. A few years, or decades, will tell if the search for alternative sources of oil was a better choice than the search for alternative sources of energy.

Ultimately, the failure of American foreign policy is rooted in the imagining of the national interest in only short-term stretches; nothing represents this more clearly than the petroleum problem each administration since World War II has faced. The United States, at this pivotal point in its history, is faced with the choice of either maintaining its failed policy of continually seeking and securing new petroleum supplies, or turning to a longer-term foreign policy conception that would favor extricating itself from this cycle. In the end, the transition from a Middle Eastern oil supply to either one that is diversified across countries or focused primarily in Western Africa is still nothing more than a reflection of decades of failed energy

policy, driven by short-term gains, and passed from one administration to the next. West Africa may indeed turn out to be nothing more than a distant manifestation of today's Middle East.

The United States should not take that chance. A foreign policy centered on securing supplies of petroleum is unsustainable, costly, and deadly for all involved. The United States should do what it has done best for over two centuries: innovate and develop new technologies, which will ultimately decrease its overall dependence on petroleum. While pressures from lobbying groups in Washington may make this a difficult political choice for the president and members of Congress, the greater challenge could become justifying American soldiers coming home in body bags—this time from West Africa.

Notes

¹ For a good discussion of the critical junctures issue see: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

² Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49. For the immediate, major critiques of Huntington's thesis, see: "Responses to Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations?'," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993): 2–27.

³ As Herbert Bix noted "Kamikaze attacks on Allied warships and troop transports were an entirely different threat, however, a real and dangerous one. They were a kind of weapon Americans, Australians, and Britons simply could not understand, and for that reason found all the more disturbing. Hirohito, however, clearly understood the rhetoric of sacrifice, and he may have hoped that the kamikaze tactic would prove militarily effective." See: Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 482.

⁴ United States Government, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," The White House, 2006, Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, (Accessed May 22, 2006).

⁵ Robert Andrews et al. (ed.) *The Columbia World of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁶ For an account of these events see Marlise Simons, "Spain Turns on Rebels with Outrage," *The New York Times*, July 15 1997; "Million Join March Against Basque Terrorism in Spain." 1997. *New York Times*, July 15, Late Edition (east Coast). <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed February 12, 2006); Peiyin Patty Li, "Will it Hold? The ETA Ceasefire in Spain," *Harvard International Review*, Winter 1998/9, 10–11.

⁷ Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus, "Al Qaeda- Hussein Link Dismissed," *The Washington Post*, July 17, 2004.

⁸ Troop support has become a significant issue in the debates on why stability did not come to Iraq after the invasion. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki argued before the invasion that hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed in the post-invasion operations to secure Iraq and to bring stability to the country. That argument led to an early retirement for General Shinseki, who lost favor with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz. Others, including L. Paul Bremer, former administrator of the US-led occupation in Iraq, have said that the lack of troop support was a major mistake in the Iraq campaign. See Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 2004), 34–56; Micheal O'Hanlon, "Speaking the Truth," *The Washington Post*, May 3, 2005; Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks, "Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels; Ex-Overseer of Iraq Says U.S. Effort Was Hampered Early On," *The Washington Post*, October, 5 2004.

⁹ The Presidency of the United States, State of the Union Address, Washington D.C., 2006

¹⁰ For a discussion of Iran's historical relationship with the West, see: John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 103-17; for a discussion of the Soviet perspective of its immediate post-World War II relationship with Iran, see: Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974), 426-30; for a discussion of US covert operations and economic interests in Iran, see: Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

¹¹ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 104-5.

¹² "Nixon and Shah Exchange Praise, Confer in Oval Office," *The New York Times*, July 25, 1973.

¹³ Bruce Lawrence (ed), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, (London: Verso, 2005), 183.

¹⁴ "Carter Lauds Shah on his Leadership," *The New York Times*, November 16, 1977.

¹⁵ Marguerite Michaels, "Retreat from Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1993/1994): 93–109.

¹⁶ "Oil Giants Eye African Prospects," BBC News, May 20, 2003; Neil Ford, "Oil Money Begins to Flow

In," *African Business*, June 2003, 40–41.

¹⁷ Pádraig Carmody, "Transforming Globalization and Security: Africa and America Post-9/11," *Africa Today*, (Fall 2005): 99.

¹⁸ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, 2002. The US Department of Energy estimates US imports of crude oil from West Africa at roughly six percent of US total imports; however, the discrepancy with the NIC estimates may evolve from different accounting methods and categories. US Department of Energy data are available from the Energy Information Administration, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oiltrade.html> (Accessed February 6, 2006).

¹⁹ "By-Passing OPEC in West Africa," *African Energy Intelligence*, February 13, 2002.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ "Republican Lobbyists in Gulf of Guinea," *African Energy Intelligence*, September 22, 2004

²² "Protecting Oil Fields," *African Energy Intelligence*, July 21, 2004.

²³ In this regard, Sao Tome and Principe have made a remarkable transformation from a country that exports mainly cocoa to a potential West African petro-power. For an excellent discussion on this transformation, see: Jedrzej George Frynas, Geoffrey Wood, Ricardo M S Soares de Oliveira, "Business and politics in Sao Tome e Principe: From cocoa monoculture to petro-state," *African Affairs* (Jan. 2003): 51–80.

²⁴ With regard to the use of Sao Tome as a military base, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies has recommended through its African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) that the US create a new military command in West Africa, similar to that which exists in South Korea, to protect US oil interest. See: Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: West Africa and Its Oil," *African Affairs*, Jan. 2003, 135–138.

²⁵ Dino Mahtano, "Nigeria turns to China for Defense Aid," *Financial Times*, February 27, 2006.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Bruce Lawrence (ed), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, (London: Verso, 2005), 183.

The transformation of Sao Tome and Principe to an oil producer also had to overcome off shore drilling and territorial water disputes with Nigeria. For a discussion of the potential joint development arrangements in the area, see: Hurst Groves, "Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Economics, Politics and the Rule of Law in the Nigeria-Sao Tome E Principe Joint Development Zone," *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 1 (Fall 2005).

²⁸ For a discussion on the impact of religion on the Nigerian state, see: Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: the crisis of religious politics and secular ideologies*, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1998).

²⁹ United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004, Washington D.C., 2005.

³⁰ Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., 2004.

³¹ For a discussion of this, see: Ricardo Rene Laremont and Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., "Ethnic Grievance or Material Greed," in *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State*, ed. Ricardo Rene Laremont (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

³² Geoffrey Wood, "Business and Politics in a Criminal State: The Case of Equatorial Guinea," *African Affairs* 103, no. 413 (2004): 547–567.

³³ R James Woolsey, "At War for Freedom," *The World Today*, August/September 2003, 6.

First Lady Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy Activism of First Lady Clinton

by Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz

First lady activism is conditioned by many factors on various levels. There are personal, institutional, societal, and public policy levels, and many variables within each level contribute to first lady activism or performance. Former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was one of the most active first ladies in modern memory. This article explores the genesis of her activism in the foreign policy realm. We first discuss the general factors that affect first lady performance. These factors are arranged in various variable sets. We then apply these sets to First Lady Clinton in order to gain some systematic understanding of her activism. With such insight we next discuss the most important of these variables which have affected First Lady Clinton's activism in foreign policy.

FACTORS AFFECTING FIRST LADY PERFORMANCE

Historian Carl Sferrazza Anthony once noted concerning first ladies, "Only the First Lady and the president determine the extent of her power, though frequently she has operated without his knowledge or permission."¹ Modern-day first ladies operate within a textured and complicated political environment composed of many variables that affect their power, influence, and ultimately, their activism. These variables are not only personal in nature but also involve the administrative environment within the White House and the Office of the First Lady. The public and the political climate during a first lady's tenure can also affect her performance.

A list of factors affecting first lady performance or activism can be gleaned from the literature on first ladies.² There are a series of personal attributes that can affect performance, such as the first lady's background, her ambition, vision, and ideology. The first lady's background consists of her personal, professional, and educational background, and general biographical information, such as employment history, schools attended, etc. A first lady's ideology is developed from her background and consists of things like religious, moral, and political views. Ambition and vision develop from a first lady's background. There seems to be a correlation between ambition and vision and the first lady's attitude toward her office, which is in turn

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linked to performance and activism. Performance can be defined in terms of how active a first lady will be in using her office to affect public policy and is determined not only by the first lady's attributes, but also by those who have had an impact upon her in her formative years.

Certain administrative variables also affect performance. Resources, such as staff and budget, as well as the location of the Office of the First Lady and its relationship with the White House Office—highly integrated or barely integrated—set the stage for first lady performance. Resources can contribute toward increased activism, as can the location of the first lady's office near the center of the policy action. More important is the level of integration of these resources and personnel with that of the White House Office. In addition, a first lady's relationship with other governmental agencies can also affect performance and activism.

Does she adopt a non-policy, traditional issue-oriented approach to her office, or will she take a policy-advocate approach and tackle controversial issues?

How a first lady perceives issues can contribute to performance. Does she adopt a non-policy, traditional issue-oriented approach to her office, or will she take a policy-advocate approach and tackle controversial issues? If she adopts the latter she will most likely increase her interaction with interest groups, legislative committees, and bureaucratic agencies in pursuit of legislative success. If she adopts the former she will function as a spokesperson for charitable and social causes and, primarily, for the president's agenda.

A first lady's professional relationship with the president can largely impact her performance because a first lady's performance is determined to some extent by the president's performance in office. This is especially the case with the present high level of integration between the two offices.³ The level of performance is also tempered by the level of support the first lady receives from the president. If, within the nature of their professional relationship, the president is supportive and encourages the first lady to take a more active approach, she will be more inclined to perform a variety of duties, serving in capacities ranging from hostess to diplomat. She will also function as an active partner, presidential spokesperson, political player, and overall assistant to the president.

Finally, the public has an impact upon first lady performance. Events, the media's interpretation of these events, public expectations, opinion polls, and public criticism and approval all affect the political climate within which a first lady operates. These variables are closely interrelated. Events such as social unrest, tragedies like September 11th, or other crises affect the political climate in which a first lady operates. What the media chooses to report or how it reports can affect public reactions and expectations, which in turn can affect the political climate and the first lady's performance. Opinion polls reflecting public criticism or approval are extremely prone to change in time and may affect her performance. Witness the

different opinions of First Lady Hillary Clinton in the beginning of her tenure as opposed to those during the Lewinsky scandal.

One of the variables that might have an impact upon the public's expectations of first ladies is the public's knowledge of the historic duties and roles of first ladies. What does the public know about first ladies? This educational variable is important because it can affect public attitudes toward first ladies. In a study of American government and presidency textbooks Eksterowicz and Watson conclude:

Many of these texts portray the first lady as simply an appendage of the president. Her political agenda, duties, and influence are ignored.... While a few texts do offer glimpses of first ladies' efforts on behalf of social causes, none gives the students enough information to understand why or how they were able to accomplish what they did. Moreover, a listing of first ladies' "pet projects" fails to capture the essence and range of activism and influence of the first ladyship.⁴

The authors go on to suggest that American government and presidency textbooks devote increased coverage to the first ladyship as an institution.

The lack of coverage of first ladies in textbooks, especially in higher education general liberal studies courses, provides insufficient knowledge concerning the roles and responsibilities of first ladies. This in turn can affect public opinion and coverage of first ladies by the media. Most coverage of first ladies in the popular press appears in the style section of newspapers and in magazines such as *Good Housekeeping*.⁵ Such coverage can lead to simplistic public assessments of the first lady and her office and can affect the performance of first ladies.

VARIABLE SETS AND FIRST LADY CLINTON

As First Lady Clinton describes her commitment to civil rights and women and children's issues, one can view an all-encompassing dedication to governmental policies that affect these issues. Mrs. Clinton was and remains involved in health care, adoption, the right to choose, mitigation of domestic violence, and electoral rights. During her tenure as first lady, she engaged in extensive contacts with legislators, testified before the Congress, and formed alliances both inside and outside Washington with groups such as Vital Voices and the Children's Defense Fund. She had her failures, such as the unsuccessful attempt to introduce universal health care, but she also had successes such as the C.H.I.P. program.⁶ The following section briefly overviews the variable sets which have allowed her to perform well as an active, policy-driven first lady.

The personal attribute variable set forms the foundation for First Lady Clinton's performance and activism. In her autobiography, *Living History*, Mrs. Clinton discusses her early years. She notes the importance of her family, especially her father, from whom she inherited a competitive nature. Her sense of optimism and vision for policy issues are derived both from her religious background and college education. Mrs. Clinton's Methodist upbringing contributed to her combining the idea of religious good with that of public policy—she often writes of good public

policy as a duty with religious and moral overtones. Her education at Wellesley College blended classroom experience with real world activism, which resulted in her particular dedication to civil, women's, and children's rights.

During her tenure as first lady, Mrs. Clinton was doubtlessly aware of the contributions of previous first ladies such as Lady Bird Johnson, Rosalyn Carter, and Nancy Reagan, all of whom had increased the size, prominence, and influence of the first lady's office. Mrs. Clinton did her share to uphold this trend. She was the first first lady to have her office in the West Wing, and she also had an additional office in the Old Executive Office Building, just down the hall from other offices in the president's West Wing office. Mrs. Clinton's second Chief of Staff Melanne Verveer indicated that such proximity to the Oval Office was important because of the integration of the two offices on public policy issues.⁷ Mrs. Clinton echoed this observation when she noted, "...some of my staff would be part of the West Wing team. I thought they should be integrated physically as well.... These physical and staff changes were important if I was going to be involved in working on Bill's agenda, particularly as it related to issues affecting women, children and families."⁸ Indeed, her work on the Health Care Task Force was integrated with the White House. Mrs. Clinton's involvement in this issue was initially challenged and led to a federal court of appeals decision in *Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Hillary Rodham Clinton*. The court sided with the Clinton Justice Department's argument suggesting that Mrs. Clinton was a government employee. This is the first formal court ruling on the position of the first lady, and it will serve to advance the Office of the First Lady as an institution.⁹ It is also an example of how location of office, resources, and integration with other governmental agencies (via health care task force work) and with the White House Office can facilitate first lady-policy activism.

By the end of the Clinton presidency, the public came to expect a certain amount of advocacy from Mrs. Clinton due to the evolution of her office.

Mrs. Clinton's personal relationship with her husband and President Clinton's own activism helped a great deal in her issue advocacy. Many of the first lady's issues, ranging from health care to human rights, were also championed by President Clinton. Thus, the president and first lady were in synch in their policies.¹⁰ Their professional partnership also entailed First Lady Clinton's campaigning vigorously for President Clinton while tending to her more domestic first lady duties. Thus, the strength of the Clinton presidency, policy synchronization, and the professional partnership of the Clintons all contributed to an activist Office of the First Lady.

In terms of public opinion, First Lady Clinton describes her ups and downs and the difficulty of managing public expectations for first ladies in general.¹¹ The public's expectations of First Lady Clinton shifted dramatically during her tenure, as did her approval and criticism from both the media and public. By the end of the

Clinton presidency, the public came to expect a certain amount of advocacy from Mrs. Clinton due to the evolution of her office. Thus as the Clinton Presidency evolved, so too did the public's expectation concerning First Lady Clinton's issue advocacy, and there was increasing support for first lady activism as the Clinton administration proceeded.¹² Mrs. Clinton was one of the most active modern first ladies at home, as well as in the foreign policy arena. It is our contention that many of the above variables played a significant role in her foreign policy activism.

MRS. CLINTON'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM

Hillary Rodham Clinton first traveled abroad as first lady when she accompanied President Bill Clinton to the G-7 economic summit in Japan in July 1993. In early 1994, she made her first official trip abroad without the president, leading the American delegation to the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway. Later that year, in May, the first lady joined Vice President Al Gore as a last minute replacement for the president as a member of the US delegation to the presidential inauguration of Nelson Mandela in South Africa. In March 1995, she took her first extended trip abroad without the president when she traveled to South Asia. In September, she traveled to China, where she served as honorary Chair of the American delegation and delivered a key address at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. In November, 1995, she would join the president on an official trip to England, Ireland, Germany, and Spain. The next summer she would partner with United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright on a tour of Eastern and Central Europe. She accompanied the president to Australia, the Philippines and Thailand in 1996. Accompanied by Chelsea, as she often was on her foreign travels, the first lady returned to Africa in March 1997. In July, Hillary Rodham Clinton accompanied the president to a NATO Summit in Madrid, where she was the keynote speaker at the Vital Voices: Women in Democracy meeting. Before the year ended, she traveled to Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a Third Way meeting and to Central Asia. In 1998, the Clintons visited Africa, China, Russia, Ireland, and the Middle East. They returned to the Middle East in January, 1999, for the funeral of King Hussein of Jordan. The first lady would also make trips that year to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Balkans.

The preceding overview does not constitute a full listing of the overseas trips taken by Hillary Rodham Clinton as first lady between 1992 and 2000. It does provide a sense of the frequency and scope of these travels. What are we to make of them? Traditionally, foreign travel by first ladies has been categorized under the heading of symbolic representation of the United States. This is one of three functions that diplomats perform, the other two being legal and political representation,¹³ and it is generally seen as the least significant to the overall conduct of diplomacy. Some of Mrs. Clinton's trips certainly fall into this category.

However, as practiced by Hillary Rodham Clinton, first lady diplomacy was much more than an exercise in symbolism. Her diplomacy was consistent with the manner in which diplomacy is conducted in the contemporary international system.

At the same time, her diplomacy was the product of the interaction of a set of personal and institutional forces that are not present in every administration. There is thus no reason to expect that all first ladies that follow her will engage in non-symbolic diplomacy.¹⁴ There are several possible explanations for First Lady Clinton's foreign policy activism.

Complex interdependence has enlarged the universe of political actors who can engage in diplomacy and the goals whose realization diplomacy can advance.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye identified complex interdependence as a prism through which to understand world politics today.¹⁵ The concept revolves around three characteristics of the international system: multiple channels of interaction, an absence of hierarchy among issues, and the lessened utility of military force to achieve policy ends. Together, these three characteristics hold profound implications for diplomatic activity. They leave unchanged the notion that the fundamental purpose of diplomacy is to lessen conflicts among states and promote peace. And, as Hans Morgenthau argued, diplomacy continues to be the primary mechanism for determining goals, strategies, and power relationships.¹⁶ The new nature of the international system has made diplomacy "messier" by permitting officials in one state to more readily reach citizens in another. Complex interdependence has enlarged the universe of political actors who can engage in diplomacy and the goals whose realization diplomacy can advance.

With these observations in mind, we can take a new look at the global travels and diplomacy of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. The first point to stress is that her diplomacy was conceived of as part of a larger whole—it was never seen in isolation from the broader foreign policy goals of the Clinton administration. At one extreme, this took the form of being told to avoid Cuba's Fidel Castro "at all costs" at a diplomatic function so as not to enrage anti-Castro factions in Florida.¹⁷ It also meant being sent to places the State Department felt were "too small, too dangerous, or too poor" to send the president.¹⁸ For instance, it was the first lady, not President Clinton, who was sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to show American support for the Dayton Peace Process. On a different occasion, when US–Chinese tensions were running high due to conflicts over Taiwan, nuclear proliferation, and human rights violations, the pluses and minuses of her trip to China were weighed carefully and her speech was reviewed by UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, and National Security Council human rights specialist Eric Schwartz.¹⁹

With increased political resources and activism also comes the potential for pursuing one's own foreign policy agenda. The first signs of this taking place came following her speech in Beijing. The first lady notes that "prior to Beijing when we traveled on official visits abroad I accompanied Bill where appropriate and attended spouses programs. In mid November (1996) when we made state visits to Australia,

the Philippines and Thailand, I followed my own agenda as well as Bill's."²⁰ She continues, "I usually branched off from Bill's official delegation... and reinforced the message that a nation's prosperity is linked to the education and well-being of girls and women."²¹

Hers was a personal diplomacy rather than an institutional diplomacy. It substituted direct and individual contacts with foreign leaders for the carefully scripted interactions between diplomats occurring in an organizational context that characterized traditional diplomacy. In 1994, she accompanied President Clinton on a trip to Russia that was designed to strengthen ties between Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin. During their discussions, the first lady met with Naina Yeltsin. While leading the US delegation to the Winter Olympics, she met with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland, who would go on to head the World Health Organization, and discussed health care issues. Other trips would have her meeting with leaders such as South African President Nelson Mandela, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Hungarian Prime Minister Gula Horn, Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, Ghana's President Jerry Rawlings, the Dalai Lama, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia.

While not consistent with the conduct of traditional diplomacy, personal diplomacy has become an increasingly important tool that heads of government use when trying to advance their international policy agendas. *Foreign Policy* has included the ability to establish good relations and rapport with world leaders as one of its evaluative questions in its Global Scorecard of presidential performance in foreign policy.²² This was President Clinton's highest scoring category and, conversely, one of President George W. Bush's lowest scoring categories.²³

In practicing public diplomacy, First Lady Clinton's principal audiences were individuals attending conferences or citizens to whom she sought to bring a message of hope.

In *Living History*, First Lady Clinton observes "one of the most important lessons I learned during my years as First Lady was how dependent the affairs of state are on the personal relationships among leaders.... But this sort of diplomacy requires constant nurturing and informal dialogue among the principals."²⁴ She speaks of the importance of her foreign contacts in a language similar to that used by world leaders in describing why they sought out meetings with foreign leaders. Good relations between spouses also contributed to positive relations between heads of state: "Forging good relations with my fellow spouses provided a convenient low-key communication among heads of state."²⁵ With regards to her five-day trip to Latin America, where she attended the annual meeting of the first ladies of the Western Hemisphere, she commented: "the personal interactions reinforced the value of building relationships that can smooth the path toward cooperation on

important projects.”²⁶

First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton also undertook public diplomacy. Public diplomacy consists of statements and actions of representatives of states that are intended to influence the public rather than the official leadership in another country. It is a major shift from classic diplomacy, which emphasizes secrecy and confidential bargaining among like-minded elites. Public diplomacy has been described as the “theater of power.” It is conducted through such varied means as public statements, press briefings, and state visits. In the past, public diplomacy often degenerated into propaganda, but its importance has been reaffirmed after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, when it became clear that success in the war against terrorism required that the US find a way to reach out directly to people in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Hillary Rodham Clinton’s foreign policy activism enhanced America’s soft power and provided a perceptual counterweight to official American foreign policy.

In practicing public diplomacy, First Lady Clinton’s principal audiences were individuals attending conferences or citizens to whom she sought to bring a message of hope. On her trip to Japan for the G-7 summit attended by President Clinton, she visited with a group of prominent Japanese women, the first of a dozen meetings of this type she would hold in her travels as first lady. Her trip to South Asia was organized at the request of the State Department, which wanted to highlight the administration’s commitment to the region but was unable to arrange for either the president or vice president to make such a trip. In India, Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke at the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation. In Nepal, she visited a women’s health clinic. Her most politically visible appearance came at the UN Women’s Conference in China where she asserted “it is no longer acceptable to discuss women’s rights as separate from human rights” and ended her speech with a call to action. The speech was politically charged both for its content and timing, coming shortly after the arrest, imprisonment, and then release of Chinese dissident Harry Wu. Later, she would deliver the keynote address at a Vital Voices forum in Vienna. A result of the Beijing Conference, Vital Voices was designed to bring together NGOs, US government representatives, and private corporations to further entrepreneurship by women, democracy, and peace. A trip to Latin America was designed to highlight US economic development programs, thus adding to the Clinton administration’s attempt to shift popular perceptions of US foreign policy in the region away from the US aid to the military juntas to its support for economic and political progress. Similarly, her trips to Africa were intended to highlight the self-help efforts of African women as supported by US foreign aid.

Her diplomatic efforts blended domestic and foreign policy in a manner that stepped outside of the traditional way of thinking underlining American foreign

policy, which stressed the primacy of American values and concerns over global ones. For example, it has long been recognized that the US position on international human rights emphasizes legal and civil rights to the detriment of economic and social rights, and that American international environmental policy has been driven by attempts to get other states to adopt American standards and to limit the cost of such policies to American firms.²⁷

The issues Hillary Rodham Clinton chose to stress were those which have long been a staple of American domestic politics: healthcare, children, education, and the position of women in society. She saw them as key to America and to the world's future as well: "In the new global economy, individual countries and regions would find it difficult to make economic or social progress if a disproportionate percentage of their female population remains poor, uneducated, unhealthy, and disenfranchised."²⁸

Where she parted company with the past was in a willingness to see the connections between foreign and domestic policy as being a two-way street in which not only the American experience held relevance for the world, but the experiences of others also held relevance to the United States. Prior to the Clinton presidency, during her husband's term as governor of Arkansas, Mrs. Clinton noted the relevance of microcredit projects that she had learned about on a trip to Bangladesh to poor rural communities in that state.²⁹ A trip to Nicaragua brought her attention to Mothers United, a microcredit organization supported by USAID, and inspired her advocacy in 1994 for a Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, which would provide financial assistance to distressed areas that were not being serviced by the established banking system.³⁰ A visit to an AIDS Information Center in Uganda revealed how HIV testing at this USAID-funded facility had already been used in the United States.³¹ A final example comes from a trip to China, where she noticed parallels between the Center for the Women's Legal Studies and Legal Studies of Beijing University and a small legal aid office she had run at the University of Arkansas.³²

CONCLUSION

Two general sets of conclusions emerge from this study. First and most concretely, it identifies the most important variables that influenced Hillary Rodham Clinton's foreign policy activism. Four stand out. First, her early life experiences were instrumental in forging the optimism and vision that she so passionately applied to the foreign policy area. Second, her knowledge of and commitment to the issues most important to her—healthcare, the status of women, and others—were especially important. These issues became central to her personal diplomacy. Third, her professional relationship with the president was also very important. Her office was highly integrated with the White House Office. Mrs. Clinton practiced foreign policy in synch with the Clinton administration, but she also achieved a certain amount of independence during her trips abroad. Fourth, the interplay between Mrs. Clinton's issues and her alliances of power were crucial to her public diplomacy. She

forged alliances with various NGOs and interest groups to advance the cause of issues important to women and children on the international level. Overall, the variables which affected Mrs. Clinton's foreign policy activism were personal, institutional, public, and issue driven. Mrs. Clinton's foreign policy activism reflected the complex international environment within which she operated and her own forward-looking, energetic nature.

Second, in a more speculative vein, Hillary Rodham Clinton's foreign policy activism provides us with a starting point for thinking about the conduct of foreign policy in a "flat world." Thomas Friedman observes that we have entered into a third era of globalization where the principal actors in world politics are not countries or corporations but individuals.³³ Moreover the dominant motif of international action is not domination, but collaboration. In analyzing impediments to the creation of a truly flat world, Friedman identifies a series of problems affecting individuals—illness, disempowerment, and feelings of alienation and humiliation. He speaks also of America's place in this new world. Though he provide hints as to what type of foreign policy might address these problems and promote collaboration at the individual level, he does not discuss this in a systematic fashion.

The logic of his argument suggests that the answer is not to be found primarily in intergovernmental relations or the activities of large international organizations. Rather, it is found in the actions of individuals. Need these be private individuals such as Bill Gates? Might they not also be representatives of governments, such as a first lady reaching out to individuals abroad in the spirit of collaboration in order to address such problems through the establishment of microcredit organizations, the promotion of health care, and conferences designed to empower women? Hillary Rodham Clinton's foreign policy activism enhanced America's soft power³⁴ and provided a perceptual counterweight to official American foreign policy. Where the exercise of American power typically occurs in conflict settings and often triggers cries of protest from individuals, Hillary Rodham Clinton's messages were generally viewed positively by individuals (although not necessarily by governments), especially by those individuals whose condition would contribute to the "un-flatness" of the world. The United States' ability to bring about and preserve a flat world may depend upon the successful pursuit of such track two foreign policy, in which official intergovernmental dialogue addressing existing problems are paired with individual activism on the part of government officials reaching out to individuals in a collaborative spirit.

Notes

¹ Carl Sferrazza Anthony, *First Ladies: The Saga of the President's Wives and Their Power, 1789–1961* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1990).

² For further information on these variables see, Anthony J. Eksterowicz, "Teaching First Ladies," *White House Studies* (Summer 2003): 325–340.

³ For a discussion of such integration see, Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Kristen Paynter, "The Evolution of the Role and Office of the First Lady: The Movement toward Integration with the White House Office," *The Social Science Journal* 37, no. 4 (2000): 547–562.

⁴ Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Robert P. Watson, "Treatment of First Ladies in American Government and

Presidency Textbooks: Overlooked, yet Influential, Voices,” *Political Science and Politics* 33 (September 2000): 593–594.

⁵ See for example the early coverage of Laura Bush. Ann Gerhart, “The First Lady’s First-Semester Report,” *Washington Post*, July 27, 2001, C1 and Ellen Levine, “We’re Going To Be Okay,” *Good Housekeeping*, January 2002, 100–105. Note also when First Lady Bush spoke about the treatment of women in Afghanistan, it was primarily covered by the Washington Post Style section. See Ann Gerhart, “Laura Bush’s Signal to Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, May 22, 2002, C1.

⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Living History* (New York: Scribner, 2004): 58–58, 414–415, 429, 228–233, 49–50.

⁷ Melanne Vermeer, Chief of Staff to Hillary Rodham Clinton, interview with Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Kristen Paynter, Old Executive Office Building, Washington D.C., October 19, 1999.

⁸ *Living History*, 132.

⁹ Anthony J. Eksterowicz and Kristen Paynter “The Evolution of the Role and Office of the First Lady,” in Robert Watson and Anthony Eksterowicz (eds.), *The Presidential Companion: Readings on the First Ladies* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 225.

¹⁰ *The Presidential Companion*, 119–120.

¹¹ *The Presidential Companion*, 119.

¹² For a discussion of these events see, *Living History*, 294–296, 474–475, 486–487.

¹³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, third edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 542–543.

¹⁴ Rosalyn Carter was also active in foreign policy. See Glenn Hastedt, “First Ladies and US Foreign Policy,” in *The Presidential Companion*, 192–209.

¹⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, third edition (New York: Longman, 2000).

¹⁶ *Politics among Nations*, 540.

¹⁷ *Living History*, 235.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 341.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 302.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 386.

²¹ *Ibid*, 388.

²² “Clinton’s Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy*, vol. 121 (November/December 2000): 18–29.

²³ “Grading the President,” *Foreign Policy*, vol. 137 (July/August 2003): 28–41.

²⁴ *Living History*, 409.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 410.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 315.

²⁷ Glenn Hastedt (ed.), *One World, Many Voices: Global Perspectives on Political Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), 240–250, 288–299.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 298.

²⁹ *Living History*, 284.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 313.

³¹ *Ibid*, 405.

³² *Ibid*, 459.

³³ Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

³⁴ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004).

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The Cartoon Riots: A New Cultural Diplomacy

by Binoy Kampmark

In September 2005, riots erupted, diplomatic relations with much of the Muslim world were ruptured, two embassies were destroyed, and several lives were lost. In Syria, the Danish and Norwegian embassies were burned. In Gaza, Danish flags were set alight. In Yemen, 100,000 women marched in protest. This mayhem was the result of a Danish newspaper's publication of caricatures (commissioned illustrations for a children's book) depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The images were not flattering. One pictured Muhammad with a bomb-shaped turban. Another mocked Islam's purported ambivalence towards women's rights: heaven was apparently running short of virgins for suicide bombers. They were hardly humorous and the Danish Government, led by a stubborn Anders Fogh Rasmussen, defended the publication of the cartoons on the grounds of free speech.¹ How should these reactions be interpreted? Was the Muslim world entitled to take such measures?

The purpose of this article is to analyze the global reaction to the cartoons, within the broader context of diplomatic precedent, a task that has been neglected in favor of purely cultural critiques.² The study seeks out comparisons with previous events in order to posit how Islam and the West come to grips with the role of religion in their diplomatic relations and how the mechanics of those relations have developed. The paper also suggests that religion has been an important part of diplomatic history. As such, this current secular-religious clash requires another mode of analysis. What is needed is the realization that a new diplomacy – one that acknowledges the resurgent role religion and cultural considerations play in state relations – has developed. The nature of such diplomacy, it is suggested, undermines sovereignty and cultural independence by requiring nation-states, notably those of the West, to appraise ethnicity and statehood in a seemingly radical way, altering the current view of international statecraft as a secular practice.

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RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY

It is an incontrovertible fact that religion has been the subject of diplomacy for centuries. While religion has ceased to be a putative feature of diplomatic engagement between most power blocs in the world (Europe, the Americas, Asia), religion as a feature of international relations has not entirely disappeared. Islam, as a case in point, acknowledges no such exclusion of religion from diplomatic practice, despite the acceptance by most Muslim states of a “secular approach to the conduct of international relations.”³ Historically, European states often employed the use of religion and culture in foreign affairs. Even after the Protestant-Catholic confrontation of the devastating Thirty Years War (1618–1648), when a nominally secular idea of the nation-state came into being after the Treaty of Westphalia, the existence of clauses protecting religious minorities were still part and parcel of treaty law. The secularization of diplomacy in the West has not precluded the use of religion for the sake of political gain or the use of religion in forcing a respect of cultural values in another state. The presence of religious and cultural values in interstate relations, in short, is a historically consistent process.

A new diplomacy – one that acknowledges the resurgent role religion and cultural considerations play in state relations – has developed.

In the age of imperialism, it was not unheard of to legislate protective clauses for religious minorities. New scholarship has furnished a previously unexamined example from the 1860s. England and Italy sought a commercial agreement that would go on to become one of many marking the first push for a “common market” in Europe.⁴ The particular agreement is notable because British representatives inserted a religious clause protecting the rights of Protestants in Italy in an otherwise commercial treaty.⁵ To retain such a clause was perceived as potentially insulting by the Italians. The religious liberties of Protestants, so claimed Italian officials, were sufficiently protected under the Italian constitution. But, it was not inconsistent with London’s desire to import Protestant values into a militant doctrine of free trade.⁶

Islam acknowledges no official separation between diplomacy and religion, just as it recognizes no official division between governance and faith. As has been pointed out in some scholarship on the subject, classical Muslims saw Islam as the “one, true, final and universal religion” and central to their concept of the international system. The division between the Islamic and non-Islamic world would be ultimately overcome by “the movement from *Dar al-Harb* (abode of war encompassing unbelievers; Land of War) to *Dar al-Islam* (the abode of peace, encompassing all Muslims).”⁷ The former encompasses non-believers, those outside the domain of Islam; the latter comprises the faithful, the submissive, the believers under the rule of Islamic law and governance.

Such views are inherently antithetical to territorial considerations reflected by conventional doctrines of international engagement, such as the recognition of

states and governments: Islam has no boundaries and its kingdom is borderless. Some writers have gone so far as to see *Dar al-Islam* as a grim world, where non-Muslims incorporated into the boundaries of Muslim empires were given the rather limited choices of death, conversion, or the status of *dhimmi*—a second-class caste of citizens, deprived of the rights and status assured to Muslims.⁸

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the objections of Muslim governments to attacks on Islam should transcend the conventional limits of the State. Islam has been affronted and requires defense; it faces a world of conflict beyond its borders, which constantly presents challenges that are difficult to overcome. Scholars argue that Western nations have been insensitive. Such humor masks old ethnocentric insensitivities, eschewing cultural difference and tolerance. Muslim delegations have been sent to Denmark and they have complained of being “hurt.” Islam is affronted; the Prophet is inviolable, beyond representation, beyond parody.

The charge of being “hurt” should be taken seriously. Cultural hurt is the inevitable outcome of humor and parody. Parody is a weapon, recognized in cultures across the globe. Humor liberates. It attacks conventions and dogmas, subverting oppressive social structures.⁹ But the question to ask here is not whether the global village is humorless, but whether new international conventions have arisen, modifying cultural behavior within and beyond nation-states. Religion has again entered the equation of international relations, challenging the way states, notably those with Muslim immigrants, deal with their culturally diverse citizenry. Such citizens have affinities not merely with their adopted homeland, but with the countries of their faith. The protests caused by the cartoons must themselves be rationalized as part of this evolution. After all, there are representations of Muhammad in other parts of the Western world, too numerous to enumerate here. The US Supreme Court embosses the Prophet in its façade and still stands without a murmur of protest. An understanding of the cultural diplomacy that has developed is useful to such ends. How, for instance, were these protests instigated?

A NEW DIPLOMACY

There is a fundamentally new strain of international engagement that has arisen from the globalization of cultural debates. We think of the sensitivities posed by the question of the Holocaust, and the sensitivities associated with its commemoration or denial.¹⁰ As common citizens gradually break out of the cage of sovereignty, the individual is far more significant, not merely from the viewpoint of rights, but from the viewpoint of expression. The field of religious expression is one feature of this revolution.

The closest parallel to the current crisis is the controversy that surrounded the publication of *The Satanic Verses* by the British author Salman Rushdie.¹¹ With the release of the book in 1988, global tremors were felt. In October 1988, Islamic diplomacy (or rather, belligerent statesmanship) entered the fray, with Saudi Arabia taking up the cause in protesting against the book. As happened in the Danish case,

local Muslim representatives organized protests. Muslim representatives in Britain drummed up support for their cause by emphasizing the blasphemous quality of the work. Faiyazuddin Ahmad, of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, England, was invited to Jidda, Saudi Arabia to consult officials about mobilizing support against the book.

In February 1989, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that a bounty be put on Rushdie's head for having written a work he considered blasphemous.

The historical parallels between the Rushdie case and the Danish cartoons incident are striking. There were first protests in India, rather than the country of Rushdie's residence, Great Britain. Muslim members of the Indian parliament campaigned to have the book banned after excerpts and reviews in *India Today* and *Sunday* came to their attention.¹² Book burnings took place and there was a violent protest in Islamabad on February 12, outside the American Cultural Center. There were six casualties in all.¹³

The agitation of the Muslim diaspora against the Danish caricatures demonstrates the remarkable mobilization of its members.

The reaction toward the cartoons in the Danish case was similar. The difference, if anything, was the effectiveness of the agitation and the speed with which the message against their publication was disseminated. The Muslim community in Denmark spread the word by telephone and the blogosphere was filled with discussion. Boycotts of Danish goods took place, first in Saudi Arabia, where text messaging spread the word with incredible speed. Arla Foods, a Danish dairy company with a highly profitable cheese business in the Middle East, suffered losses amounting to €1.5 million per day.¹⁴ But the key factor, the effective mobilization of low-level organizations and activists, managed to convince member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a group of fifty-seven Islamic countries, to boycott a Danish exhibition to be held in Denmark that summer. Flushed with indignation, a group of Danish Imams led by such figures as the truculent spokesman Ahmed Akkari and Sheikh Raed Hlayhel, journeyed to the Al-Azhar University in Cairo with the express purpose of consulting prominent Muslims, amongst them the Grand Mufti and Arab League officials. They were armed with a dossier of inflammatory publications highlighting the plight of Muslims as a minority in Denmark. The forty-three page document in their possession placed less emphasis on the original cartoons of the prophet than other newly acquired material – amongst them clippings from the *Weekend Avisen* and samples of hate mail.¹⁵ It took time to take hold, but in January, when the photos were rerun, the seeds of anger flourished.

The agitation of the Muslim diaspora against the Danish caricatures demonstrates the remarkable mobilization of its members in combating a style of behavior, common within secular societies, but regarded in Islamic societies, as

offensive. But, there is a transnational dimension as well, one that defies territorial constraints associated with traditional diplomacy. An efficient group of clerics and intellectuals have facilitated an effective Muslim voice in the international community. They have developed philosophies that meld into local environments. The logical connection between national (the cleric preaching in a Copenhagen mosque) and international actions (the same cleric protesting to representatives of the Arab League) reveals a common strategy: individuals within the diaspora campaign for the rights of Muslims within non-Muslim societies while making their positions known in the Muslim world through such remarkable networks as Al-Jazeera. While doing so, they pacify their non-Muslim hosts with promises of integration and tolerance. The cleric, Ahmed Abu Laban, a leading figure in the NGO, Islamic Faith Community—a body comprising the membership of approximately twenty-seven Muslim organizations—is a case in point. While professing to be conciliatory, he still co-authored, along with Akkari, the vengeful dossier illustrating acts of anti-Muslim fervor committed by Danes.¹⁶

But there are others. Figures such as Dyab Abu Jahjah of Antwerp or Tariq Ramadan of Switzerland, grandson of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, have insisted that Islam's identity trumps Western norms within the non-Muslim setting. Abdurhahman Alamoudi, now serving a twenty-three-year prison sentence for breaching anti-terrorist laws in the US, was feted by the Clinton and Bush administrations as a voice of tolerance and “mainstream” American Islam. Yet, in 1996, at an address to the Islamic Association for Palestine, he was quoted as saying, “I think if we are outside this country, we can say ‘Oh, Allah, destroy America.’” At other stages, after his arrest in 2003, he shifted his focus from the US to targets in Europe and Latin America.¹⁷

Cultural diplomacy is, by nature, a breach of sovereignty.

There is, in short, an entire dimension of international diplomacy that is happening outside official channels. A twenty-first-century global village has now mobilized political actors outside the State Department, the White House, and UN headquarters in New York City. On the one hand, human rights and environmental NGOs have diminished the conventional role of nation-states as the exclusive actors of international relations. But, there is a far more pressing modern phenomenon that has come on the heels of such agencies: religion. Non-state actors, specifically religious figures with transborder connections, feed their faithful with messages that are duly adapted for the politics of the moment.

The Muslim diaspora has become a potent force in this new diplomacy due to the highly effective way its religious representatives within non-Muslim societies have rallied support for Islamic causes. The danger posed by the actions of such representatives is the powerful show of support for their causes from States of the *Dar al-Islam*. Iran and Syria, who were keen to promote the demonization of Denmark and the West in the aftermath of the publications, come to mind as examples.¹⁸ Such a phenomenon has triggered worries that multiculturalism is not

merely weak but fatal, protecting the very agents that seek to undermine it.¹⁹ But such concerns are extreme. Turkish Muslims in Denmark have proven remarkably resilient in adapting to existing conditions. Most do not seek to convert the western state into an abode of the Islamic faithful. Given Islam's enormously diverse pool of immigrants in the West, the problems and aspirations of various Muslim groups vary.

SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS

The implications of conducting cultural diplomacy through non-state actors are significant. First, cultural diplomacy is, by nature, a breach of sovereignty. Second, when such diplomacy is backed by states (Iran, Syria) it becomes a danger to territorial integrity. Cultural diplomacy is anathema to sovereignty: it requires one nation to alter its domestic approach to cultural values to make it acceptable to a concert of other nations. Islam only knows its own sovereignty. Here is the impasse. The prophet may be inviolable, but so is Danish sovereignty.

Sovereignty is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, a legacy of post-war security agreements. True, these agreements have been challenged. The current global order undermines state borders at short notice: international disease, refugee flows, and terrorism know no specific boundaries. There is, additionally, a debate about global citizenship, the idea of a universal morality, and a common basis for politics and governance that transcends the limits of the individual state.²⁰ But the notion that a state must increase its control on the press or impose penalties for alleged infractions of cultural sensitivities poses a challenge to the internal order of nations. Is there a solution to this problem?

APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS

It is apposite to see the cartoon riots as fundamental to a broader problem between Islam and the West. But such problems are solvable through a historical approach, which finds its solution in diplomatic precedent. Islamic and non-Islamic states have engaged in remarkably enlightened discussions in the past, exempt from the warring features and hostility that often characterize these culture wars that have become the stock and staple of history. One of the most remarkable treaties ever signed between a Muslim and non-Muslim state is the 1535 Treaty of Alliance between Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent and the then King of Spain, Francis I. Its framework guaranteed peace between the powers. The treaty granted reciprocal rights between subjects, allowing freedom of worship for French subjects within Ottoman territories and exempting them from the poll tax. It allowed the French to send a bailiff to Ottoman territories to assess disputes that might arise between Ottoman subjects and French merchants.²¹ Given the rather parochial standing of the prominent jurists of international law at that time—Albericus Gentilis and Hugo Grotius favored discrimination against non-Christian states—the agreement seems somewhat miraculous. The current sea of hostilities, the language of rogue states, and the accusations of Islam's backward orientation can give way to rapprochement.

The shape of such an agreement is admittedly complex; it is merely sufficient in this short note to illustrate precedents.

The current sea of hostilities, the language of rogue states, and the accusations of Islam's backward orientation, can give way to rapprochement.

The basic fact that Islam seemingly abrogates any form of division between state and religion should not imply the incapacity of Islamic states to exert a constructive influence over this modern phenomenon of cultural diplomacy. In 1956, a scholar writing for the flagship journal of the American Society for International Law, argued that Muslim states, in the twentieth century, had proven "active" in participating in "international conferences, in the League of Nations, and the United Nations and its agencies" demonstrating the case that the *Dar al-Islam* had "reconciled" its dictates with the *Dar al-Harb*.²² Despite their refusal to accept the international dimension of other legal systems, a corollary of Islamic states' refusal to accommodate the non-Islamic world, Islamic nations gradually established those features associated with a "law of nations." In other words, even in the field of international relations, religious states have a constructive role to play within the *Dar-al-harb*. Even if there was a supposition that the entry into negotiations with a state, the signing of a treaty, or the establishment of any formal relations was only based on the premise of convenience—Islamic states would not recognize the non-Islamic state—the very fact that such engagement took place demonstrates the importance and utility of understanding the curious manner of such states' conduct. In short, we can appreciate the concept of *Dar al-Islam* (Land or House of Islam) without endorsing pro-Arab designs or a repudiation of Judaic or Western models of cultural-diplomatic understanding.²³

Certainly, Muslim states are capable of more moderate approaches on the issue of cultural sensitivity, which would assure the sovereignty of other states in the international system. The Malaysian reaction to Britain in the Rushdie affair is illustrative of such an approach. The Muslim fundamentalists' Malay party, Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS), endorsed the Ayatollah's fatwa, but the government did not. An official from PAS was noted as saying that the government needed to regard the "hypocrisy and insult of European countries and the US towards the Islamic ummah" and support the Khomeini's directive to "kill the enemies of Islam" with greater seriousness. The same official also argued that there was widespread disapproval of Britain's participation in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). "We are not anti-British but we do not want Britain to shelter acts that insult Allah and his prophet."²⁴ The Malaysian government was far more open to respecting the municipal laws of Britain, warning against the dangers of seeing Islam as a monolithic front.²⁵

There is a final point that should be heeded. The value of modern, instant communication should not be underestimated. There is a yawning chasm between

the developed and developing world and that is not merely economic, but cultural. Civil servants have lamented the decline of “public diplomacy”—the promotion of cultural values through global institutions such as the Goethe Institute, BBC services, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe.²⁶ Islam has been increasingly effective in garnering its forces within non-Muslim domains and facilitating sophisticated channels of communication through twenty-four hour exposure and establishing audiences in both European and Islamic societies. This comes on the heels of the establishment of Muslim schools and educational institutions in the *Dar al-Harb*. It seems logical that for the West to improve the accessibility of its messages, whether they be on the war on terror (that is, reiterating that the conflict is not one against Islam per se but its aberrant followers) or an amelioration of poverty in the third world, funding to its flagship broadcasters must be increased and its diplomatic exchanges improved. More effective communication channels might have countered militant reactions in the Islamic world at shorter notice. At the most basic level, the Danish Prime Minister, whilst holding to the view that Denmark’s press was entitled to express its views on the subject of depicting the Prophet, might have still engaged his Muslim counterparts with empathy. He might have at least met with the eleven Islamic ambassadors seeking his audience in October 2005. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit made it clear that punishment of the *Jylland-Posten* was not sought, merely a statement acknowledging “the need for and obligation of respecting all religions and desisting from offending their devotees” to quell prospects of an “escalation” in the crisis.²⁷

We have, in the final analysis, a departure from the norms of diplomatic engagement in the way Muslims in their non-Muslim settings reacted to the cartoons of the Prophet. International diplomacy is no longer exclusively fueled by conflicts of secular ideology (a free-market versus a command economy; liberalism versus communism). Religion, with its complex cultural, cross-border considerations, has become a paramount consideration in making policy. This requires that states realize how the highly mobile nature of the modern Muslim activist, operating from their adopted homes within the *Dar al-Harb*, may voice their grievances in the *Dar al-Islam*. A new diplomacy, aware of the cultural pitfalls brought on by this change of circumstances, is required. The twenty-first century, as the Gaullist Minister for Culture André Malraux posed, may indeed be an age of religion.

Notes

¹ “Danish Cartoons Raises Few Smiles in Arab World,” *Middle East Economic Digest* 50, no. 5 (February 3, 2006): 3.

² “Prophetic Insults: Free Speech Clashes with Religious Sensitivity,” *Economist* 378, no. 8459 (January 7, 2006): 44.

³ Majid Khadduri, “Islam and the Modern Law of Nations,” *American Journal of International Law* 50, 2 (April, 1956): 358-372.

⁴ P.T. Marsh, *Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Common Market, 1860-1892* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁵ Article 16 of the agreement is notable for this: Draft treaty attached to the letter Edmund Hammond (Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) to Sir J. Emerson Tennent, April 24, 1862, F.O. 881/1276 (Foreign Office Records), Public Records Office (PRO), Kew, England.

- ⁶ Hudson to Lord Russell, August 1, 1863, F.O. 45/42, PRO, Kew. I am indebted to Danilo Raponi's fine "Religion and Trade: the Anglo-Italian Commercial Treaty of 1863," as yet unpublished, for this point.
- ⁷ Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), 1.
- ⁸ David Pryce-Jones, "Muslims: Integration or Separatism?" *New Criterion* 24, no. 6 (February 2006): 4-9.
- ⁹ For an analysis of this function, see Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Folk Humour and Carnival Laughter," in *Rabelais and his World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).
- ¹⁰ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder, "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 1 (February 2002): 87-106.
- ¹¹ Salman Rushdie, *Satanic Verses* (New York: Viking, 1989).
- ¹² Daniel Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1990), 19.
- ¹³ Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair*, 24.
- ¹⁴ Kristina Bergmann, "The Comic Jihad: Throwing Oil on the Fire," *Spiegel Online*, February 4, 2006. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,398984,00.html> (Accessed August 28, 2006).
- ¹⁵ "Alienated Danish Muslims Sought Help from Arabs," *Spiegel Online*, February 1, 2006. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,398624,00.html> (Accessed August 28, 2006).
- ¹⁶ Karl Ritter, "Danish Imam accused of fuelling Cartoon Conflict says West must learn to Respect Islam," *Associated Press Newswires*, Feb. 11, 2006, Factiva Electronic Resource (Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive), accessed Feb. 28, 2006.
- ¹⁷ Joseph Braude, "Misled: Moderate Muslims and their Radical Leaders," *New Republic* 234, no. 7 (February 27, 2006): 19.
- ¹⁸ *APS Diplomat Recorder*, "Syria and Iran Accused Over Cartoon Riots Strife," 64, 8 (Feb. 11, 2006), Expanded Academic, Infotrac, Aug. 28, 2006.
- ¹⁹ See Daniel Johnson, "Terror and Denial," *Commentary* 122 (Jul-Aug., 2006), 83-5.
- ²⁰ Rainer Bauböck, *Transnational Citizenship* (Aldershot, Hants, England/Brookfield, Vermont: E. Elgar, 1994); Richard Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship," in *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenbergen (London, England: SAGE, 1994), 127-140.
- ²¹ Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," 361.
- ²² Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," 370-1.
- ²³ Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, "Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 11, no. 1 (February 1980): 1-2.
- ²⁴ Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 167, fn 67.
- ²⁵ Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, 146-147.
- ²⁶ Mark Leonard, "Diplomacy by Other Means," *Foreign Policy* 132 (September/October 2002): 48.
- ²⁷ Statement in "Egypten gav Fogh mulighed for forsonig" [Egypt gives Fogh the possibility for reconciliation], *Politiken*, February 22, 2006.

Address to Seton Hall University

By Robert E. Andrews

We probably all remember the images in the days after Saddam Hussein's government fell. They were dramatic images of Iraqis going to the street and pulling down a huge statue of Saddam Hussein in the last days of his regime. It was a compelling image of Iraqis taking rope and pulling over this statue of Saddam and watching, both literally and symbolically, his government fall to the ground.

At that very same spot where that statue tumbled to the ground, something different happened on October 24, 2005. A convoy of cars and trucks reached the security gate that is around that area. That area is a turnabout, as they call it over there—we call it a traffic circle in New Jersey. And near it are two of the most prominent hotels for visiting journalists, diplomats, and other people coming to Baghdad. One is called the Palestine Hotel, which is probably the most significant hotel in Baghdad. There was a security perimeter that existed around that circle. On October 24, a car breached that security perimeter, engaged some of the guards, and shot some of them. Several minutes later, a cement truck breached the same perimeter and detonated in front of the Palestine Hotel, killing, at last count, at least a dozen people—probably killing many more—and certainly injuring many others. Several minutes later another vehicle came through, apparently laden with explosives, and engaged some private security guards and US military personnel.

This vignette dramatically illustrates what I believe, sadly, is a failing US policy in Iraq. At the very spot where we were supposed to have our greatest triumph, where the statue of Saddam literally crumbled to the ground, there was violence and mayhem that was beyond belief in its human suffering, but all too believable in its frequency. There is not a day that goes by that we don't pick up the newspaper and read about similar attacks in virtually all parts of that country.

Another juxtaposition was the welcome, and good news, on October 25, that the votes have been counted, and it appears that the Iraqis have approved their new constitution. It was accompanied by the very welcome news that nearly two-thirds of eligible Iraqi voters went to the polls, under threat and fear of death, and participated in that referendum. That is a significant achievement that is not to be minimized.

The other news the same week was that the two thousandth US soldier gave his or her life. Through it all, whether it was the transfer of sovereignty, the foolish

Congressman Robert E. Andrews, (D-NJ) spoke at Seton Hall University on October 25, 2005.

declaration of “mission accomplished” on the deck of that aircraft carrier, the first elections on January 30th of 2005, or the constitutional referendum of ten days ago, one thing has remained consistent. Day in and day out, week in and week out, month in and month out, you can count on the fact that, on the average, every day two Americans lose their lives. You can count that, on the average, every day, week in and week out, month in and month out, dozens of innocent Iraqis lose their lives.

There are three views about the Iraq situation that are prevalent in American politics. Two of them are dysfunctional, and I think are doing the country a great disservice. The first is held by people who are adherents of our president—who voted for him, who support him, and in some cases who revere him. And it is their view (and I am to some extent oversimplifying) that what he is doing is right; that criticism of what is happening is informed by unfair partisanship, that things are getting better on a regular basis, and that somehow it is the US media that are the cause of the problem, because they are reporting all this bad news. I wish that our biggest problem in Iraq was that the US media was exaggerating our problem there. But the fact of the matter is, the most important fact is the number of folded American flags being handed to wives and mothers, brothers and sisters, and sons and daughters over the coffin of their loved ones. It is indisputable, it is painful, and it is real.

There is another view held by many people who do not support the president, who did not vote for him, do not support his agenda, and believe that very little he does makes any sense. Many of these people, in good faith, opposed the war in the first place, out of patriotic belief that it was the wrong thing for the country to do. And their view (and again I am oversimplifying) is that since the president caused this mess, let him figure out how to get out of it.

The lesson that we should learn from September 11th is if you permit a nation to become a sanctuary for terrorist activity, you can expect to be attacked.

We need more people who hold a third view, which is that it is everyone’s problem to figure out what success means in this situation; Republicans and Democrats. It is everyone’s problem to figure out how to solve this problem. That, of course, first acknowledges that there is a problem. I have been discouraged, as time has gone on, in hearing from the secretary of state, the secretary of defense and the president himself, a near blind refusal to acknowledge that there is a problem in the first place. You cannot solve a problem that you do not acknowledge that you have, and I think we need to start this discussion with that acknowledgment.

What I would like to talk about this afternoon is:

What is at risk in Iraq if we fail;

Why I think we are failing at present;

And most importantly, what I believe we must do to succeed.

What is at risk in Iraq is best understood by thinking about what happened on

September 11th. There is not a shred of evidence that Saddam Hussein's government had anything to do with September 11th. Not a shred. And I think that anyone who implies or suggests differently is manipulating the facts in a disingenuous way. But the lesson we should have learned from September 11th is that if you give a terrorist organization the time, the tools, the money, and the opportunity to attack a civilized people, they will attack. There would have been no 9/11 without the Taliban government in Afghanistan facilitating the operations of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. If the government of Afghanistan had behaved as a normal, law-abiding government behaves, as the government of Egypt behaves, as the government of Kuwait behaves, as the government of Qatar behaves, as the government of Israel behaves, as the governments of many other parts of that region behave, there would never have been a safe harbor and sanctuary for al Qaeda. The lesson that we should learn from September 11th is if you permit a nation to become a sanctuary for terrorist activity, you can expect to be attacked.

The most important fact is the number of folded American flags being handed to wives and mothers, brothers and sisters, and sons and daughters over the coffin of their loved ones. It is indisputable, it is painful, and it is real.

And despite all of the administration's changing reasoning on the justifications for the war, and for all of its changing factual explanations, the one fact that I think you cannot look beyond is that with Saddam Hussein leading Iraq, Iraq was potentially such a sanctuary. A Stalinist leader, with access to \$30 billion a year of petro-dollars, with the capacity to build, use, and deploy chemical and biological weapons, and possibly acquire nuclear weapons was a risk that I believe the US could not take and could not afford. The central risk of the regime of Saddam Hussein is that it could have become a staging area for an attack against the United States, or its allies, using such weapons.

It's important to understand what such weapons look like. Americans have an image of weaponry that is based upon the Cuban missile crisis—something that happened long before most people in this room were born. But if you have seen the news clips of it, there was footage of missile silos being built down in Cuba. If you have seen the movie about President Kennedy during that period time, he had to make some difficult decisions about what to do to persuade what was then the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro with the Cubans to stop building missile launch facilities that could attack the United States. That is our image of weaponry.

In the stark terror of the 21st century, weapons look very different. A quantity of sarin gas that could fit into a fire extinguisher could kill thousands of people in the New York City subways. A quantity of smallpox that could fit into an orange juice glass, if deployed through the heating and air conditioning system of a

shopping mall or office building, could lead to a man-made pandemic that could kill hundreds of thousands of people. A nuclear bomb in a suitcase could kill thousands. This is what weapons of mass destruction look like. This is how portable they are. This is how relatively easy it is to get such weapons into a country like ours. So permitting an area of the world to exist where there is the money, the opportunity, and the sanctuary for jihadist forces to get their hands on such a weapon would be a serious mistake. That was what was at risk in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The cruel and terrible irony of this Administration's failure however, is that I believe if we do not change our policies, we will be on the verge of re-creating that very same risk or worse.

A stable government must take hold in Iraq. I define a stable government as one that is able to preserve lawfulness on its own streets; where acts of terrorist violence against people are the exception and not the rule, where it would be almost unheard of for people to drive a cement truck and several cars up to a major hotel and detonate a bomb. An orderly and stable society is a place where someone who would be synthesizing or manufacturing sarin gas or smallpox would be taken in by the authorities of that country and would be stopped before they could do so. Iraq is far from being such a place today. The only thing that stands between Iraq and anarchy is 160,000 American troops. That's it. And anyone who has studied this situation, who has been there, as I have, would fairly draw the conclusion that if the American troop presence were not in Iraq today, one of two results would occur, neither of which is compatible with this country's security or the security of civilized people around the world.

The idea of a nuclear Iran, further enriched by \$30 billion a year funded by Iraqi oil, is an unacceptably dangerous proposition. It would be far worse than having Saddam Hussein sitting in Baghdad.

What happens if we leave? What's at risk? One result would be a religious civil war between the Shiites and Sunnis with the Kurds unfortunately caught in the middle. In all likelihood, the Shiite factions would win that war because they represent 61% of the population; because their area of the country has not been as badly damaged and has more of a thriving economy; and because their Persian Shiite cousins to the east in Iran would almost certainly side with them. What would the result of such a civil war be? An emboldened, richer, stronger, and empowered Iran. I cannot think of a more dangerous result than that. The Iranian government was, in September, cited by the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a vote opposed only by Venezuela, as having maintained a secret nuclear weapons program for the last twenty-five years. This is not an allegation by the US CIA. This is not another political statement from the White House. This is a fact that has been acknowledged by the global community. And, as you no doubt know from your studies of world affairs, there is now an intense debate pending as to what the UN Security Council

should do about this, if anything. The idea of a nuclear Iran, further enriched by \$30 billion a year funded by Iraqi oil, and further enriched by their de facto annexation of their neighbor, is an unacceptably dangerous proposition. It would be far worse than having Saddam Hussein sitting in Baghdad.

I think security has to come first before there is wider sharing of intelligence and wider investment in that government.

The second possible result is that no real government would rule all of Iraq. The government would dissolve into anarchy, as Afghanistan essentially was prior to 9/11. You understand that the Taliban was the strongest of any group, or clan, or tribal leaders, none of which had effective control over the whole country. The difference of course would be that Iraq would be Afghanistan on steroids. Because, unlike Afghanistan, whose principal exports were heroin and terror, Iraq would be in a position to export \$30 billion a year of oil, in a world starved for oil. So you would have tribes and clans that would govern and rule parts of that country. Mr. Zarqawi is a current example of this kind of ruler. Such choices would create the possibility of sanctuary for jihadist forces that might want to attack civilized people in that region as they have in Riyadh, as they have in Madrid, as they have in London, or as they have here.

Either of these outcomes would be a horrific result. I believe that unless we change our policy and correct our mistakes, that is where we are headed.

What mistakes have we made? What have we done wrong? I have sat through hours and hours of briefings from the administration on this. I have traveled to Iraq. I have heard from Secretary Rumsfeld. In September, I sat in the White House situation room with the deputy national security advisor and our ambassador to Iraq, who is doing a terrific job, by the way, in his early tenure. I have heard the administration's plan and here it is.

To evaluate the administration's plan, you have to understand what happened on October 24 at the Palestine Hotel. Iraq is a country of 24 million people, with insurgents that number, according to the public record, no more than 25,000 people. Let me say that again. It is generally understood that the number of insurgents who have taken to arms in Iraq are 25,000 people in a country of 24 million people. And those insurgents are matched up against, when you add up US troops and allied troops and battle-ready Iraqi security forces, 300,000 security forces. So in a country where there are 300,000 security forces and 25,000 resistance fighters, how is it that someone can drive a cement truck up to the front door of one of the most protected places in the country and detonate it? The answer is that the attackers can succeed because the quality of our intelligence is so bad. We don't have the ability to send some of those 300,000 troops out to stop the resistance fighters before they attack. Why is this?

It's in part because they are guerilla warriors. These are not people who march

down the street in uniforms with a flag. These are classic guerilla warriors who execute their attack and when the attack is over, if they are still alive, they fade back into the woodwork of society. Why don't we know who they are and where they are? The first reason is that we have botched, horrendously, our on-the-ground intelligence operations in Iraq. Now there is an understandable reason for this, but there is an inexcusable reason for it as well. The understandable reason is, the way you breach into a cell of Sunni resistance, or a cell of insurgent resistance, is you have someone penetrate that cell that can pass as being part of it. They are called spies or operatives. Given the culture, given the ethnicity, given the history of the area, American soldiers and CIA operatives are not going to be able to do that. So what you need to do is have people who have dealt with this problem on a daily basis, in their daily lives, help you. This is not a problem unknown to the Egyptians. It is not a problem unknown to the Pakistanis. It is not a problem unknown to the Kuwaitis. Not unknown to those who run Turkey. It is not a problem unknown to many, many nations in that part of the world.

We literally said to friends in the Arab League, in NATO, to the United Nations, “we don't want you here.”

What did we say to these potential allies in the waning days of Saddam's departure? We said “get out and stay out...we don't want you...we don't need you...this is our operation.” We literally said to friends in the Arab League, in NATO, to the United Nations, “we don't want you here.” So we do not have the intelligence resources and capabilities to find out for ourselves where the next cement truck is going to go. That's the pure and simple problem. And that's an inexcusable failure.

There's a second way you can find out where the next cement truck is going to go. You can hope that one of the 23.975 million people who live in Iraq, who are not part of this resistance, will tell you. Think about this for a minute. How many people had to know about this operation? It took three to four vehicles including a cement truck loaded with explosives and a timed arrival at the Palestine hotel in such a way that they would be effective? At a very minimum, 25-30 people had to be involved in planning that operation. And if you know from your experiences in life, if 30 people know about something, then it is likely that 300 people know about something. Because no matter how secretive people are, they talk to each other. Why didn't one of those 300 people step forward, call the security forces, and say I've heard that this horrific attack is about to take place at the Palestine Hotel? It's because they don't want to die, that's why. Because they are more afraid, justifiably so, of retaliation against them then they are invested in sharing intelligence with the American forces and Iraqi security forces. So it makes it so easy for the attackers to fade back into the woodwork.

With that backdrop, what is the administration's strategy? The administration believes that as political progress is made toward a functioning sovereign Iraqi government, that this progress will make fear dissipate, that more Iraqis will share

more intelligence with the security forces, and we will be able to find out that someone's going to drive a cement truck to the Palestine Hotel, and stop them before they do.

I hope, with every ounce of hope that I can summon, that I am wrong about my assessment of this proposition, but I think that proposition is wrong. I don't think human nature works that way, and I think the fact that two-thirds of the people went to the polls and voted in a referendum does not trump the fact that I am afraid that my daughter might get murdered if I turn in the person down the street who's going to drive that truck. That's what this is about.

The administration is right in stating that progress has occurred. The elections last January were a wonderful thing and the referendum this October was a wonderful thing. There is political progress. The administration believes that as political institutions evolve, confidence will rise, and as confidence rises, intelligence will improve, and as intelligence improves, security will improve. I think they have it backwards. I think people will start to identify the person down the street who's going to drive that cement truck when they believe that if they do, the attacker will be arrested and stopped and the informant will be protected. I think security has to come first before there is wider sharing of intelligence and wider investment in that government.

I wish the facts proved me wrong, but I think they prove me right. The transfer of sovereignty was promoted as the first time when the Iraqis would feel they were truly invested in their own future; the death toll did not go down. The elections of January 30th were counted as a further expression of Iraqi confidence in their future; the death toll did not go down. And most recently, the adoption of the referendum has been touted as one more step in building confidence among the Iraqi people so that they will take charge of their future and provide the intelligence necessary to stop these attacks. I hope I am wrong and that the death toll does go down, but I really doubt it will.

It is the supreme irony that an administration too quick to use force is relying on a political process—and not intelligence-guided lethal force—to try and solve this problem. I don't believe the administration's approach will solve the problem.

What do I think will solve the problem? I think there are four things that we need to do, sooner rather than later.

It is the supreme irony that an administration too quick to use force is relying on a political process—and not intelligence-guided lethal force—to try and solve this problem.

The first is that we need to approach our allies in that part of the world and ask for their help in dealing with the daily intelligence problem that we have. What does that mean? It does not mean that we host a summit conference. It does not mean that we introduce a resolution at the Security Council. It means that we ask our allies

if they would be willing to work with us with their intelligence officers, and their intelligence methods, in getting on the ground, isolating parts of the resistance that are particularly effective, and stopping them before they can kill more people.

It will require what heretofore this administration has been incapable of demonstrating—humility.

It will not be easy to convince our allies to do so. One reason why they will not do it is Abu Ghraib. You cannot understand the damage that was done by the mismanagement of that prison until you evaluate how hard it will be to convince our allies to help us. When I was in that region in 2004, I met with King Abdullah from Jordan and Queen Rania. They are very much in tune with the United States. You would feel welcome and comfortable with them as neighbors and leaders. I thought they were both great. And they want to help us. But you need to understand that within their country the desecration of the culture and their religion that took place in that prison makes it almost impossible for them to do so without inciting huge discord and violence within their own country. Americans, and I include myself in this category, do not understand the depth of the insult that occurred in that prison. If you are Jewish, it was the equivalent of seeing a swastika painted on a synagogue. If you are Christian, it was like seeing the desecration of a crucifix. The combination of nudity and abuse of prisoners, women abusers of male prisoners in particular, was a horrific insult to the people of those countries. It is too late to undo that, but it is not too late to go to our friends in the Arab League, in that part of the world and ask for their help on this intelligence problem. This will require diplomacy. I hope some of the graduates of this school will be involved in that effort. It will require what heretofore this administration has been incapable of demonstrating—humility. The greatest sin the United States has committed in Iraq is the sin of hubris. Hubris is believing that because we think something is, it is. Believing that because we have done some things well, we do everything well. Believing that because we have the best and bravest military in the world—which I believe we do—that everything they do is right. If we do not engage our allies in this intelligence venture we will fail.

The second step we must take is to put an international face on the political process, rather than an American face. Most people were disturbed by the images of Abu Ghraib. Who would not be? I sat in a conference room and saw the slides and photos that were taken there and was appalled. What a few people did disparaged the huge majority of military people in this country, who would never consider doing such a thing. And what they did to their reputation. And what they did to our country's reputation.

But I will tell you what is also troublesome to me. In the press reports about the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the draft constitution that the Iraqis just approved, there was a snag, as you would expect, between the Sunni and the Shiite about certain issues of minority representation. The Kurds were very much in it as

well. The president of the United States got on the phone with several Sunni leaders and asked them to make concessions; the same way he is going to try to get on the phone and ask Republican senators to go along with his Supreme Court nominee; the same way he gets on the phone and asks House members to cast that one more vote to get his budget over the top. He should be making those calls as part of his job, as president of the US, to members of our Congress. But, if we are trying to make the argument that this is a sovereign independent political process, the president of the US should not be making those calls; Secretary-General Annan should be making those calls. His diplomats should be making those calls. Will the Iraqis do everything we want them to do? I hope not. Because if they are, then their sovereignty becomes artificial, the argument that we are overseeing a sovereign process becomes hollow, and the process becomes less likely to succeed.

I agree with the administration that rising confidence in Iraqi political institutions will lead to an improvement in security, because it will make some people more invested in the future of their country and therefore more likely to share intelligence about where the next cement truck is coming from. I agree that some people will do that. I do not think nearly enough will do that. But I do not think we will achieve nearly enough legitimacy in those political institutions until they have a truly international face with respect to the way they are being worked out. Does that mean we need to back out of the process? No. But the missed opportunity that I made reference to earlier is just that: a missed opportunity to promote credibility in the new Iraqi government through UN involvement. This is a continuing missed opportunity. We should not let our disagreements with some things the UN does stand in the way of the good sense of involving the UN in solving this very difficult problem.

What a few people did disparaged the huge majority of military people in this country, who would never consider doing such a thing.

The third step I think we need to take is to dramatically step up the training of Iraqi security forces. And when they are ready, for every Iraqi soldier that steps into the breach, an American soldier should come home. This is important for both our country and the Iraqis. I asked the commanding general of our forces in Iraq, General Casey, at a congressional hearing in early October, how large he thought the security force needed to be in order to maintain order. His best guess was 325,000 people under arms. But presently only about 60,000 or 70,000 Iraqis are capable of caring out that mission. As quickly as we can, with the aid and assistance of the Arab League, of NATO, of other international institutions, we need to train, recruit, equip, and prepare, as many Iraqis to take on that role as possible. And as they do, on a gradual basis, Americans should come home. In part because it is what our people expect, and in part because it is what is necessary for us to succeed.

In order to do these three things we have to do a fourth thing, which will be very

hard for this president. If we are going to go to our friends in the Arab and Muslim world, if we are going to go to our friends in Europe and say “we have disagreements—and we still have disagreements about how we got here and what we ought to do next—as we have helped you in the past, we are asking you to help us now with this intelligence problem that we have.” And in order for us to go to the international community and say “we want you to play a more active role in brokering the evolution of political institutions in Iraq;” in order for us to go to the Iraqis and to others who train the Iraqis, and say “we want your more active participation in training Iraqi security forces, so they can take over this important job of keeping peace and order;” in order for us to ask those questions, we need new people asking those questions.

I will say something that will sound unusual for a Democrat. If I were the president, I would ask George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st president, to help.

The president needs to change his team on this issue. Now I will permit you a partisan comment, there are many of us who felt that the leader of the team needed to be changed last November. I am certainly one who felt that way. But the president was reelected. It is his purview, his right, and his obligation to run the country for the next three years. And I do not mean what I am about to say as being critical of these people as individuals or their careers, but Secretary Rumsfeld in particular, is not capable of accomplishing the objectives that I just laid out. Not because he is not smart, because he is. Not because he does not care about the problem, because he does. But because he will not be listened to in the parts of the world that we need to persuade. I think starting with Secretary Rumsfeld, and all of the policymakers in the Defense Department, the president needs to make a change.

I will say something that will sound unusual for a Democrat. If I were the president, I would ask George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st president, to help. If there is a person in American history over the last twenty years who has been uniquely successful in communicating with Arab and Muslim states at a time of crisis, it was the first President Bush, who back in 1991, built a coalition that included everyone, even Syria, in a coalition against Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. The stakes were different. They were lower. The problem was less difficult than this, and the world was a different place, but we need people who can speak with credibility and authority to people in that part of the world, or we will not succeed.

Now I will stop where I started. I am hopeful that what is about to unfold in Iraq will be the first in the chapter of improvements in the human condition in that region and around the world. I reject the proposition that people of different faiths cannot live together, in harmony and peace, and achieve prosperity with their children. I reject the proposition that any one faith doesn't want that as an objective. I reject the proposition that I have the right to impose those propositions on anyone. I do not, as an American. But I refuse to believe that any area of the world must be

and should be an incubator for the kind of attacks against innocent people that we have seen in London, Riyadh, Madrid, and in New York City. We have the obligation and opportunity to stop those attacks by denying terrorists the sanctuary they require.

The saddest irony of this administration's policy is that if they do not change, if they do not move away from the argument that the evolution of political institutions alone will provide security, and security will wipe out the possibility of that sanctuary, if they do not divorce themselves from this argument and move on to a real solution, I fear that they are going to create a problem at least as bad, if not worse, than the one they went to Iraq to solve.

I have attended the funerals of five young men from my district who have died in Iraq. Not one of their family members has said to me, "I regret that my son, my husband, my brother, served his country in this way." Not one of those grieving loved ones has ever said, "because I lost my son, my husband, my brother, we should stop trying to do what we are doing." But, in their own way, each one has asked me what exactly is it that we are trying to do. Whether it is because of the crisis of confidence that stems from the White House, or whether it is from other factors, I don't think they have ever gotten an answer. My answer is, and has been, your family suffered this sad sacrifice because we want to eliminate or minimize the possibility that someone who wants to fly an airplane into a building, or spray sarin gas on the subway, or spread smallpox through the heating and air conditioning system of a building, will have the money and chance to do so. That is how we intended to protect our country by removing Saddam Hussein.

How can we say, to those who have suffered loss, if we fail on this objective, that their sacrifice has been worth it? If we continue to follow a policy that I believe is likely to lead to a horrific civil war—which Iran will win—or the evolution of what I call an Afghanistan on steroids—a place where terror could be exported with much greater horror—then I think we failed the sacrifice of every one of those young Americans who have given their life, as well as the innocent Iraqis and members of other coalition groups.

The time has come to move beyond a political debate on whether or not we like the president; or whether we think he has been forthright or not; or whether there have been mistakes made in Iraq or not. We have debated these points. People have reached their conclusions. The time has come for those of us in both parties to decide what to do next. The plan I have outlined today is what I think we need to do next. If we do not, I am quite concerned that history will record this effort as a failed attempt to make us safer.

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The Determinants of Internal Conflict in the Third World

By Hae S. Kim

Of the many characteristics that set the First World apart from the Third World, one of great significance is the frequency of internal conflict and political violence occurring in the latter. While many Third World countries experience a much higher frequency of internal conflict and political violence than their First World counterparts, not all less developed countries (LDCs) in the Third World experience internal conflict and political violence. As such, it seems that the Third World can be dichotomized between conflict-stricken and non-conflict-stricken countries. What causes the occurrence and nonoccurrence of internal conflict and political violence in some countries of the Third World? This paper addresses that question by analyzing determinants of internal conflict and identifies those conditions that dichotomize between the occurrence and nonoccurrence of internal conflict in Third World countries. Utilizing a multivariate analysis, moreover, this paper seeks to understand which factors may be contributing to such conflict.

The attacks in the US on September 11th and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have overshadowed crises and internal wars prevalent in other parts of the world, particularly in the Third World's LDCs. Crises in other parts of the Third World have become "forgotten crises" when indeed they are still active and significant.¹

Conflict-stricken Third World countries suffer from, *inter alia*, poverty, refugees, civil wars, political violence and instability, food shortage, drought, AIDS, famine, as well as economic devastation. Internal crises, as manifested by ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, riots, forceful overthrows of governments, secessionist or independence movements, or civil and political violence, may arise for a number of reasons: racial, religious, cultural, ideological, and economic factors, as well as political and social structures.

In recent decades the world community has witnessed a high frequency of such terms as "ethnic conflict," "ethnocentrism," "ethnonationalism," and "ethnic cleansing." These "ethnic" prefixes have been more widely used since the end of the Cold War. Also, such terms portray internal conflict as based on ethnic-racial lines

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within a state. Ethnic-racial determinists of internal conflict argue that the distinctiveness of each of the diverse groups within a state is the very source of internal conflict and political violence in the Third World.²

Religious determinists argue that religious differences are the source of internal conflict. A system of belief, they argue, provides religious believers with their main source of identity. Their “belief” and “identity,” if compromised, are the key factors of civil wars and political violence. Those who advocate religion as a factor for conflict also argue that this type of conflict spills over to ethnic-racial conflict.³

While there is a dichotomy between racial-ethnic and religious conflicts, some determinists take an integrated view of the causes of internal conflict in the Third World, undifferentiating between ethnic-racial and religious determinants. The term “ethnic-religious conflict” is one prime example of this supposition.

What causes the occurrence of internal conflict and political violence in some countries of the Third World?

Cultural determinists explain the cause of internal conflict based on a broad concept of civilization. Such explanations are more expansive and comprehensive than either ethnic-racial or religious determinists’ views on the causes of conflict. One notable argument made by cultural determinism is that no attempt has been made to conceptually differentiate between ethnic-racial and religious lines. Clearly the cultural determinism of conflict is more comprehensive than either ethnic-racial or religious determinism in explaining the causes of conflict.

Relative deprivation theory, which attempts to explain the cause of conflict, is based on psychological dimensions of any society transitioning from underdeveloped to advanced stages in much of the developing world. The aspiration gap between the rising expectation (hopes) and the actual level of satisfaction (realities) is particularly eminent in these transitional societies. The wider the aspiration gap, the more the people suffer, and this frustration can eventually lead to conflict.⁴ Simon Kuznets advanced the gap theory, which also attempts to explain causes of conflict. The so-called “Kuznets curve” aims to explain the gap in income distribution that develops during the early stages of modernization between the traditional rural and advanced industrialized sectors within a nation. Accordingly, the gap between the two sectors is the very cause of internal conflict.⁵

Some argue that the gap between economic growth (i.e., the quantitative dimension of economic development) and quality of life (i.e., the qualitative dimension of economic development) serves as a source of internal conflict. It is generally argued that economic growth is not necessarily and positively correlated with the quality of life, although the economic growth itself will upgrade other broader indicators of living standards such as literacy, health and nutrition, life expectancy, and infant mortality. The discrepancy between the economic growth and the quality of life is generally considered more conspicuous in developing nations than in industrialized ones. The wider the gap between the economic growth and the

quality of life, the more frequently countries will experience internal conflict.

Empirical evidence has shown that ethnic-racial heterogeneity, rapid population growth, and excessive defense spending were found to be the detrimental factors in widening the gap between quality of life and economic growth (per capita GNP level) in developing nations in the Third World. These factors impede the economic growth from being fully reflected in the level of the quality of life, thus widening the gap between these two levels of economic development. These same variables, however, were found to be insignificant or weak factors in developed nations.⁶

Polity categories of totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic-competitive states are argued to have a significant effect on the frequency of internal conflict as well. In a study of seventy-four states from 1955 to 1960, Zinnes and Wilkenfeld discovered that authoritarian states tended to have more than their share of internal conflict but a fair share of external conflict. It is argued that libertarian regimes, in which the authors include Western democracies with free-enterprise economies, were found to have less external conflict than totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.⁷

During the final years of the Cold War and the years of the post-Cold War era, many Third World countries experienced a growing sense of individual equality and a desire for citizen participation in the political process, serving as an engine for democratization. Both democracy and the democratization process, as political factors, were considered to be important determinants of internal and external conflict.

Power-transition theorists argue that most internal crises and conflicts erupted when states were locked in internal power transitions, usually characterized by new state formation, political revolution, or efforts to democratize autocratic regimes. These drastic internal developments, whether as a result of rapid social mobilization or of sharp advances in national economic development, invite internal conflict and crisis.⁸

Proliferation of arms and weapons, particularly shipped into many parts of Third World countries, is also thought to be a culprit for a great deal of killings and repression.⁹ Weapons are used by government-controlled armed forces, local police and militia, private military forces, as well as insurgents and bandits. Such groups arm themselves for many reasons, including regional rivalry, prestige, and the pervasive ambition of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes. It is argued that sophisticated arms and weapons have increased the death toll, as well as the number of refugees, in the Third World.¹⁰

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The theories and approaches reviewed above have a number of things in common. Each attempts to explain the causes of internal conflict primarily based on a single variable rather than utilizing a multivariate approach, where a variety of variables, theoretically relevant, are employed to analyze the causes of internal conflict. Ethnic-racial determinism, for example, is solely based on ethnic-racial composition of a nation-state, where economic, political, and even religious factors

are ignored.

This single variable approach, however, has an inherent weakness in that it cannot provide a “pure” effect of the single variable since many other variables might also cause internal conflict. In order to identify the pure effect of a given single variable, the effect of those other variables must be controlled for.

None of the theories or approaches previously reviewed suggest that the effects of other variables were controlled for in order to isolate a pure effect of the single variable on internal conflict. None of the ethnic-racial, religious, cultural, relative deprivation, power transition, political system, or proliferation of arms theories suggest that control variables were employed in the context of multivariate analysis.

Therefore, this paper employs a multivariate analysis aiming to isolate the pure effect of each of the variables theoretically relevant to the cause of internal conflict. A logistic regression analysis is used to predict a binary dependent variable from a set of independent variables. As the data for the analysis in this paper are based on “occurrence” versus “nonoccurrence” of internal conflict in the Third World—the binary dependent variable—the logistic regression is the most pertinent method of multivariate statistical analysis.

METHODOLOGY

A cross-sectional analysis, based on both conflict-stricken and non-conflict-stricken developing countries (140 countries in total), was utilized for this study. The time span covered in the analysis is the 2000–2005 period.

The following three criteria served as the basis for dichotomizing countries between conflict-stricken and non-conflict-stricken. Third World countries experiencing any of the following criteria were classified as conflict-stricken countries and the remaining as non-conflict-stricken:

1. The UN list of the world’s twenty-one “forgotten crises:” post-war poverty, refugees, war and civil war, political instability, food shortage, drought, conflict, AIDS, famine, and economic devastation
2. Significant ongoing armed conflicts
3. Countries producing worldwide refugees and asylum seekers

Countries classified as conflict-stricken are coded as “1” and the remaining countries as “0.” The dependent variable, the existence of conflict, is classificatory and dichotomous.¹¹ Since the dependent variable is grounded in whether an event will or will not occur, based on dichotomous internal conflict (occurrence) versus non-internal conflict (nonoccurrence), logistic regression analysis is the most pertinent analysis that can be applied. Logistic regression estimates the probability that an event will or will not occur.¹²

The following are treated as independent variables as well as control variables. These were selected because they have been theoretically assumed to affect the likelihood of internal conflict: political freedom, ethnic homogeneity, religious diversity, income distribution, quality of life, economic growth, population growth, and military expenditures. Each is hypothesized to have a significant effect on the

likelihood of internal conflict. They are operationalized respectively as follows:

Political freedom/political system: Political freedom is classified as “not free,” “partly free,” and “free.” Types of political systems are classified according to the degree of political freedom; “not free” as totalitarian, “partly free” as authoritarian, and “free” as democratic. This variable is treated as a categorical variable, in which totalitarian is coded as “1,” authoritarian as “2,” and democratic as “3.”

Ethnic homogeneity: The ethnic homogeneity is measured by the percentage of the dominant ethnic-racial group within each nation.

Religious homogeneity: This is measured by the percentage of the dominant religious group within each nation.

Income Distribution: This is measured by the Gini index, which measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in any given country. The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditures) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The coefficient ranges from ‘0’—meaning perfect equality—to ‘1’—complete inequality.

Quality of Life: This is measured by a Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievement in three basic aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. The most basic capabilities for human development include leading long and healthy lives, gaining knowledge, having access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and being able to participate in the life of the community. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP in US dollars).

Economic Growth: Economic growth is measured by purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP allows a standard comparison of real price levels between countries, while normal exchange rates may over- or undervalue purchasing power. At the PPP rate, one dollar has the same purchasing power over domestic GDP that the US dollar has over the US GDP. The data derived from the PPP method provides the best available starting point for comparisons of economic strength and well-being among countries.

Population growth: This is based on a natural increase per 1,000 people; it is based on natural growth or the balance of births and deaths reflecting the difference between the birth rate and the death rate of a given population.

Defense spending: This is measured by military expenditures as a percentage of GNP.

Table 1: Difference in the Means of Socioeconomic and Political Variables Between Conflict and Non-Conflict Countries (2000–2004)

	Non-conflict	Conflict
Ethnic Homogeneity (%)	73.19 (88)	64.50 (52)
Religious Homogeneity(%)	72.12 (88)	69.48 (52)
GINI (%) (a)	47.24 (47)	41.63 (32)
HDI (b)	.68 (78)	.56 (47)
PPP (\$)	7230.68 (88)	2640.38 (52)
Political Freedom (c)	2.36 (87)	1.56 (52)
Population Growth (%)	17.15 (91)	19.91 (52)
Military Expenditures (%)	2.93 (69)	3.08 (49)

(a) GINI: 1.00 (100%) perfect inequality while 0 (0%) perfect equality.

(b) HDI ranges between 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

(c) Political freedom ranges from 1(not free) to 3(free).

Source: *The World Factbook* 2000–2005; *Britannica Book of the Year* 2000–2005.

Table 1 contrasts the differences between conflict and non-conflict countries in terms of the composition of ethnic-religious, socioeconomic, and political variables. Out of 140 developing countries, 52 countries (37 percent) were classified as conflict-stricken. One of the most glaring differences between these two groups comes from economic growth as measured by purchasing power parity (PPP). Where non-conflict countries have a PPP of \$7230.68, conflict-stricken countries have a PPP of \$2640.38. In other words, the former has a PPP 2.74 times as much as that of the latter.

In the area of ethnic diversity, conflict-stricken countries turned out to be more heterogeneous than their non-conflict counterparts, but in religious homogeneity both groups of countries retained a similar level.

Income distribution as measured by Gini coefficients shows 47.24 for non-conflict countries, while 41.63 for conflict countries: the higher the coefficients, the more unequal the distribution. The non-conflict countries are more unequal than the conflict countries in the distribution of income among different segments of the population.

Quality of life, as measured by HDI, is similar to the economic-growth as measured by PPP, although non-conflict countries retain a higher quality of life than conflict-stricken ones. The level of political freedom is higher in non-conflict countries.

Table 2: Conflict vs. Non-Conflict Countries by Political System

Type of Government	Conflict Countries	Non-Conflict Countries
Section I: Totalitarian	Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Congo (former Zaire), Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, Zimbabwe	Brunei, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen
Section II: Authoritarian	Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda	Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Seychelles, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia
Section III: Democratic	Ghana, India, Mexico, Philippine, Senegal, Thailand	Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, South Korea, Lesotho, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Suriname, Taiwan, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu

Source: *The World Factbook* 2000–2005; *Britannica Book of the Year* 2000–2005

Table 2, Section I, indicates that there are many totalitarian countries classified as conflict-stricken, yet there are also totalitarian countries such as Brunei, Cameroon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Togo, among others, classified as non-conflict-stricken. Many totalitarian countries suffer from internal conflict and crisis, but not all. Authoritarian countries whose level of political freedom is based on a “partly free” system are relatively “equally” divided between conflict-stricken and non-conflict-stricken.

Table 2, Section III, indicates that there are democratic countries suffering from internal conflict and crises, such as Ghana, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Senegal, and Thailand. Democracy does not necessarily guarantee peace and stability in Third World countries, yet many democratic countries turn out to be non-conflict countries.

Both non-conflict and conflict countries show similarities in the population growth as well as in military spending, respectively. Essentially, there is virtually no difference between the conflict and non-conflict countries when it comes to the amount of military expenditures.

Despite the similarities, Table 3 shows that totalitarian countries spend much more than democratic countries in military expenditures regardless of their conflict status. Conflict-stricken totalitarian countries spend 2.63 times (3.82/1.45) and non-conflict totalitarian countries 3.07 times (5.38/1.79) more than their respective democratic counterparts. One notable finding is that even the “peaceful” totalitarian countries’ military expenditures are much higher than their conflict-stricken counterparts (5.38 percent and 3.82 percent, respectively). Regardless of internal conflict, totalitarian leaders in the Third World strive for a higher level of arms acquisition than those in democratic countries.

The “peaceful” totalitarian countries that have large military expenditures turn out to be wealthy countries as well. As Table 3 further indicates, those countries retain an economic strength in terms of PPP at \$9030.77, which is much higher than the authoritarian average (\$5476.67) and even the democratic one (\$7880). The PPP in those non-conflict totalitarian countries is 4.09 times as much as that of conflict-stricken countries (\$2206.90). As seen from Table 2, the totalitarian and non-conflict countries are mostly from the Middle East and, as such, produce oil.

RESULTS

Table 4 presents the logistic model analysis of the likelihood of internal conflict in Third World countries. Political freedom (political system), ethnic composition, and income distribution, respectively, were all found to have a significant independent effect on the likelihood of internal conflict. This subset of independent variables in the equation can be taken as a good predictor of the likelihood of internal conflict, which is then treated as the dependent variable. But the logistic regression analysis has excluded religious composition, economic development (quality of life, HDI and economic growth, and PPP), population growth, military spending, as well as “authoritarian” political system variables. In other words, this means that those

Table 3: Means of Socioeconomic and Military Spending Variable of Conflict and Non-Conflict Countries by Political System

Conflict Countries

Political System	Low	Medium	High
Ethnic Homogeneity (%)	68.61	54.34	77.38
PPP (\$)	2206.90	2682.35	4616.67
Religious Homogeneity (%)	68.88	65.29	84.22
Population Growth (%)	20.34	20.94	14.97
Military Spending (%)	3.82	2.35	1.45
HDI ^a	.544	.543	.654
Gini Coefficient ^b	39.11	44.33	41.28

Non-Conflict Countries

Political System	Low	Medium	High
Ethnic Homogeneity (%)	67.96	71.86	75.58
PPP (\$)	9030.77	5476.67	7880.00
Religious Homogeneity (%)	76.77	72.55	70.49
Population Growth (%)	22.10	18.40	14.90
Military Spending (%)	5.38	2.96	1.75
HDI	.696	.637	.717
Gini Coefficient	44.68	44.61	50.79

^aHDI ranges between 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

^bGINI: 1.00 (100%) perfect inequality while 0 (0%) perfect equality.

Source: *The World Factbook* 2000–2005; *Britannica Book of the Year* 2000–2005

excluded “variables not in the equation” were all found to have no significant effect on the odds of internal conflict.

The political freedom variable—i.e., the political system—indicates that the totalitarian political system, with little or no political freedom, had the largest regression coefficient (2.04), to be followed by income distribution (-.064), and ethnic homogeneity (-.026). The value of the largest coefficient means that totalitarian countries in the Third World are more likely to experience a higher frequency of internal conflict and crisis than authoritarian or democratic countries.

As one might expect, totalitarian political systems at the “not free” level of political freedom were found vulnerable to the likelihood of internal conflict and

Table 4: Logistical Regression: Internal Conflict

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	Waldo	Sig
Political System ^a			
<i>Low/Totalitarian</i>	2.04	8.443	.004*
Ethnic Homogeneity	-.026	5.589	.002*
Income Distribution (Gini)	-.064	4.437	.035*
Constant	3.790	5.201	.023*

Variables Not in the Equation

Variable	Score	Sig
Political System		
<i>Medium/Authoritarian</i>	.107	.744
<i>High/Democratic^b</i>	0	
Economic Growth (PPP)	1.57	.211
Quality of Life (HDI)	1.018	.3133
Religious Heterogeneity	.553	.810
Population Growth	-.239	.625

^aPolitical System is a categorical variable, in which the system was categorized into totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic according to their respective degree of freedom.

^bDemocratic here is a "reference category," whose coefficient accords with 0, that is to be compared with the coefficients of the other two categories, totalitarian and authoritarian, respectively.

*Significant at .05 level

Source: *The World Factbook 2000–2005; Britannica Book of the Year 2000–2005*

political violence, in comparison with authoritarian and democratic counterparts at the “partly free” and “free” levels of political freedom, respectively. Countries in the Third World with a higher level of political freedom were less likely to suffer from internal conflict and crises than their totalitarian counterparts.

The finding also supports the argument that a democratic political system is

more capable of solving and managing internal crisis and conflict than the non-democratic political systems in the Third World. Regardless of ethnic and religious composition (homogeneous or heterogeneous), and even regardless of economic development, totalitarian countries in the Third World are more likely to experience such strife and unrest; that is, the less political freedom, the more likely they experience internal conflict and crises. Those non-democratic political systems with little or no political freedom were found to be less capable of solving and managing crisis and conflict. The finding seems to support the “democratic peace” premise: democratic politics is capable of attenuating internal and civil conflict, thus leading to peace and stability.

Ethnic composition was found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of internal conflict, indicating that ethnically homogeneous countries are less likely to experience internal conflict than ethnically heterogeneous ones. Although its coefficient (-.026) is much smaller than the political system variable (totalitarian with 2.04), ethnic homogeneity is more conducive to the maintenance of domestic stability and peace than the ethnic heterogeneity in the Third World. Regardless of its political system or economic development, ethnically homogeneous countries are less vulnerable to the likelihood of internal conflict than ethnically heterogeneous ones. Unlike ethnic composition, and perhaps somewhat surprising, religious diversity was found to have no significant effect on the likelihood of internal conflict.

Both ethnic and religious compositions were found to be independent of each other in affecting the odds of internal conflict. This suggests the need for a distinction between the ethnic and the religious components of internal conflict needs to be made in conflict analysis. In short, these findings suggest that the phrase “ethnic-religious conflict,” having been so widely used in conflict literature on developing countries, needs to be revised into separate categories of ethnic or religious conflict.

No significant and independent effect of the religious variable on the likelihood of internal conflict indicates that what appears to be a “religious conflict” is actually due to ethnic, racial, and/or political reasons; so-called “ethnic-religious” conflicts seem, indeed, to be ethnic or racial rather than religious. In other words, the religious composition, taken by itself, appears not to be a direct cause of likelihood of internal conflict and crisis in the Third World.

Income distribution was found to have a significant independent effect on the likelihood of internal conflict. The negative regression coefficient of income distribution (-.064) in Table 4 indicates that the more unequal the distribution of income among different segments of the population within a nation, the less likely they are to experience the internal conflict and crisis in developing countries of the Third World. Under any conditions of ethnic composition and political freedom, income distribution was found to affect the likelihood of internal conflict.

That income distribution is expected to have a significant effect means that countries in the Third World undergoing a more egalitarian process of distribution,

as realized by the equitable income distribution among diverse segments of population, are more likely to experience internal conflict and political violence. Table 5 shows the “most unequally” distributed twenty countries, in terms of income, in contrast with the “most equally” distributed ones. Clearly the most equally distributed countries document higher scores of internal conflict than the most disparate countries.

Countries transitioning toward a more equal distribution of income among different segments of the population are more likely to experience a higher frequency of internal conflict than those countries still under the condition of established unequal distribution. Internal conflict is more likely to be triggered

Table 5: Unequal vs. Equal Countries: Top 20

Most "Unequal" Countries: Top 20

Country	Gini Coefficient	Conflict (1)/ Non-conflict (0)
Namibia	70.7	0
Lesotho	63.2	0
Botswana	63.0	0
Sierra Leone	62.9	1
Central African Republic	61.3	1
Swaziland	60.9	0
South Africa	59.3	0
Brazil	59.1	0
Colombia	57.6	1
Chile	57.1	0
Zimbabwe	56.8	1
Paraguay	56.8	0
Panama	56.4	0
Nicaragua	55.1	0
Honduras	55.0	0
Mexico	54.6	1
El Salvador	53.2	0
Zambia	52.6	0
Argentina	52.2	0
Papua New Guinea	50.9	0

Most "Equal" Countries: Top 20

Albania	28.2	0
Macedonia	28.2	0
Rwanda	28.9	1
Ghana	30.0	1
Ethiopia	30.0	1
Korea/South	31.6	0
Bangladesh	31.8	0
India	32.5	1
Pakistan	33.0	1
Burundi	33.3	1
Yemen	33.4	0
Indonesia	34.4	1
Egypt	34.4	1
Sri Lanka	34.4	1
Algeria	35.3	1
Vietnam	36.1	1
Jordan	36.4	0
Nepal	36.7	1
Laos	36.7	1
Jamaica	37.9	0

during the transitional period toward a more equitable distribution among diverse segments of the population than the period of unequal distribution of income. The more the countries are transitioning to an equal distribution, the more likely they are vulnerable to the occurrence of internal conflict, regardless of political system, economic growth, and/or quality of life.

Quality of life (HDI) and economic growth (PPP), both of which represent the dimension of economic development, were found to have no significant effect on the likelihood of internal conflict. This means that income distribution rather than issues of development—i.e., economic growth and quality of life—appears to be an important factor in determining the likelihood of internal conflict. In other words, even if economic development has been achieved, the development itself was found to have no significant effect on the odds of internal conflict in the Third World.

What affects the likelihood of internal conflict and political violence in the Third World is not the level of economic growth or quality of life, rather it is income distribution within an economy, egalitarian or not. Countries in the process of

transitioning tend to experience a more equitable distribution of income among different segments of the population. The more equitable distribution of income, the more likely it triggers internal conflicts and crisis. Third World countries under an established inequality were less likely to experience an internal conflict or crisis. This means that the transition period in the course of economic development and modernization in the Third World is more vulnerable to internal conflict and crisis.

Population growth and military spending were found to have no significant, respective effect on the odds of internal conflict and political violence in the Third World. It is generally assumed that rapid population growth has been one of the major detriments to economic growth and the quality of life in the Third World; yet, population growth itself is not likely to increase the likelihood of internal conflict and crises in the Third World.

Regardless of any ethnic-racial, political, or economic conditions, military spending was found to have no significant effect on the odds of internal conflict. Military spending, particularly excessive as seen from totalitarian and authoritarian countries (conflict and non-conflict, see Table 3), has been assumed to trigger a higher frequency of internal conflict and political violence. The finding, however, does not support the long-held assumption that sophisticated arms and weapons, as purchased or developed by runaway military expenditures in the Third World, increased the death toll as well as the number of refugees. No direct and independent effect of military spending on the odds of internal conflict and crises was found.

CONCLUSION

A number of factors effect the odds of internal conflict and political violence in the Third World. In this regard, the type of political system, which reflects a different degree of political freedom, was found to be the most important factor. A totalitarian political system, allowing no political rights and civil liberties, was found more likely to experience internal conflict and crisis than their authoritarian and democratic counterparts. The lack of political freedom and dictatorial leadership were found to be chief culprits in the likelihood of internal conflict and crisis in the Third World, regardless of ethnic and religious diversity or economic development.

Internal conflicts and crises in the Third World are more likely to be associated with ethnic and racial differences than religious ones. Under any conditions of religious composition, homogeneous or heterogeneous, ethnic-racial diversity retains its significant effect on the likelihood of internal conflict. Ethnically heterogeneous countries are more vulnerable to internal crisis and conflict regardless of religious composition.

Economic development variables (economic growth [PPP] and quality of life [HDI]) were found to have no significant effect on the the likelihood of internal conflict and political violence. Neither the quantitative (economic growth) nor the qualitative (quality of life) dimensions of economic development appear to be culprits for the likelihood of internal conflict.

What matters in the initiation of internal conflict and crisis is the distribution,

rather than development, aspect of the economy. Whether income is equitably or inequitably distributed does affect the likelihood of internal conflict and political violence regardless of economic development as measured by economic growth. Contrary to the conventional theory that income inequality is among the serious causes of political conflict and instability in the Third World, it is rather the developing income equality among different segments of the population that is likely to trigger an internal conflict and/or political instability.

In short, the odds of internal conflict in the Third World are likely to be affected by political freedom rather than economic development, ethnic and racial differences rather than religious ones, and by distributive and egalitarian causes pursued by the populations of the Third World. Governments in the Third World should be able to meet the growing egalitarian demands generated from diverse ethnic and racial groups in the course of economic development. Political development securing democracy with a higher degree of political freedom could accommodate the demands. Governments in the Third World should be able to reconcile economic development with political development in order to diminish the odds of internal conflict and political violence.

Notes

- ¹ "Humanitarian Appeal 2004," The United Nations. Available at: www.un.org/depts/ocha/cap/appeals.html. (Accessed 22 August 2006.) UN Secretary of General Kofi Annan identified 21 crises in the world, which have been neglected by the international community. Those "forgotten crises" are from the following countries/regions: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chechnya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Great Lakes Region (Africa), Guinea, Liberia, North Korea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Africa, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, West Bank of Gaza, West Africa, and Zimbabwe.
- ² See Thomas D. Hall, "Ethnic Conflicts as a Global Social Problems," in *Handbook of Social Problems: A Comparative International Perspective*, ed. George Ritzer (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 139-55; David Carment, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2, (May 1993): 137-150; Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 347-377.
- ³ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, Ltd., 1993); R. H. Shultz and W. J. Olson, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security," Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1994.
- ⁴ T. R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; P. A. Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories versus Indignation," *Politics and Society*, 2 (Fall 1971): 89-104.
- ⁵ Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45, no. 1 (1955): 1-28; Simon Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
- ⁶ H. S. Kim, "Analysis of the Gap Between Growth and Quality of Life in the Third World," *National Social Science Journal* 10, no. 2, (1998): 84-90.
- ⁷ Dina.A. Zinnes and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," *Comparative Foreign Policy*, ed. W. F. Hanrieder (New York: McKay, 1971): 167-213.
- ⁸ Lars- Erik Cederman, "Emergent Polarity: Analyzing State-Formation and Power Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, (1994): 501-533.
- ⁹ *Small Arms Survey*. Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org> (Accessed 17 September 2005.)
- ¹⁰ Ruth L. Sivard et. al., *World Military and Social Expenditures 1996*, (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1996).
- ¹¹ Countries classified as "conflict-stricken" are as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Laos, Liberia, Mauritania, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan,

Philippine, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Solomon, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (49 countries).

¹² The logistic regression is based on the Advanced Statistics of SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).

Preaching Against the Choir: An Examination of the Influence of Multinational Enterprises On the Negotiation of Investment Rules at the World Trade Organization

by Brian N. Zeiler-Kligman

In many circles, there seems to be a consensus that multinational enterprises (MNEs) dominate the World Trade Organization, dwarfing the interests of all other groups. Reading literature regarding the WTO, one regularly encounters statements such as “[t]oday’s agenda [for the next round of trade talks at the WTO], set by multinational enterprises engaging in foreign direct investment...”¹ or “[g]iven the importance of multinationals in dominating world trade and being major investors in developing countries, further developments in investment policy/rules within the WTO are likely.”² These commentators, and those echoing such sentiments, take as an article of faith that the economic clout of MNEs compels the WTO to cater to their whims; that what the MNEs want is what determines WTO priorities. As this is an article of faith, the truth of this proposition escapes verification by such commentators.

MNEs appear to be fairly busy outside of their business dealings, for it is not only the WTO that supposedly kowtows to big business. Regional agreements and organizations, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are also accused of serving the interests of MNEs.³ While some may accept these positions as given, this paper tempts accusations of heresy by testing the extent to which MNEs direct the negotiating agenda of the WTO. Do MNEs really dictate the direction of the trading agenda? Do MNEs appear to have relatively more influence at one organization as compared to another? This paper will show that MNEs in fact do not dominate the WTO or its negotiating agenda. A combination of structural, systemic, and perceptual factors have served to diminish MNEs’ influence on the WTO agenda, particularly when compared to their ability to dominate the

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agenda of other international agreements and organizations, such as NAFTA and the OECD.

The issue of investment rules shall be used to demonstrate the above conclusions. Investment is an ideal topic to discuss for a number of reasons. First, logically speaking, without investment in foreign countries, there could not be MNEs. If it were true that MNEs set the WTO negotiating agenda, then it would logically follow that their particular interest in foreign investment would lead to the development of rules encouraging such investment. Second, investment has only recently been recognized as a trade issue.⁴ Given its nascent status, influences that mold the treatment of investment can be more easily explored than other trade issues that are already deeply entrenched. Finally, investment has become a contentious issue. Business would like to see progress in this area, while civil society feels otherwise.⁵ This diametrical opposition presents a perfect opportunity to ascertain the relative power of each of these interested parties.

The first section of the paper will look at the way investment is currently treated in the WTO agreements. The second section will discuss what MNEs would like to see happen at the WTO in the investment field. The third section will note what is on the current agenda of the WTO, particularly with reference to the Doha Development Agenda. The fourth section will explain the reasons for any gulf between the agendas found in the second and third sections.

INVESTMENT AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS IN THE WTO

Although the link between trade and investment received very little attention prior to the Uruguay Round, it is clear that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) addressed investment. This was confirmed in the 1984 *Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act* panel, which found that local content requirements were inconsistent with the national treatment obligation contained in GATT Article III:4. The panel's decision confirmed that existing obligations under GATT were applicable to performance requirements imposed by governments in an investment context to the extent that such requirements were trade-distorting.⁶

Including investment within the auspices of the WTO is sensible given the extensive impact that investments by MNEs have on the volume of trade. Estimates fluctuate, but anywhere from one-third to one-half of all world trade is intra-firm trade.⁷ Even when not trading internally, MNEs have an immense impact on trade patterns. The world's 500 largest companies are responsible for 70 percent of all world trade, with approximately one-third of all world trade involving MNEs trading with unaffiliated firms.⁸ Given these statistics, it is not surprising that extensive research suggests that trade and investment are complements, rather than substitutes.⁹

The sorts of performance requirements imposed by governments in the investment context, such as local content requirements as addressed in the *Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act* panel, are encapsulated under the rubric "trade-related investment measures" (TRIMs). There is no agreed definition

of TRIMs, however at least the following measures are considered to be TRIMs:

- i) local content requirements;
- ii) export performance requirements;
- iii) local manufacturing requirements;
- iv) trade balancing requirements;
- v) production mandates;
- vi) foreign exchange restrictions;
- vii) mandatory technology transfers; and
- viii) limits on equity participation and on remittances.¹⁰

A country might impose a TRIM for any number of reasons; the most common justification is to increase the country's share of the gains from foreign direct investment (FDI) or to ensure that the country realizes the desired gains.¹¹ Often, MNEs undertaking FDI will engage in some practice—frequently a restrictive business practice of some sort—that reduces the host country's benefits from the FDI. It is posited that many TRIMs are a response to these restrictive business practices by MNEs.¹²

FDI inflows to developing countries have increased more than 20 times in absolute terms since 1980.²⁷ However, these inflows are concentrated in a few developing nations.

In the Uruguay Round, investment was dealt with in relation to both goods and services. The agreement covering investment relating to goods is called the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement).¹³ The TRIMs Agreement is a compromise document that essentially interprets and clarifies the application of TRIMs to GATT Article III (national treatment) and Article XI (quantitative restrictions). Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement states that it applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only. Article 2 stipulates that members are not to apply TRIMs that are inconsistent with Article III or Article XI of the GATT. To clarify which measures might infringe this article, an illustrative list is annexed to the TRIMs Agreement. Basically, a TRIM—whether mandatory, enforceable under domestic law or administrative rulings, or one with which a company must comply in order to obtain an advantage—that creates a local content requirement or that seeks to balance trade is inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT. In addition, trade balancing TRIMs, foreign exchange balancing TRIMs, and measures restricting an enterprise's exports to its local production are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of GATT. Further, Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement establishes that developing countries can deviate temporarily from the obligations of the treaty as provided in Article XVIII of GATT, which provides safeguard measures for balance-of-payment difficulties.

Members were to notify the Council for Trade in Goods of any TRIMs in effect in their country that were not in conformity with the TRIMs Agreement.¹⁴

Elimination of these TRIMs was to take place within two years for developed countries, five years for developing countries and seven years for the least developed countries. The TRIMs Agreement also established a Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures,¹⁵ and it is subject to the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.¹⁶

Although the TRIMs Agreement ostensibly served to merely clarify what Members had already signed on to in the GATT, some commentators felt that the agreement went too far and, further, that it showed the influence of MNEs at the WTO. For example, it was argued that by making an agreement related to TRIMs, but not one addressing competition issues and MNE restrictive business practices, the approach to TRIMs in the GATT amounts to a weakening of the bargaining power of developing countries vis-à-vis MNEs.¹⁷ Essentially, MNEs have been given greater rights, but no constraints have been put on their actions. It should, however, be noted that competition was one of the "Singapore Issues" introduced in 1996 at the behest of the developed countries, principally the European Union (EU). The developing countries resisted the introduction of these issues and ultimately demanded that they not be part of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations.

As a means of comparison to the TRIMs Agreement, one should look at NAFTA's Chapter 11, which is the chapter dealing with investment. Like the WTO's TRIMs Agreement, NAFTA also made curbs on TRIMs a central feature of its investment provisions.¹⁸ As noted above, the TRIMs Agreement outlawed only local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, and partial foreign exchange restrictions. Under NAFTA, not only are these three types of TRIMs disallowed in their entirety, but export performance requirements, local manufacturing requirements and production mandates have been eliminated as well; further, linking performance requirements to investment incentives is also prohibited.¹⁹ However, NAFTA's Chapter 11 also goes well beyond curbing TRIMs. Chapter 11 of NAFTA is a comprehensive investment regime—with a broad definition of investment, expropriation, and investor-state dispute resolution—that reflects the type of investment agreement that MNEs favor developing at the multilateral level, as will be seen in the next section of the paper.

WHAT ARE THE MNEs SEEKING?

MNEs tend to locate wherever in the world their reward will be greatest.²⁰ As shown in Hymer's market power model, firms invest abroad when they regard the transaction costs of trade in their current location as greater than the costs of relocation and organizing production through direct managerial control.²¹ The presence of impediments to investment or the imposition of costs in addition to the relocation of the business reduces the possible reward available to MNEs. Further, such obstacles will often make the costs of trade cheaper than investment. However, firms seeking to protect and/or to reap the advantages of their proprietary assets will still want to invest in foreign countries, in spite of the cost disadvantage. Thus, theory tells us that MNEs would ideally prefer an investment environment that is

unencumbered, so that their investment decisions do not have to be premised on variances in national regulatory schemes, and the profits from their proprietary assets will be diminished as little as possible from such regulatory regimes. Not surprisingly, MNEs desire as few restrictions on investment as possible.²²

In practice, this outcome would seem to be what business is advocating. In general, business is seeking broad advancement on the investment front. Business organizations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, are advocating the creation of high-standard multilateral rules within the WTO to protect and liberalize investment.²³

Some commentators argue that MNEs actually are not powerful agents for liberalization, at least at the multilateral level. MNEs are generally reluctant to reorganize or retool their operations without seeking assurances that sinking capital into new production structures will be profitable. As such, MNEs have incentives to seek credible commitments to the policy regime in place, or to the one that will be put in place. In addition, MNEs tend to desire the creation of entry barriers to compensate for the costs sunk to comply with the outmoded regulations, as well as transitional protection while the restructuring is taking place. Thus, in practice at least, more localized bilateral and regional treaties are better equipped than multilateral agreements to provide the assurances that foreign investors desire. Consequently, MNEs often seek regional arrangements to ensure that regulatory liberalization is durable, gradually implemented, and biased to favor incumbent investors.²⁴ As a result, MNEs may actually seek to impede, rather than encourage, multilateral investment liberalization.

Despite the desire of the business community to see a broad investment agenda in this round, the Doha Declaration gave the issue of investment a fairly narrow scope.

While the evidence of MNE preferences and the emergence of regional liberalization agreements would seem to confirm this hypothesis, the theory does not hold when one examines investment patterns. The US, the EU, and Japan are the principal sources and hosts of FDI. A main reason for this is that much of the FDI flows in the late 1990s were due to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, much of which took place in tertiary industries such as banking, finance, and related services, which are conducted almost exclusively among the developed nations.²⁵ In fact, over 70 percent of FDI inflows go to developed nations, with only about a quarter of FDI inflows going to developing nations. It should be noted, though, that while the percentages of investment dollars going to developing countries has been falling in recent years,²⁶ FDI inflows to developing countries have increased more than 20 times in absolute terms since 1980.²⁷ However, these inflows are concentrated in a few developing nations. For example, while there has been strong growth in inward investment in Latin America, most of it has gone to either Mexico or Brazil.²⁸ China

and India are other developing countries that have greatly profited from increased investment inflows.²⁹

Consequently, in developed nations and certain developing countries, MNEs are established investors, and thus might be less than receptive to multilateral investment liberalization that would put them on the same footing as other investors who have not had to bear the MNEs' sunken investment costs. While some MNEs have made investments in developing countries, many of them have not done so or have not done so extensively. The sorts of impediments that would make MNEs liberalization-averse are not present where the MNEs are prevalent. For instance, no developed countries were among those that had TRIMs in place requiring notification to the Council for Trade in Goods.³⁰ Further, numerous regional and bilateral agreements amongst these countries, such as found in NAFTA, should provide the protections and favoritism that MNEs supposedly would seek. Finally, the trading system has been stagnant in recent years. The uncertain prospects for future trade negotiations have provided an important stimulus for higher levels of FDI,³¹ as can be seen by the 1,726 bilateral investment treaties negotiated in the period of 1990–1998.³²

Essentially, because countries rely more heavily on non-tariff barriers, and because progress in reducing these barriers is likely to be slow, MNEs now have good reason to rely upon FDI as a key means of continuing the expansion of their businesses. Consequently, it would seem likely that MNEs would want multilateral rules on investment to make the investment environment in developing countries—where they have the least amount of presence and which would likely be a desired location for investment and expansion—more accommodating and attractive. This hypothesis is confirmed by the underlying desires of the OECD Member countries negotiating the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Many felt that, as the OECD countries are largely liberalized in the area of investment, the real payoff of such an agreement would be a significant number of developing countries signing on to the MAI.³³ Given the nature of FDI flows today, though one would expect MNEs to be bullish on regional and bilateral arrangements, one would also expect MNEs to be advocates of multilateral–investment liberalization.

INVESTMENT AS IT WILL PROGRESS AT THE WTO

Although the inclusion of the TRIMs Agreement in the Uruguay Round and Chapter 11 of NAFTA announced that investment emerged as an international trade issue, these agreements have not been the final efforts in the area of investment. Perhaps reflective of the developed countries' displeasure with the Uruguay Round's results in the area of investment, negotiations for a comprehensive investment agreement through the auspices of the OECD, known as the MAI, began in September 1995, shortly after the conclusion of the final Uruguay Round agreement.³⁴ While the MAI talks began with great optimism, they soon floundered. The Member countries of the OECD failed to conclude an agreement by their self-imposed April 1998 deadline. As a result of this failure, the negotiation of an

investment agreement through the WTO has become the avenue of choice.³⁵

As a consequence of the above developments, it is not surprising that investment is still being discussed at the WTO. The establishment of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment was one of the results of the 1996 Ministerial Meeting in Singapore.³⁶ Despite its creation, several Members made clear that formal negotiations in the area of investment should not begin until after the completion of the MAI talks.³⁷ Investment, along with competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation, was introduced at this meeting, and has come to be known as one of “the Singapore Issues.”³⁸ These issues have been put on the agenda by the developed countries,³⁹ principally the EU.⁴⁰ However, a number of developing countries still see significant problems surrounding investment issues and thus feel that advancing beyond the TRIMs Agreement at this point would be premature.⁴¹

There were hopes to launch a new trade round at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial conference. Unfortunately, a lack of consensus meant that the “Millennium Round” did not materialize. Despite this setback, a new round of WTO trade talks was agreed to at the 2001 Ministerial meeting in Doha.⁴² Reflecting the round’s aims of advancing the development of the developing countries, these negotiations have been called “the Doha Development Agenda.”⁴³

Unfortunately, progress in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations has been lackluster. In fact, the entire round of trade talks nearly ended before it began, due to deadlock at the 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Cancun.

Despite the desire of the business community to see a broad investment agenda in this round, the Doha Declaration gave the issue of investment a fairly narrow scope. The Implementation Decision issued with the Doha Declaration focuses on implementation-related issues and concerns, which is a prime objective of the developing countries. As part of the Decision, the Goods Council is to consider positively requests from least-developed countries to extend the seven-year transition period for eliminating measures that are inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement.⁴⁴ Neither was a great deal of progress made on any of the “Singapore Issues.”

The Doha Declaration did not immediately launch negotiations in these issue areas. Rather, negotiations were to take place after a decision to be taken by explicit consensus at the 2003 Ministerial meeting in Cancun on the modalities of negotiations.⁴⁵ In spite of this limitation, the Doha Declaration did spell out some of what investment negotiations would entail. The essential point was making progress toward a “positive list” agreement (similar to the structure found in GATT)—rather than making broad commitments and listing exceptions, as was the approach in NAFTA and the MAI—that is mindful of development and developing

country concerns. This also included coordination with other international organizations, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.⁴⁶

Unfortunately, progress in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations has been lackluster. In fact, the entire round of trade talks nearly ended before it began, due to deadlock at the 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Cancun. The “July 2004 Package” contains a new focus on how the talks will progress and what will be negotiated. This agreement, which sets out what will be part of the results of the Doha Development Agenda, emphasizes issues that are of interest to the developing nations: liberalization in agriculture, technical assistance to developing countries, and special and differential treatment for the developing countries. As for the issue of investment, it will not form part of the work program. Therefore, no work towards negotiations on investment—or any of the other “Singapore issues”—will take place within the auspices of the WTO during the Doha Round.⁴⁷ That being said, as of October 2006, the Doha talks are officially suspended, creating uncertainty whether any further trade liberalization in any area will occur under the auspices of the WTO for the time being.

WHY THE DIFFERENCE?

The second section of the paper demonstrated that MNEs desire a multilateral agreement on investment, or at the very least some advancement of the investment issue, in a new round of WTO trade talks. The section above indicated that investment was included fairly superficially in the Doha Declaration and has subsequently been abandoned altogether in the “July Package.” This divergence between desires and outcomes would seem to reflect a lack of influence on the MNEs’ part, rather than an abundance of it. Overall, a combination of structural, systemic, and perceptual factors has served to diminish the clout of the MNEs at the WTO.

First, the structure of the WTO restricts the influence of MNEs. Explicitly, members seek to expand the scope of the multilateral trading system on a non-discriminatory and reciprocal basis through the auspices of the WTO. According to economic theory, such a goal is in the best interests of all countries. However, in practice, countries tend to have a mercantilist mindset, pressing for their domestic protectionist interests with any and all available bargaining power.⁴⁸ So, even if MNEs vigorously lobby their home and/or host governments to pursue trade policies that are sought by MNEs, it is the states—not the MNEs—that are at the bargaining table and ultimately negotiate the agreements. Unless one can accept that most elected governments in the world are also at the whim of MNEs,⁴⁹ such a structure ensures that the agreements that materialize represent a compromise between the interests of all countries.

Another element of the WTO’s structure that provides evidence against this discrepancy is its consensually-based organization. As of December 11, 2005, the WTO had 149 Members, the vast majority of which are developing countries.⁵⁰ While one might therefore expect the WTO to be skewed in favor of the developing

countries, this has not necessarily been the case. In the past, developing countries had been willing to accept much of what was proposed by the developed countries because many developing countries saw global trade liberalization as a kind of fast track to prosperity.⁵¹ The developing countries' acquiescence has diminished as the anticipated gains have not always materialized; according to some commentators, the Uruguay Round agreements have been "GATTastrophic" for the developing countries.⁵² Consequently, since the 1999 Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, the developing countries have been more forthright in demanding what they see as being in their best interests.⁵³ Rightly or wrongly, many developing nations do not feel that they have reaped the benefits anticipated from FDI, and thus they do not feel that liberalizing investment is in their interests at the present time.⁵⁴

As a consensus-based system allows for even a single member to bring about an end to negotiations, the gulf between the views of developed and developing countries has resulted in a stalemate. Because of apparent differing interests between developed and developing countries, it is unlikely that much progress will be made at the WTO, at least in the near future.⁵⁵ For example, developing countries are only willing to discuss investment liberalization if a narrow definition of investment is applied,⁵⁶ whereas developed countries and business interests seek to give investment a broad definition.

By way of comparison, NAFTA's Chapter 11 has a broad definition of investment, as well as a broad definition of expropriation and a mechanism for investor-state dispute settlement. In addition, the MAI also contained a broad definition of investment, although this was one of the main outstanding issues when the negotiations broke down.⁵⁷ Thus, in negotiation contexts where the developed countries outnumbered the developing countries, definitions of investment more in line with what the MNEs would like to see have been attained. In the WTO, however, such a broad definition seems unattainable given the development make-up of its members. Such an outcome would also appear to reflect a lack of influence on the part of the MNEs at the WTO.

The gulf between what is in the best interests of the developed and the developing countries at the WTO may be more perception than reality.

Despite the developing countries' apprehension to the negotiation of an investment treaty, many commentators feel that such an agreement is in their best interests because of the stabilizing influence FDI has on national economies and because the competitiveness of nations is enhanced by inward FDI flows.⁵⁸ Thus, the gulf between what is in the best interests of the developed and the developing countries at the WTO may be more perception than reality. Nevertheless, a chasm remains, and given the developing countries' recent flexing of their muscle, it is unlikely that this gulf will soon be bridged.

Second, systemic factors have served to further reduce the influence of MNEs

on the bargaining outcome. New actors and considerations have emerged that have fundamentally altered the negotiating environment, causing a drastic impact on the relative influence of each party. The traditional bargaining model for understanding international governance (which includes international institutions such as the WTO) foresaw an interplay between states and MNEs; these were the only actors taken into account. In the investment field, it was perceived that relative power sided with the MNE at the outset until the investment was made. Governments then gained power as local personnel gained technical expertise and managerial capabilities.⁵⁹ The new bargaining model has more actors to consider and new forms of power to sway the balance. This explains why MNEs do not always succeed in securing the regimes they desire.⁶⁰

The new bargaining model takes account of civil society actors and softer forms of power, such as moral suasion. Since MNEs are not a monolithic entity with a single goal-set, a political space exists for other actors to emerge and press their agendas. Civil society now has a considerable influence over the regime-building and bargaining processes on account of their organizational capabilities and their ability to resonate with particular ideological and cultural discourses.⁶¹ So, while MNEs wield “hard power” in the form of their economic clout, civil society tends to exercise “soft power” through morals and norms.⁶² The presence of civil society in the bargaining process means that both MNEs and governments have less control over the bargaining process and that bargaining outcomes are more uncertain. Further, the newfound importance of soft power means that control of economic and material resources is less important in determining the outcome in institutional bargaining.⁶³ Such a shift accounts for the current international system of governance’s untidy and uneven form.⁶⁴

The power of civil society groups is so immense right now that many in the business community feel that civil society has taken sway.

Currently at the WTO, civil society is making its presence known and felt, sometimes so much so that it is causing business to retreat. Many commentators feel that the influence of civil society has been behind the new radicalization of the developing countries in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. According to some, a large part of the blame for the collapse of the talks at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial should be pinned on civil society groups. These groups convinced the developing countries to refuse all compromise with the developed countries and made the developing countries believe that they would get what they wanted if they “shout[ed] loudly and long enough.”⁶⁵

The power of civil society groups is so immense right now that many in the business community feel that civil society has taken sway.⁶⁶ In 1996, the WTO’s General Council clarified the framework for relations with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by adopting a set of guidelines.⁶⁷ Since this clarification,

arrangements have been made to have NGOs attend Ministerial Conferences⁶⁸ and participate in issue-specific symposia;⁶⁹ there is also regular contact between WTO secretariat staff and NGOs. Furthermore, the WTO director-general in 1998 established a number of new initiatives to enhance the dialogue with civil society. Among these initiatives were regular briefings for NGOs by the WTO secretariat, a special NGO section on the WTO website with specific information for civil society, and a monthly dissemination of NGO position papers received by the secretariat to members.⁷⁰ By way of contrast, corporations have no similar formal channels of access to the WTO secretariat.⁷¹ As a result of the above overtures to civil society, business has backed away somewhat from the trade round⁷² and sought to realize its interests through other means.

Since MNEs are not a monolithic entity with a single goal-set, a political space exists for other actors to emerge and press their agendas.

Unfortunately for the business community, it is not only at the WTO that civil society groups are making their presence known. In the context of the MAI, opposition by civil society groups has frequently been cited as a major reason for the collapse of the agreement.⁷³ It should be noted that the business community's waning interest was another strong factor that led to the demise of the MAI talks, as the business community removed its support when it saw that no significant liberalization was to ensue from the agreement.⁷⁴ Even so, the watered-down liberalization found in the MAI, which caused business to back away from the agreement, owes much to the vocal and fierce opposition by civil society groups.

Finally, a number of problems of perception affect the ability of MNEs to influence the negotiating agenda of the WTO. There is the perception that the developed and developing countries have different interests.⁷⁵ At the very least, it is believed that they envision different means of achieving the same end goal. There is also the view that civil society at least has the ear of the developing countries, if not the negotiating agenda of the WTO altogether. It is argued that it is vital to get the developing countries' support, which in turn means getting the support of civil society, in order to start talks on investment.⁷⁶ The same is not said of business, and this has caused some business interests to feel that pursuing their objectives at the WTO is a dead end.⁷⁷

While these perceptions present obstacles to MNEs achieving their aims, perhaps the greatest challenge to overcome is the perception that what the MNEs seek in the investment field is unlikely to be attainable within the context of the WTO. There is a belief that investment bargains, such as have been reached in NAFTA or other bilateral or regional agreements, could not have been reached in the GATT or the WTO because multilateral institutions work best with general rules that apply universally. Some believe this "one size fits all" approach does not work in the investment context, as this area requires more detailed bargains, with special

provisions, in different sectors, to adapt to the unique trade issues that can arise between countries with high levels of bilateral FDI.⁷⁸ Specifically, moving from bilateral to regional, and from regional to multilateral negotiations involves not only quantitative differences (in terms of the number of countries involved), but also qualitative differences (in terms of the nature of the agreements involved).⁷⁹ Consequently, progress toward liberalizing TRIMs is likely to continue at the regional rather than the multilateral level,⁸⁰ since overly ambitious investment negotiating agendas at the international level may have a lesser likelihood of success than more modest and incremental propositions.⁸¹ Even if this perception has caused MNEs to focus on more local agreements rather than multilateral ones, this shift in focus reflects the MNEs' lack of dominance at the WTO; such considerations would never materialize if the MNEs truly ran the show.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to many authors' assertions, MNEs do not run the negotiating agenda of the WTO; structural, systemic, and perceptual factors have all served to diminish the power that MNEs exert on the WTO and its negotiating agenda, particularly when one compares the results obtained at the WTO to those attained through NAFTA or the OECD. Despite the MNEs'—and the rest of the business community's—desire to see multilateral investment negotiations take place at the WTO, opposition from the developing countries and civil society groups has kept this issue off the work program of the Doha Development Agenda. Such an outcome only contributes to the perception that culminating an investment agreement at the multilateral level will be next to impossible. Consequently, countries have sought to achieve their aims through bilateral arrangements, as shown by the explosion of bilateral investment treaties negotiated in the 1990s.

The experiences of NAFTA and the MAI further reflect the MNEs' lack of control at the WTO. NAFTA's investment provisions could serve as a template for the type of investment agreement MNEs would like to see agreed to at the multilateral level. The MAI, negotiated through the OECD, incorporated many elements of NAFTA's Chapter 11. While there was not a successful conclusion to the MAI negotiations, the mere presence of such provisions is indicative of the MNEs' ability to get their desires on the agenda at the OECD. However, the strident opposition to the agreement by civil society groups, and the rejection by some OECD Member countries, which ultimately prevented agreement on the MAI, also reveals how MNEs shrink in influence as the stage gets larger and more disparate actors become involved. The recent difficulty in negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas is another instance of this phenomenon.

In reality, one of the biggest surprises is the paucity of influence that MNEs seem to have at the WTO. As discussed earlier, MNEs vastly dominate the global flow of trade and investment. Through the WTO, members strive to negotiate agreements to gradually liberalize their trading regimes on a reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis. Essentially, members' discussions determine the trading and

investment environment under which businesses operating within their borders will be working. Thus, it would only be logical for those who will be the major operators in these environments to greatly influence such talks. However, that is clearly not the case at the WTO, at least not at the moment. On the other hand, the relative influence of civil society at the WTO presents a public relations opportunity that the WTO should utilize to soften its public image; this openness to civil society participation is a potent counter-argument to those who are antagonistic to the WTO and claim it to be a secretive and non-democratic institution.

Despite their apparent clout, civil society groups still choose to portray themselves as David, to the Goliath of the MNEs. Much like the biblical story, the MNEs tower over civil society economically, but the slingshot of moral persuasion can still fell such giants. Therefore, while money may equal power in some circles, money is clearly not the only—or possibly even the most effective—path to influence at the WTO. Those who purport to spread the gospel of how the WTO operates should heed such observations and should leave their faith to other areas.

NOTES

¹ Allan M. Rugman, "The World Trade Organization and the International Political Economy," in *The World Trade Organization in the New Economy: Trade and Investment Issues in the Millennium Round*, ed. Allan M. Rugman and Gavin Boyd (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001): 19.

² Oliver Morrissey, "Investment and Competition Policy in Developing Countries: Implications of and for the WTO," *Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade Research Paper* no. 00/2 (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 2000): 1.

³ See for example, "Ethics in International Economics: The WTO, NAFTA, the IMF and the World Bank," Markkula Center for Applied Ethics (2001). Available at: www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ie/wtotext.html (Accessed February 9, 2005), and organizations such as Public Citizen <www.citizen.org> with respect to NAFTA. With respect to the OECD, it is often referred to as a "rich nations" club. See, for example, UNICEF 2003, which uses data from OECD countries as the evidence of educational disadvantage in rich nations.

⁴ Trade-related investment, along with services and trade-related intellectual property rights, comprised the so-called new trade areas that were discussed as part of the Uruguay Round. See, for example, *Trade Rules Behind Borders – Essays on Services, Investment and the New Trade Agenda*, ed. Pierre Sauv  (London: Cameron May, 2003), and the description of the book found at: www.jus.uio.no/lm/man/pdf/1874698295.pdf (accessed October 17, 2006). Arguably, trade-related investment issues were the least developed during the Uruguay Round, as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures was the least comprehensive of the agreements concerning these new issues.

⁵ With respect to business' goals on the issue of investment in the Doha Round, see the discussion found in the second section of the paper generally and notes 22 and 23 in particular. With respect to what civil society groups would like to see emerge regarding investment issues, see the Declaration of Non Governmental Groups and Civil Society Movements, "No Investment Negotiations at the WTO" which, as of April 1, 2003 has been signed by over 70 such groups, available on the Public Citizen website: <http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/investment/articles.cfm?ID=9984> (accessed October 22, 2006).

⁶ "TRIMS: Background," *World Trade Organization* (1998). Available at:

www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto05/wto5_3.htm (Accessed February 9, 2005).

⁷ See Kerry A. Chase, "From Protectionism to Regionalism: Multinational Firms and Trade-Related Investment Measures," *Business and Politics (Online Version)* 6, no. 2, (2004) 1-36. Available at: www.bepress.com/bap/vol6/iss2/art1 (Accessed February 18, 2005) and Maria L. Cattai, "Trade Rules after Seattle: A Business Perspective," in *The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance*, ed. G.P. Sampson (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001).

⁸ Chase, "From Protectionism to Regionalism," 1ff.

⁹ See Richard E. Caves, *Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and James R. Markusen, "Multinational Firms, Location and Trade," *The World Economy* 21 no.6 (1998), 733-756. A survey of MNE international economic activity is found in Caves at

chapter 2. Further, Markusen, at pg. 749, suggests that investment liberalization can actually increase the volume of trade.

¹⁰ Eden S.H. Yu and Chi-Chur Chao, "On Investment Measures and Trade," *The World Economy*, 21 no. 4 (1998): 549-561.

¹¹ Oliver Morrissey and Yogesh Rai, "The GATT Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures: Implications for Developing Countries and their Relationship with Transnational Corporations," *The Journal of Development Studies*, 31 no. 5 (1995): 706.

¹² Morrissey and Rai, "The GATT Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures," 704.

¹³ Investment relating to services is covered as part of mode 3 (commercial establishment) in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is for this reason that the GATS has been referred to as "the MAI by any other name" [see, for example, Steven Shrybman, *The World Trade Organization: A Citizen's Guide* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Ltd.), and Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2001):100], despite the fact that the GATS came into force before negotiations on the MAI even began. Due to GATS' architecture, some of its provisions do not apply uniformly to all Members or to all sectors. Thus, the coverage of services investment is somewhat piecemeal. Further, GATS 2000 negotiations are ongoing as part of the Doha Development Agenda. Further liberalization of services, particularly in reference to mode 3, is being encouraged by some members. However, it is unclear at this time what the results of the negotiations will be. For these reasons, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address investment relating to services.

¹⁴ Article 5.1, The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. Available at: <http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/GATT.html> (Accessed July 28, 2006).

¹⁵ Article 7, GATT

¹⁶ Article 8, GATT

¹⁷ Morrissey and Rai, "The GATT Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures," 704.

¹⁸ Chase, "From Protectionism to Regionalism," 1.

¹⁹ Yu and Chao, "On Investment Measures and Trade," 550-551.

²⁰ Caves, *Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis*, 1.

²¹ John B. Davis and Joseph P. Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages in World Commerce," in *The World Trade Organization in the New Economy: Trade and Investment Issues in the Millennium Round*, ed. Allan M. Rugman and Gavin Boyd. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001): 80.

²² Morrissey, "Investment and Competition in Developing Countries," 13.

²³ Cattau, "Trade Rules after Seattle," 260.

²⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1.

²⁵ Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 75-78.

²⁶ Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 75-78.

²⁷ Amit Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" *Economic Review: Occasional Paper 13* (April 2001): 93.

²⁸ Nigel Pain, "Openness, Growth and Development: Trade and Investment Issues for Developing Countries," in *The World Trade Organization in the New Economy: Trade and Investment Issues in the Millennium Round*, ed. Allan M. Rugman and Gavin Boyd (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001): 229.

²⁹ See generally "The tiger in front: a survey of India and China," *The Economist*, March 5, 2005, and particularly "The insidious charms of foreign investment," 7.

³⁰ "TRIMS: Notifications and Transitional Arrangements," *World Trade Organization* (1998). Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto05/wto5_6.htm (Accessed February 8, 2005).

³¹ Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 75-78.

³² Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" 93.

³³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Lessons from the MAI*. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York and Geneva: UN, 1999): 25.

³⁴ "The talking FDI blues," *The Economist*, March 14, 1998, 18.

³⁵ See "The talking FDI blues," 19 and "The sinking of the MAI," *The Economist*, March 14, 1998.

³⁶ Rugman, "The World Trade Organization and the International Political Economy," 5-6.

³⁷ Edward M. Graham, "Trade and Investment at the WTO: Just Do It!" in *Launching New Global Trade Talks: An Action Agenda*, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998): 151.

³⁸ "Understanding the WTO: Cross-Cutting and New Issues – Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler Procedures," *World Trade Organization* (2003). Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm (Accessed February 11, 2005).

³⁹ Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" 82.

⁴⁰ Alexander Böhmer and Guido Glania, *The Doha Development Round: Reintegrating Business Interests into the Agenda*. (Wittenberg, Germany: Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht, Juristische Fakultät der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2003): 19.

- 41 Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" 96.
- 42 "Understanding the WTO – The Doha Agenda," *World Trade Organization*, (2001). Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm (Accessed February 11, 2005).
- 43 "Understanding the WTO – The Doha Agenda."
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 "Text of the 'July Package' – the General Council's Post-Cancun Decision," World Trade Organization (2004). Available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm (Accessed February 11, 2005).
- 48 Rugman, "The World Trade Organization and the International Political Economy," 1.
- 49 "Ethics in International Economics: The WTO, NAFTA, the IMF and the World Bank."
- 50 "Understanding the WTO: The Organization – Members and Observers," *World Trade Organization* (2004). Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (Accessed December 12, 2005). Least Developed Countries are classified according to the countries that have been designated as such by the United Nations. Currently, 32 of the 50 countries designated as least developed are WTO members. Further, a country self-identifies as "developing" or "developed" since there are no WTO definitions for these terms. However, such designations are not automatically accepted in all WTO bodies. For more information on designation, see "Understanding the WTO: The Organization – Least Developed Countries," *World Trade Organization* (2004). Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (Accessed February 12, 2005).
- 51 Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" 83.
- 52 Dasgupta, "WTO and 'New Issues,'" 83.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Morrissey and Rai, "The GATT Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures," 707-708.
- 55 Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 89.
- 56 Böhmer and Glania, *The Doha Development Round*, 22.
- 57 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1.
- 58 Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 87.
- 59 David L. Levy and Aseem Prakash, "Bargains Old and New: Multinational Corporations in Global Governance," *Business and Politics (Online Version)* 5 no. 2 (2003), 146. Available at: www.bepress.com/bap/vol5/iss2/art1 (Accessed February 18, 2005).
- 60 Levy and Prakash, "Bargains Old and New," 140.
- 61 Ibid, 143.
- 62 Ibid, 144-145.
- 63 Ibid, 147.
- 64 Ibid, 143-144.
- 65 "The WTO under fire," *The Economist*, September 20, 2003, 18. See also the post-Cancun analysis by Pierre Sauvé, who notes that the intransigent stance of many developing countries, who received significant advisory assistance from civil society groups advocating generally absolutist positions, as a source of blame for the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial "The WTO After Cancun: Crisis or Teething Problems?" (2004), available at: <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0414e.pdf> (Accessed October 22, 2006).
- 66 Böhmer and Glania, *The Doha Development Round*, 5. The business community's support for the opening of a new round of trade negotiations was somewhat mild in the run-up to the Doha Ministerial in 2001. The inclusion of "trade-related" issues, such as the environment and social standards, led some in the business community to believe that civil society actors were having more influence on the trade agenda than were corporations.
- 67 "The talking FDI blues," *The Economist*, March 14, 1998, 18.
- 68 "647 Non-Governmental Organizations Eligible to Attend the Doha Ministerial," *World Trade Organization*. Press Release, Press/240 (August 13, 2001).
- 69 "Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society," *World Trade Organization* (1998). Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm (Accessed March 30, 2005).
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 MNEs can still wield some influence through this channel, as corporations can form industry-supported NGOs to take advantage of this avenue of consultation. Even so, it is clear that groups that, in general, oppose the aims of the WTO comprise the vast majority of activity in this area, potentially having a larger impact. For example, the WTO posts on its website NGO position papers received by the WTO secretariat (http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/pospap_e.htm). The majority of such papers are critical of international trade. Similarly, NGO participation in Ministerial conferences is highly skewed to those groups that are critical of the WTO and/or international trade (for an example, see the list of NGOs that

participated in the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/list_ngo_hk05_e.pdf). When combined with the fact that numerous civil society groups are providing significant advisory assistance to developing country members (see note 65 and related text), it is clear that civil society actors have a much greater ability to directly influence the direction of the WTO than do similarly-oriented business-minded groups.

⁷² Böhmer and Glania, *The Doha Development Round*, 5-7.

⁷³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1-2.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Davis and Daniels, "Corporations and Structural Linkages In World Commerce," 89.

⁷⁶ Böhmer and Glania, *The Doha Development Round*, 25.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁷⁸ Chase, "From Protectionism to Regionalism," 30-31.

⁷⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 28.

⁸⁰ Chase, "From Protectionalism to Realism," 32.

⁸¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 28.

BOOK REVIEWS

No More Dollars for Dictators

by Michael Palmer

The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Peace and Prosperity. By Halperin, Morton H., Michael M. Weinstein and Joe Siegle. New York: Routledge, 2005. 288 pp. \$27.50, hard bound. ISBN 0-415-95052-X.

“Yet much remains to conquer still: Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war.”

John Milton, To the Lord General Cromwell, 1652.

In *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*, Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegle, and Michael Weinstein explore the theory that democracy trumps dictatorship in improving the economic well-being of societies. The authors define democracy as “those governance systems in which national leaders are selected through free and fair elections, [in which] there are institutions that foster a shared distribution of power and citizens have extensive opportunities to participate in political life.”¹ Using a time-series statistical analysis, the authors refute constructivist ideas that “countries must go through an important structural change in their economic and political systems to even contemplate democracy.”² Democratic institutions, Halperin et al. contend, also enhance security (internal and external) and foster more sufficient economic growth than non-democratic regimes.

The authors first tackle the “50-year-old myth” that countries controlled by dictators are best suited to bring about necessary structural changes in the initial stages of development. Those supporting this view argue that politicians in income-poor democracies will avoid hard, economically necessary choices in order to curry favor with voters. Halperin et al. claim that the economic-development-first argument is fundamentally flawed because autocratic leaders tend to undermine the rule of law and use public office for personal gain. Additionally, the legal system in such countries is frequently decrepit, and judges often decide disputes as directed by

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those in charge. Furthermore, there is no off-the-shelf legal system available to install once a country has reached the magic per capita income to become a democracy. Rather, properly adapted laws, procedures, and institutions must be developed painstakingly over time in conjunction with civil society and economic growth.

In chapter three, “Sustaining New Democracies,” Halperin et al. acknowledge the logical appeal of the economic-development-first argument, but show through meticulous examination that the evidence leads to the opposite conclusion: autocratically ruled countries seldom become either prosperous or democratic. The authors also counter the assertion that incipient democracies are likely to fail because they lack mid-level economies. It is not the case, they say, that “when countries become democratic at low levels of development, their democracy usually dies.”³

In chapter four, “Democracy and Security,” the authors marshal their research in order to show that both internal and external security are enhanced when the international community supports democratic institutionalization in developing countries. They follow with two points of support: “first, autocracy, poverty, and conflict are a package deal. . . . [A]utocracies are more likely than democracies to generate both poverty and conflict... second, U.S. policy decisions to support autocratic governments in the name of stability have, at times, contributed to this vicious circle” of internal and external violence.⁴ They believe the resulting provision of security is, itself, a sufficient reason to promote democracy.

Admitting that there are some economically successful autocracies (e.g., Singapore), the authors discuss how they are different from run-of-the-mill dictatorships. But they also caution against making too much of the East Asian Tigers, noting that autocratic economic wonders experience economic collapse more frequently and with more devastating effects than do democracies.

Chapter eight stresses the need for a change in Western lender policy. Such policy, they assert, should see “democratic governance as the norm and should treat any funding for dictatorships as deviations from that norm.”⁵ But such deviations should be allowed. While some states should be cut off entirely, others, like Jordan, that have made an explicit commitment to democratic development should be assisted in ways that help them achieve greater transparency, greater self-reliance, and better skills in governance.

The assertion made in *The Democracy Advantage* is one which would have profound effects on international security and economic development if heeded by officials in the US, other donor countries, and especially the World Bank and IMF. The sooner donors stop doling out dollars to dictators and begin using them to support freedom and democracy in developing countries, the safer and more economically prosperous the world will be.

Notes

¹ Halperin et al., *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Peace and Prosperity* (New York: Routledge,

2005), 9.

² Sunder Ramaswamy and Jeffrey W. Cason (eds.), *Development and Democracy: New Perspectives on an Old Debate* (Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 2003), 7.

³ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 69.

⁴ Halperin, et al., *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Peace and Prosperity*, 93.

⁵ Halperin, et al., *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Peace and Prosperity*, 238.

Advances in Understanding State Socialization

by Clayton J. Cleveland

Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe. Ed. Flockhart, Trine. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 288 pp. \$79.95, hard bound. ISBN 1-4039-4521-7.

Events surrounding the enlargement of the European Union and Europeanization generally have garnered increasing attention from students of European politics.¹ Trine Flockhart's edited volume, *Socializing Democratic Norms*, represents significant progress on these topics and the role of international organizations in promoting norms and values.² The theoretical framework used to analyze the efforts of International Organizations (IOs) is labeled complex socialization for this volume. This theoretical model provides a sophisticated understanding of how IOs spread their norms and principles.

The book is arranged into three sections. The first section provides an explanation of the theory of complex socialization and the state of the art on the influence of international and transnational influences on democratization. The second section focuses on the various organizations which play a role in the socialization of Europe. These first two sections provided a strong framework to evaluate the target cases evaluated in the third section.

In the first section, Jean Grugel examines the literature surrounding democratization.³ From her perspective, the literature on international factors within the processes of democratization was very scarce until the 1990s. In this Clayton J. Cleveland holds an MA in Diplomacy and International Relations and is currently a doctoral student in political science at the University of Oregon.

literature, there has been strong emphasis on structure rather than agency when international factors are examined.⁴ The solution Grugel offers is to adopt a transnational perspective incorporating both structure and agency into this process. Complex socialization represents this solution as it examines the process of how agents attempt to modify the structure of domestic political behavior.

In the next chapter, Flockhart outlines the volume's framework as the model of complex socialization that produces a variety of analytic tools that can be applied across different cases.⁵ This framework provides order to the various micro-level explanatory theories which have been previously available. Using a theory of socialization, the efforts of European international organization examined in this volume are based on "in-group/out-group" dynamics. The "in-group" in this case constitutes Western European countries, based on Karl Deutsch's conception of liberal democratic security communities.⁶ The "out-group" is further subdivided into four different groups with different orientations towards the "in-group."

In the next chapter, two factors are stressed by Frank Schimmelfennig: the governmental level political elites and the general masses of the public.⁷ This division compliments the theory of complex socialization by demonstrating how the "in-group" European organizations can influence the different forms of "out-groups" in the target countries. Schimmelfennig stresses the cost benefit analysis used by elites as they consider the implementation of measures which conform to international norms. Schimmelfennig specifies the antecedent conditions wherein, if present (*ceteris paribus*), domestic conditions determine the outcome. This is suggestive that there may be conditions where international factors determine the outcome of the socialization process.

The chapters dealing with target societies examine different cases representing the various societal groups vis-à-vis the socializing agents. These groups include two countries which have joined the EU in the most recent round of the enlargement, the Czech and Slovak Republics; a candidate country, Turkey; and two countries from further east, Russia and Belarus. In addition to the case studies of target countries, this volume examines the ways in which different organizations address the activity of socialization between societies in Europe. The different roles of the UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO are highlighted in comparison with each other.

This volume succeeds in laying out a framework for viewing the socialization of societies in Europe. Though often complex, leading to mixed portrayals of the empirical evidence within the case study chapters complex socialization represents advancement in the study of the mechanisms of how international organizations can influence domestic societies. In fact the largest disappointment is that there are not more cases examined including some of the more successful countries which have acceded to the European Union.

Notes

¹ Notable attempts include Geoffrey Pridham, *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research," *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 4 (2002), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), Milada Anna Vachudová, *Europe undivided: democracy, leverage, and integration after communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Previous attempts, although admittedly less systematic than might be hoped for, are very informative. See Ronald H. Linden, ed., *Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

² On the role of international organizations promoting democracy, see Jon C. Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also the special issue "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe," *International Organization*, Fall 2005, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel.

³ Jean Grugel, "The 'International' in Democratization: Norms and the Middle Ground," in *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, ed. Trine Flockhart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).

⁵ Trine Flockhart, "Complex Socialization and the Transfer of Democratic Norms," in *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, ed. Trine Flockhart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁶ Karl W. Deutsch et. al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁷ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The EU: Promoting Liberal-Democracy through Membership Conditionality," in *Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, ed. Trine Flockhart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Is the Welfare State Doomed to Extinction?

by Heather Ramsey

The Decline of the Welfare State: Demography and Globalization. By Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, in cooperation with Chang Woon Nam. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005. 133pp. \$28, hard bound. ISBN 0-262-18244-0.

In this brief, but rigorous volume, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka use a political economy approach to examine the future of the welfare state in the context of

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globalization, increased migration, and aging populations. The two part, eight chapter tome manages to build on itself chapter-by-chapter to draw simple (and, according to the authors, inevitable) conclusions about the outlook for welfare states. Part of the CESifo series, a division of MIT press, the book aims to contribute to economic policy debates through overviews of current economic issues. Though the authors draw largely on the European experience for their examples, the statistical models used to predict the future of welfare state programs may certainly be applied elsewhere. Following an overview, the authors analyze in detail the effects of aging; migration and wage issues; the need for a balanced budget; the type of predominant tax (capital vs. labor); and international tax competition.

The first international trend with a potential impact on the existence and fortitude of the welfare state is migration, which has been increasingly facilitated by the globalization process. The authors theorize that welfare states attract low-skill migrants, as opposed to the traditionally welcomed high-skill ones. This influx increases pressure on the welfare state. Since it is assumed that these migrants possess little, if any, capital, they pressure the state to pay for welfare structures through capital, rather than labor, taxation. This pressure, however, is returned by the aging and native-born populations, who may not tacitly accept the burden of assisting the low-skill migrants. The concept that welfare may decline despite increased need is important in that it directly contrasts much of popular opinion, which tends to state that more people needing state assistance means more state assistance. An issue not addressed, however, is how the downsizing of welfare states will affect migration trends, and how these trends will then affect the evolution of the welfare state.

The authors then tackle the growing importance of aging populations. These groups increase pressure on pay-as-you-go systems, causing the younger population to encourage a switch to individual accounts. The young, seeking to avoid receiving smaller proportions of benefits in their own old age, thus anger the current elderly who benefit from the pay-as-you-go system. The effects of an aging population depend, however, on the type of taxation supporting the welfare system: a reliance on labor taxes will result in a downscale of the system, while a reliance on capital taxes will result in an upscale. Generally speaking, older people are less than a majority, but are holders of capital; therefore young people will prevail in a vote to tax capital rather than labor. Whether this wealth structure will always be present to support such voting patterns is unclear.

The authors then segue into a discussion of the current issues surrounding international tax competition brought on by globalization. Simply put, as capital is free to move across the globe, countries may compete for it through their capital tax rates. Though a country may wish to use capital taxes to finance its welfare state, it will likely face the threat of this capital being lured elsewhere through lower tax rates, and, consequently, a loss of capital and tax income. Because of this, the authors assert that, “a welfare state that relies on capital taxes is akin to a house built on sand.”¹ This fact, in conjunction with the pressure to base the welfare state on capital

taxes, leads inevitably to the downsizing of the welfare state.

This conclusion certainly has important ramifications, not just for the European countries examined, but for welfare states worldwide. Though the book does provide an interesting overview of the problems faced by welfare states in the era of globalization, this overview abounds with complex statistical models that, though critical for practicing economists and statisticians, do not help promote the message of the book as well as concrete examples would. Nonetheless, the authors open the door for further research. An interesting question that immediately arises from this book's conclusion, for example, is how states can effectively react to the inevitable need for change in order to bring about the least painful adjustment process possible. This is a timely subject that will have a direct impact on the millions, if not billions, of citizens in welfare states worldwide.

Notes

¹ Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, *The Decline of the Welfare State: Demography and Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 104.

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